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
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# THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF U.S. MILITARY FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

R.D. McLaurin  
with  
Suhaila Haddad

of  ABBOTT ASSOCIATES, INC.

July 1977



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THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF  
U.S. MILITARY FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT

R. D. McLaurin  
with the assistance of  
Suhaila Haddad



ABBOTT ASSOCIATES, INC.

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All the newspapers surveyed depended heavily on Western sources-- particularly AP, UPI, AFP, and Reuters--for their news. Even on issues such as the global balance, Western news is the dominant source.

The primary subject of the newspapers is military assistance and arms transfers in and to the Middle East. This area accounts for over one third of the total coverage of force events.

American and Soviet weapons are both highly regarded. Soviet weapons are viewed more favorably than overall Soviet technology. In general, U.S. high technology is greatly respected, as is advanced American military technology. Soviet air defense and ATGMs received particularly favorable treatment.

American "commitment" to Israel is seen to be in terms of Israel's existence only, not support of any particular Israeli policy. The United States is also viewed to owe its regional "friends" something, as well. These are seen to include most prominently Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sadat's Egypt, and, in a different sense, Lebanon.

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## THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF U.S. MILITARY FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

### Executive Summary

A content analysis of key Arabic-language newspapers assessed

- Arab perceptions of U.S. military presence, capabilities (absolute and relative), actions, and intentions
- Societal factors influencing perception and response to such military stimuli
- regional and sub-regional response patterns engendered by these perceptions.

This study used rigorous content analysis to assess the perceptual impact of events relating to broadly defined U.S. force. The content analysis was applied to four Arabic newspapers with different points of view. From the systematic analysis of media content emerged an empirically grounded assessment of the impact of force events.

Although the major focus of this research was to develop, test, refine, and implement a systematic content analysis of selected Arabic language media in order to evaluate the impact of force events, a framework model, within which the empirical content data can be used, was also developed.

### FINDINGS

Arab media seem to see the United States and the Soviet Union in a situation of mutual deterrence. Neither superpower is believed to have a decisive margin in the global strategic balance. However, given this orientation, Arab commentators and media do not pay careful attention to the superpower military balance. They are relatively inattentive to and vague about strategic arms control and strategic weapons development. Small deployment changes do not generally attract the attention of Arab newspapers even when associated with a crisis or singled out by others (foreign news media, press spokesmen, etc.) for special consideration. Only about 18 percent of all coverage was original

and since only *Al Ahram* among the newspapers monitored has its own military affairs editor, it is hardly surprising that global military events with little immediate meaning specific to the Middle East are overlooked.

In discussions with Arab intellectuals, the reasons for inattentiveness to the strategic balance emerged:

- The superpowers are in a situation of mutual deterrence that renders careful monitoring of the strategic balance unnecessary for and irrelevant to the Middle East.
- The on-line, advanced strategic weapons and delivery systems are too sophisticated for developing countries to accurately assess comparative effectiveness.
- Technological developments--including breakthroughs and superpower negotiations as in SALT--are too technical or closely guarded to be monitored systematically, understood completely, or weighed accurately in developing countries.
- Net military balance assessment techniques coming into vogue are too new and unfamiliar to be absorbed even by experts in countries where such techniques are generally not appropriate to the immediate environment.

All the newspapers surveyed depended heavily on Western sources--particularly AP, UPI, AFP, and Reuters--for their news. Even on issues such as the global balance, Western "news" is the source for most articles. Few articles originated outside the West--even on Soviet military developments.

For articles on the strategic balance, the reader is virtually forced to depend upon *Al Ahram*, the only newspaper to give the subject any substantial coverage. (81 percent of all observations on the strategic balance appeared in *Al Ahram*.) We assume this reflects Egypt's comparatively significant international role by contrast with other Arab states.

The newspapers and interviews conducted suggest that although there is a strong reluctance to deal with the U.S.-Soviet balance, the following views are widely held.



- Soviet manpower and other resource allocations give the U.S.S.R. a quantitative "edge" in most areas of the strategic balance.
- The United States is perceived to have a distinct overall qualitative edge in military technology. The logic runs as follows: America has a superior technology base, especially in high technology, and therefore is able to produce more technologically advanced weapons systems, especially in high technology areas.
- The Soviet Union, however, is viewed as leading in some dimensions (e.g., SAMs).
- The Soviet soldier is considered to be brave and a "good fighter," but less flexible and innovative than the American soldier whose educational and skills level is widely believed to be higher.

Yet, if Arab newspapers pay little attention to the global superpower strategic balance, they pay far less to most aspects of the regional military forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. What the newspapers do watch carefully is military assistance and arms transfers in and to the Middle East. Over one-third of the total "force" coverage during the periods the newspapers were monitored was occupied by articles on this subject. No other subjects individually attracted substantial (ten percent or more articles or space) attention.

When subjects were analyzed in terms of the space allocated per article rather than frequency, complex or topical subjects ranked first--technology and weapons development, military missions, and military operations. This hierarchy could suggest either that the subjects' complexities required longer articles or that the subjects were perceived to be important by newspaper editors. Articles on space technology--in which references to military applications of space technology appeared at times--tended to be particularly long.

American and Soviet weapons are both highly regarded, if the newspapers are any guide. In general, Soviet weapons are lauded more than overall Soviet technology. American weapons systems received both



favorable and critical comparisons to Soviet equipment. Favorable treatment attended especially high technology systems, but Soviet ATGM and air defense systems were preferred. American high technology amenable to military application received an extraordinarily high proportion of favorable treatment.

Visits were rather non-controversial. They elicited some favorable coverage and little critical coverage. Political visits were treated as far more significant than military visits which were in turn viewed as more important than naval visits.

Military assistance and sales, the largest single topic in both number of articles and space, is, of course, a subject of vital interest to the countries of the Middle East. Well over half the articles (56 percent) concerned U.S. arms transfers to Israel, and other measures of intensity similarly indicated a primary concern with military materiel sent to the Jewish state. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria were the Arab recipients receiving most of the press attention.

With respect to arms transfers, the media understand and follow the different stages of decisionmaking in the executive and legislative branches, but for the most part pay greater attention to decisions than deliveries.

The air war dominates elite attention in the Middle East, and air defense systems have come to play their rightful role in this concept. Thus, arms transfers dealing with aircraft and air defense systems capture the greatest press coverage.

The United States and the Soviet Union--in large part through their supply of arms to the parties--are seen by the press to control the pace, tenor, and course of war in the Middle East.

In general, newspapers displayed an unwillingness or inability to forecast in the subject area of U.S. military force. We found a rather surprisingly sound understanding of U.S. federal decisionmaking processes, and very little understanding of organizational (i.e., inter-branch and intra-departmental) politics. Newspapers carried straight news for the most part and did relatively little editorializing on most military subjects. Indeed, more editorial commentary might help the readers place news in better perspective.

The four newspapers monitored carried little anti-American rhetoric. The few editorials suggest a dominant view that the United States is committed to only one state in the Middle East--Israel--and that this commitment is to Israel's existence. That the United States "owes" its Arab clients in the Middle East some support is, however, also believed. United States clients or "friends" are seen to include most prominently Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sadat's Egypt, and, in a different sense, Lebanon.

Arab newspapers displayed a reasonably sophisticated understanding of the relationship between threat, action, and credibility. Criticism of the United States for the Mayaguez operation, for example, was mild, and was accompanied by several comments that demonstrated an understanding of the necessity for the United States to reassert itself, to regain its credibility, following the debacle in Vietnam.

In terms of superpower readiness to use force, Washington is viewed as historically being more willing to "go to the brink," both globally and regionally (that is, in the Middle East). However, increasing note is taken of the impact of three phenomena on U.S. actions and intentions--"detente," growing Soviet regional and global military capabilities, and domestic U.S. attitudes toward the use of American force and forces abroad.

#### OTHER INDICATIONS

Arab views on the strategic balance are affected by statements and articles prepared as a function of the U.S. budgetary process. Thus, at least some of the perceived quantitative edge given the U.S.S.R. results from the politics of the U.S. Defense budget for which Arabs became an unintended audience.

In the Middle East, the Arab press and Arab analysts seem to have feared the imposition of a U.S.-Soviet agreement as much as the Israelis. The reasons, presumably, were the inability to appeal if the accord was firm and the widespread feeling that *faits accomplis* brought about by external powers have not generally been favorable to the Arabs.

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## PREFACE

This study is a product of the efforts of a number of individuals and groups. The original concept was developed by Dr. Paul A. Jureidini of Abbott Associates, Inc. and Mr. Gerald Sullivan of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. After modifications in the content by Dr. Jureidini and the author of this report, The American Institutes for Research formally proposed the research for sponsorship to DARPA.

Throughout the conduct of the research, many persons--only some of whom can be acknowledged here--have assisted the research team. Dr. Jureidini acted as co-project director for the early phases of the work. In the pilot phase, Mr. Jon Cozean and Mr. Phillip P. Katz modified existing PAMIS programs to handle the data for this work. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-3, permitted the use of its computer facilities for which we are grateful. In particular, we would like to express our appreciation in that regard to Captain J. C. Humber, USN, and Colonel James Dandridge, AUS.

Following the pilot phase, a new coding and data analysis schema was developed by Dr. McLaurin, Ms. Suhaila Haddad, and Dr. Edward E. Azar (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill). Coding of the content analysis data was accomplished by Ms. Haddad, principally, and by Messrs. Alaeddin S. Hreib and Khalil Haddad, all of whom also prepared article abstracts. Data processing and analysis were carried out by personnel of the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, under the supervision of Dr. Azar.

Our gratitude for help in the development of one or more aspects of methodology is due Dr. Azar, Dr. Charles H. Wagner, and Dr. Arnold E. Dahlke. We have also benefitted from the assistance of Dr. Charles Murray of the American Institutes for Research, who coordinated liaison between AIR and Abbott Associates, and Dr. Preston S. Abbott of Abbott Associates. The decision factor analysis was aided by contributions of a number of individuals, including Dr. Mohammed Mughisuddin, Dr. William E. Hazen, and Ms. Suhaila Haddad, all of Abbott Associates; Dr. Azar;

Dr. Wagner; Dr. Emile A. Nakhleh, Mount St. Mary's College; Dr. Lewis snider, Claremont Graduate School; and Dr. Elias Sam'o, Central Michigan University. Ms. Cathie Love worked with totally illegible scrawl and turned all of it into finished, edited, and typed copy. They deserve at least as much sympathy as gratitude.

In spite of an immense debt of gratitude to many others, the author, of course, bears full responsibility for errors and shortcomings of substance or methodology.

## CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

### BACKGROUND

Ultimately, all military forces exist to serve political ends. This is a truism of political scientists, politicians, and many military leaders, but its understanding is central to this study. Some military forces are primarily intended to have a domestic role, others an international one; some are heavily oriented toward deterrence, others toward attack; some are supposed to be ideologically pure, others purely professional; some perform major non-military functions in civic action, disaster relief, and the like; others guard their solely military mission with almost religious fervor. In all cases, however, to the extent these forces are military--i.e., organized and legally constituted and authorized appliers of sanctions (legal force)--their mission, both psychologically and physically is political. That their weapons may not be used underscores the essentially political nature of the objectives. Resource allocation for any of the foregoing activities is premised upon and aims at preserving the nation--and usually the institutions making the allocation (the regime).

In spite of the fact that military forces serve political ends--indeed, in spite of the fact that this has long been recognized--our understanding of the political impact of military force is extremely vague. Until very recently, the number of treatises on the subject have been largely confined to general explanations of process by which force "affects" people<sup>1</sup> and to the construction of typologies of use or impact.<sup>2</sup>

Studies such as those we have seen in the past have been useful in electing us to the existence and general parameters of the relation-

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<sup>1</sup>Many peace research studies address this aspect of the use of force. Psychologists write on people's reactions to specific force events. The strategy by which one seeks to influence is examined in detail in R. D. McLaurin, *et al.*, editors, *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations* (2 volumes, Washington, D.C." U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976).

<sup>2</sup>See, e.g., Edward N. Luttwak, *The Political Uses of Sea Power* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).

ship between military force and audience perception. Systematic or conceptually innovative typological discussions have a traditionally important place in scientific research, for they allow us to develop hypotheses. It is, however, easy to become impatient with the progress of normative theory-building. Impatience unfortunately paves a quick but weak path to prescription without the empirical support to refine theory, validate concepts, and construct solid paradigms.

In his FY 75 posture statement to Congress,<sup>3</sup> Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger indicated the need for a greater appreciation of the political use of military forces. This research is premised upon the idea that an operational appreciation of "political use" requires a thorough understanding of "impact." How do foreign elites perceive and react to military stimuli?

In this stimulus-response equation, the stimuli may be forces in being, perceptions of the static strategic balance, changes in the relative effectiveness or sophistication of various weapons systems, dispatch of training teams, establishment or enlargement of military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs), arms transfers, negotiation of security agreements, troop (fleet or force) movements, maneuvers, mobilizations, or alerts. The environmental factors influencing perception and response include past U.S. actions, policies, and interactions; the nature of communication of the stimulus; decisionmaking patterns and bureaucratization; societal fractionation (minority groups, political schisms, regional separatists movements, class conflict); cultural and individual variables; and other political, economic, social, and infrastructural considerations that may be significant in societal dynamics.

Greater understanding of the impact of American military force would enable the United States Government to respond more appropriately to crises in specific areas. The ability to foresee the probable reactions to a range of U.S. options would facilitate selection of the

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<sup>3</sup>See James R. Schlesinger, *Report of the Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 and FY 1975-1979 Defense Program* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974).



option most likely to occasion the desired response, thereby improving the likelihood of achieving specified objectives.

Similarly, while a more complete grasp of the effects of military force would not overcome problems of the "unintended audience," at least such an understanding would permit an assessment of the impact of available options on these unintended audiences. For example, the United States may deploy new weapons systems or additional forces to the Sixth Fleet in order to respond to or preclude some Soviet action in Europe. However, the impact of the American action may extend to Western Europe, the Middle East, and North Korea, though the political requirements in none of these areas were considered (or could be forecast) by U.S. decisionmakers. An understanding of probable perceptions and reactions would facilitate a more accurate assessment of the costs and benefits of each U.S. option and would enable the government to undertake steps to mitigate undesirable effects on unintended audiences.

Yet another important result of understanding foreign perceptions and responses to U.S. military force is the greater sensitivity to incremental costs and benefits allowing for more efficient allocation of resources. For example, even if the results of deployment of a certain number of additional U.S. Marines to the Sixth Fleet were known and deemed desirable, should two battalions be deployed or merely one? If one should suffice, why incur the additional cost of deploying the second battalion? At present, systems analytic procedures can assist in such a decision process, but only on the cost side. Benefits cannot be determined without better data on response expectations.

Similarly, the stationing of strategic forces in a given area may lead to a regional arms race that may in turn give rise to strong pressures for the transfer of U.S. arms. In view of the political, economic, and military complexities attaching to arms transfers in the 1970s, such a result could be very costly. At the same time, stationing the forces at a second location may be more financially draining in the short term, but far more cost effective along all three dimensions (political, economic, and military). In order to gauge such a situation, it is necessary to understand the regional perceptions of and consequent potential reactions to these types of force events.



Finally, and generally, the process of politics is the process of influence. A clearer understanding of stimulus-response patterns is fundamental to increasing our ability to influence foreign elites. What events concerning military force have a foreign impact and to what degree?

If it is true--as we suggest--that perception-response patterns are influenced by societal forces and regional considerations, as well as cultural and other collective variables, substantial weight is conferred upon the idea of studying stimulus-response trends at aggregations below the global level and above the individual level. While we would not argue against the usefulness of considering global patterns and individual factors, we do feel that national-regional desiderata are central to governments' responses to foreign stimuli. Thus, this research focuses on the Middle East region and its reactions to the presence, use, and dynamics of U.S. military force.

#### OBJECTIVES

This research was undertaken in order to test the utility of, and apply, media analysis in terms of the description and assessment of (1) Middle Eastern perceptions of U.S. military presence, capabilities (absolute and relative), actions, and intentions; (2) the societal factors influencing perception and response to such military stimuli; and (3) the regional and sub-regional response patterns to military stimuli engendered by these perceptions. A second objective of the research has been to evaluate the usefulness of the results as a tool for description, analysis, and policy support.

Throughout the research period, from conception through design and collection and analysis phases, the objective in mind has been the development of an approach sufficiently simple and concrete that it could, once applied, be easily employed by Defense analysts having little or no connection with and no knowledge of the research on which the system is based. Thus, the desired end result of the research reported here is a set of findings and simple procedures directly helpful in analysts' predicting responses to Defense options.

#### ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

This report is presented in five chapters. The present section describes the background and objectives of the research and the organization of the report. Chapter 2 discusses the relationship of the present research to other past and current work for introducing the methodology of the various sections of the report. The third chapter describes the data used in the content analysis phase, and presents the detailed analysis of those data. Chapter 4, in turn, addresses the decision factor clusters and procedures that would facilitate the use of these data in policy formation. The final chapter presents an overview of the substantive conclusions and findings. The bibliography provides a list of articles, books, and studies relevant to this research.

## CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY

### INTRODUCTION

Previous research into the relationship between perceptions and responses in international relations has been very limited. By far the most well known program was carried out at Stanford University and is, therefore, sometimes referred to as "The Stanford Studies."<sup>1</sup> These involved the use of archival material on the outbreak of World War I. Unfortunately, it would be dangerous to assume that conclusions generated from the study of relatively developed countries in what was then the center of world power at the outset of the twentieth century apply directly to much less developed countries somewhat distant from the superpowers in the last quarter of the century. That cultural differences as well may play a central role in elite perception of and response to foreign events further reduces the appropriateness of the 1914 European model.<sup>2</sup>

Other research into international perception and response has been less programmatic than the Stanford Studies. A substantial part of it has been directed at cognitive process and information processing behavior. Although directly relevant, the research has limited applica-

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<sup>1</sup>The Stanford studies have been listed in the Bibliography. This research program led to a number of very important and highly regarded publications whose principal authors were Richard A. Brody, Robert C. North, Ole R. Holsti, and Dina J. Zinnes.

<sup>2</sup>The role of culture in policy has never been systematically studied. Although the present study makes some important assumptions about culture's impact in perception and response (particularly in the decision factor section) and has tried to accommodate the potential role of culture through the use of textual materials in Arabic rather than in translation (such as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service), further study on this subject is clearly needed. See Mohammed Mughisuddin, *The Impact of Culture on State Behavior: A Study of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia* (Alexandria, VA: Abbott Associates, Inc., 1977).

bility for model-building in terms of the political impact of military force.<sup>3</sup>

The recent interest in cognitive processes' relationship to decisionmaking and in cognitive mapping has led to a series of studies that may be considered quasi-programmatic.<sup>4</sup> This work uses two forms of data--documentation and expert judges.<sup>5</sup> Although we feel the cognitive mapping of decision and decision-related elites is very close to the kind of result our own research seeks to achieve, once again the sources of data for cognitive maps are elusive in political analysis of contemporary situations. The documentation is simply not available. Other forms of data are gathered through overly obtrusive methods.<sup>6</sup> Although cognitive mapping theorists have so far focused on crises, there is no reason cognitive mapping must be limited to crisis assessment.

A second research area is also relevant--the crisis research that has been conducted by a number of scholars over the last decade. Although this work bears a direct conceptual link to the Stanford Studies and to our own subject, the output of crisis research has so

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<sup>3</sup> See Michael J. Shapiro and G. Matthew Bonham, "Cognitive Process and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," *International Studies Quarterly*, XVII, No. 2 (June 1973), pp. 147-174; R. Axelrod, "Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition," *The American Political Science Review*, LXVII, No. 4 (December 1973), pp. 1248-1266; G. M. Bonham and Michael J. Shapiro, "Simulating Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Application to the Middle East," *The Simulation of Inter-Societal Relations*, ed. Joseph Ben-Dak (New York: Gordon & Breach, ); J. D. Steinbruner, *Decisions Under Complexity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

<sup>4</sup> See Robert Axelrod, ed., *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 5-8.

<sup>6</sup> Specifically, some of the best work on recent political events has been accomplished through interviewing. However, in order for this inherently obtrusive method to be acceptable, fortuitous circumstances have come into play. Cf., e.g., G. Matthew Bonham, Thomas L. Trumble, and Michael J. Shapiro, "The October War: Congealed Beliefs and Historical Analogizing," paper presented to the 1976 annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, February 1976; and G. Matthew Bonham and Michael J. Shapiro, "Explanation of the Unexpected: The Syrian Intervention in Jordan in 1970," *Structure of Decision*, edited by Axelrod, Chapter 6.



far been of very limited use for present purposes. Predictably, crisis research has been plagued by phenomenological approaches and unsystematic conclusions. A recent crisis research study undertaken to evaluate three of the leading models of and their applicability to the Middle East arrived at conclusions that varied between the obvious and the dubious.<sup>7</sup>

Methodologies employed in these studies have varied widely. Perhaps because the link between perception and response presupposes an understanding of the former, a number of studies have relied upon methods such as content analysis. Once again, the Stanford Studies are the primary example. It should not, however, be assumed that content analysis has monopolized the field. Events data researchers have advocated the use of "behavior" as the best, ultimately incontrovertible evidence of perceptions, i.e., responses as perceptions. Many others have used traditional, historical methods to look at specific cases, generalizing from one or more cases.

A final group of studies should be considered--the very diverse group that focus on "perceptions" as its key concept, that seek to identify, describe, or analyze foreign perceptions or methods for assessing them. These include work by Jervis,<sup>8</sup> Luttwak,<sup>9</sup> Blechman and

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<sup>7</sup> See James M. McCormick, "Evaluating Models of Crisis Behavior: Some Evidence from the Middle East," *International Studies Quarterly*, XIX, No. 1 (March 1975), pp. 17-45.

<sup>8</sup> Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) and, especially, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), a brilliant analysis of the nature and impact of perceptions in the dynamics of international exchanges.

<sup>9</sup> Edward Luttwak, *The Missing Dimension of U.S. Defense Policy: Force, Perceptions and Power* (Arlington, VA: U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1976).



Kaplan,<sup>10</sup> Goldhamer,<sup>11</sup> Leites,<sup>12</sup> and several others.<sup>13</sup> For the most part, these "perceptions" studies are not principally intended to blaze new methodological trails so much as they are to elucidate certain principles and trends. Indeed some<sup>14</sup> are very loose on method, while others are much more structured. Most feature a marriage of normative and empirical research approaches. Some of these studies feature the use of content analysis in more or less rigorous application and are thereby related to the present work. The application is in general neither as broad nor as systematic as the approach we have used in the content analysis, but the results sought demanded less as well.

From the outset it must be clear that there is no way to validate (or invalidate) conclusions concerning the perceptions of one or more individuals comprising or dominating a foreign elite. The methods described above as well as those we have used can only assert--frequently, however, with compelling evidence--that resulting findings accurately portray or represent foreign perceptions.

#### RESEARCH PROCEDURES

The procedures used in this research comprise a number of discrete tasks. The major steps are described below under "Method." The first consideration, however, was to define the scope of the research.

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<sup>10</sup>Barry M. Blechman and Stephen A. Kaplan, *The Use of the Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1977).

<sup>11</sup>Herbert Goldhamer, *The Economist's Perception of the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Balance, 1948-1973*. (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1975).

<sup>12</sup>Nathan Leites, *Calculations about Theater Nuclear Weapons: East and West Compared* (U) SECRET. (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1976).

<sup>13</sup>For example, Warren P. Hottle, et al., *Impact of the Middle East War of 1967 on European Perceptions of U.S. and Soviet Power* (Vienna, VA: The BDM Corporation, 1976).

<sup>14</sup>Robert W. Herrick, *The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Maritime Balance*, Draft Final Report (Arlington, VA: Ketron, Inc., 1975).

### Definition of Scope

In analyzing political impact of military force in the Middle East, much of the scope was self-defined. Using a modification of Lasswell's communication paradigm,<sup>15</sup> we are studying

WHO -- Arab elites

SAYS WHAT -- reaction to U.S. military events in Middle East

ABOUT WHOM -- United States

IN WHAT CHANNEL -- Arab newspapers.

In essence, the answer to this question-paradigm is part of the "effect" aspect of Lasswell's original query.

The area was, then, the Middle East. Actions in, or reported as affecting, the area from Morocco on the west to Iran on the east and from Turkey on the north to Oman on the south, were considered. At the same time, the objective was to understand, and improve forecasting ability with respect to, the impact of U.S. military force on Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Thus, the focus of research data collection was distinctly different from the focal point of analytical output.

The period of time over which data were to be collected was established at ten years. The rationale for selection of this period was to allow for a time long enough to observe substantial regional change. We were constrained by the limited U.S. role prior to World War II. The decade period finally was determined on the basis of (1) data availability and, principally, (2) the desire not to cover too many wholly different subsystemic patterns. Resources were inadequate to collect data systematically across one or more newspapers for all or even most of the ten years. Therefore, specific time periods within the decade 1965-1975 were selected. These are discussed below under "Selection of Historical Cases."

Finally, the subject of the research was military force events. Thus, an initial effort was made to create a typology of force stimuli for the purpose of more fully understanding project scope and in order

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<sup>15</sup>"Who Says What, In Which Channel, To Whom, With What Effect?"  
H. D. Lasswell, "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society,"  
*The Communication of Ideas*, edited by L. Bryson (New York: Harper & Row,  
1948), p. 37.

to sketch a preliminary mission of the content analysis codebook. This typology was later refined and appears below under "Definition of Terms."

#### Operational Procedures

As a first step, key terms were defined. Conceptual and operational definitions were required (1) to identify the specific elites that were the focus of the study, and (2) to determine the types of military force stimuli to be considered. Second, a set of hypotheses was developed to apply to the data resulting from content analysis and unobtrusive measures. Third, historical cases were selected--events over the last ten years across a variety of behaviors relevant to the study of stimulus-response issues.

Two separate activities followed. For the content analysis of regional media, four newspapers were selected--three representing particular points of view, one chosen because of its reputation as the leading independent newspaper in the Arab world. A computerized content analysis system was designed. The thesaurus and coding procedures were developed, and abstracters selected and trained on the system. For current and historical periods newspaper data were content analyzed, keypunched, and stored for later retrieval and analysis. Newspaper data were retrieved, and the hypotheses developed previously were tested on these data.

In order to investigate the potential contribution of unobtrusive measures, the countries identified earlier were disaggregated and grouped by decision factors. Historical and current cases of the political impact of U.S. military force in the Middle East were tested against the hypotheses developed in a previous phase.

From the results of both approaches some tentative conclusions have been drawn relative to (1) the impact of certain types of military force; (2) Arab perceptions of U.S. military power and U.S. behavior in terms of the local military balance, the local superpower military balance, and the global superpower military balance; and (3) likely Arab reaction patterns to U.S. military behavior in the future. Gross reaction models were developed for country-groups. These steps are described in greater detail below.

### Definition of Terms

#### Elites

A number of key terms must be conceptually and operationally defined. One of the most important is the term, "elites." While many definitions of elites have been employed,<sup>16</sup> most share the idea that elite members hold positions of power in society.<sup>17</sup> For the present purposes, we did not wish to restrict "elites" to the national leadership, political or military decisionmakers, or even to the ruling classes or groups. *Elites* for the purposes of this study constitute any group whose attitudes, beliefs, or real or potential actions significantly influence national perceptions or decisions. In practice, this usually means that elites influence the weight decisionmakers place on general or specific military force stimuli (facts, events, trends, or developments).

"Political impact" is the measure of military force in this study. What is political impact? For present purposes, *political impact* is the response--in terms of policies, decisions, expressed perceptions or other actions--of relevant elites to U.S. military force stimuli and expressed in the fields of national security, armed forces, or domestic or international power alignments.

#### Military Force

*Military force*, insofar as it concerns the political impact on Middle Eastern elites of American force, consists of stimuli based on trends, developments, activities, and actions related to the armed forces of the United States. These military "events" include (but are not limited to) the conclusion of defense agreements; agreements on, implementation of, or other developments concerning arms transfers; weapons systems developments, and performance characteristics; advanced technology breakthroughs with potential military relevance; force deployments (including new weapons or additional manpower); the establish-

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<sup>16</sup>See Carl Beck, James M. Malloy, and William R. Campbell, assisted by Jerry L. Weaver, *A Survey of Elite Studies* (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, The American University, 1965).

<sup>17</sup>See, e.g. Joseph Dunner, ed., *Dictionary of Political Science* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1964), p. 162.



ment, expansion, reduction, termination, or change in terms of reference of U.S. military missions in countries near or in the Middle East area; maneuvers and exercises; visits to these countries of U.S. armed forces, ships, aircraft, or personnel; military (naval) operations in times of crisis; policy decisions or statements by the U.S. executive or legislative branches relating to Defense policy; and debates on Defense policy within Congress.

(Because one of the sub-categories of interest in this study is the Arab perception of the U.S.-Soviet military balance in the region, we shall also consider Arab views of that balance as reflected solely in the four newspapers selected for content analysis. Although articles on the Soviet military will not be reviewed, articles that compare, whether implicitly or explicitly, any aspect of the armed forces of the countries will be considered, as will weapons systems comparisons.)

#### Content Analysis

*Content analysis is a research method to objectively, quantitatively, and systematically describe communication content.*<sup>18</sup> Although the innumerable systems of content analysis vary markedly depending upon objectives, all must enable different coders to arrive at similar coding decisions on the same material, must organize content into discrete categories of which statistical analyses are possible, and must explicitly posit criteria for treatment of content.

#### Categories of Military Force

A second key step in the research was the identification of the types of military force or events (or stimuli) to be considered. We have organized our categories as follows:

- I. Symbolic force
  - A. Naval visits
  - B. Military visits
  - C. Other ceremonial acts involving U.S. military forces

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<sup>18</sup> The elements of this definition are commonly accepted. Cf. Dunner, ed., *Dictionary*, p. 122; Johan Galtung, *Theory and Methods of Social Research: Data Collection* (Oslo: Institutet for Sosiologi, 1965), p.1; Bernard Berelson, "Content Analysis," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), p. 489.

- II. Military manpower
  - A. Quality of manpower available
    - 1. Educational and skills levels
    - 2. Training
    - 3. Morale and discipline
  - B. Quantity of manpower available
- III. Technology
  - A. Early research and development
  - B. Advanced research and development
  - C. Testing
  - D. Production
    - 1. Quality control
    - 2. Quantity
  - E. Deployment/Use
  - F. Performance
  - G. Technological breakthroughs
  - H. Application of civilian technology breakthroughs
- IV. Force deployments and employments (operations)
  - A. Deployments
    - 1. Routine
    - 2. Crisis-related
  - B. Maneuvers, games, exercises
  - C. Airlift/sealift
    - 1. Capabilities
    - 2. Operations
  - D. Military Operations
- V. Military bases and facilities
  - A. Agreements on and negotiations for establishment
  - B. Purpose
  - C. Establishment
  - D. Operations
  - E. Change in purpose, terms of reference, status
- VI. U.S. military missions
  - A. Agreements on and negotiations for establishment
  - B. Establishment

- c. Operations
- D. Change in size, terms of reference, status
- VII. Military assistance and sales
  - A. Arms transfers (security assistance and sales)
    - 1. Procedures (domestic)
    - 2. Negotiations
    - 3. Agreements
    - 4. Deliveries
    - 5. Effects
  - B. Supporting assistance
    - 1. Procedures
    - 2. Decisions
    - 3. Deliveries
  - C. Training and non-lethal equipment
    - 1. Procedures
    - 2. Negotiations
    - 3. Agreements
    - 4. Operations/deliveries
    - 5. Effects
- VIII. Other
  - A. Strategy/policy
    - 1. National military strategy and policy
      - a. Strategy/policy developments
      - b. The U.S.-Soviet strategic balance
      - c. Budget considerations
    - 2. Threats and military intervention
      - a. Executive actions
      - b. Legislative actions
    - 3. National politico-military decisionmaking
      - a. Role of the executive branch
      - b. Role of the legislative branch
      - c. Role of the judiciary branch
    - 4. Intelligence
    - 5. Civilian/military personnel in other roles

### Development of Hypotheses

In order to achieve the project objectives and to develop appropriate hypotheses against which to test the data, a series of questions, some deriving directly from the initial research concept and proposal, was articulated. These questions are ordered, for the most part, within the military force categories already identified. These questions are listed in Appendix 1. The resulting hypotheses appear as in Appendix 2.

### Selection of Historical Cases

Historical cases were chosen against several criteria. First, most should be clearly relevant to the Middle East. Second, all should have taken place within the ten-year period 1965-1975, with a greater number between 1970 and 1975 than between 1965 and 1970. Third, most of the categories of military force should be represented, and be represented by more than one example, if possible.

For the historical cases, content analysis was applied only to *Al Ahram* and *Al Nahar*. The reason for this is clear: only these two of the four papers chosen have continuity of sponsorship. Although it is true that the nature of the regime in Egypt changed substantially between 1965 and 1975, *Al Ahram* represented the regime in power throughout that period. Likewise, *Al Nahar* remained an independent continuously during 1965-1975.

The time periods during which content analysis is to be performed are as follows: the major specific events that took place during these periods are identified in Appendix 3.

26 Feb-15 Mar 1965	25 Oct-10 Nov 1969	22-28 Feb 1973
30 Dec 1966-10 Jan 1967	23-31 Mar 1970	15 Sept-31 Oct 1973
15 May-17 Jun 1967	11-15 Jun 1970	30 Nov-6 Dec 1973
3-12 Nov 1967	30 Aug-30 Sept 1970	24-31 Dec 1973
23 Jan-23 Feb 1968	31 Mar-7 Apr 1971	5-15 Jan 1974
1-15 Apr 1968	1-31 Dec 1971	4-14 Feb 1974
1-13 Jul 1968	1-5 Jan 1972	19 Feb-5 Mar 1974
16-31 Aug 1968	8-31 May 1972	18-31 Jul 1974
1-31 Dec 1968	15 Jul-15 Aug 1972	23-30 Nov 1974
1-25 Jan 1969	1-15 Oct 1972	9-20 Dec 1974
15 Jul-15 Aug 1969	23-31 Oct 1972	1 Jan-15 Feb 1975
7-15 Sept 1969	8-15 Jan 1973	Mar-Dec 1975



### Content Analysis

The major portion of the research has been devoted to content analysis of four Middle East newspapers. We have already described the purpose of content analysis as the objective, quantitative, and systematic description of communication content. The purposes of using content analysis on the selected regional newspapers were twofold. First, we wished to determine whether any single regional newspaper was broadly representative of elite views. Second, on the admittedly simplistic assumption that newspapers reflect (if not directly, then indirectly) elite attitudes, we wished to assess the reaction of these media-reflected attitudes to events involving U.S. military force.

#### Selection of Newspapers

Four newspapers were selected for analysis, three from Lebanon and one from Egypt. All are written in Arabic, and all but *Al Sharq* are highly regarded for their broad coverage of news and opinion from and about the Middle East. All but *Al Sharq* also enjoy a wide circulation and are frequently quoted in other publications.

Three of the newspapers covered in the study--*Al Hayat*, *Al Nahar*, and *Al Sharq*--are published in Beirut, Lebanon. With the highest literacy rate of any Arab country, Lebanon in 1975 had 96 newspapers of which 40 were dailies. The large number of newspapers in a country with a limited population (approximately 2.5 million) indicates that Lebanese journalism was highly competitive. To survive in such an atmosphere, a publication had to be either responsive to the reading tasks of some segment of the public or accurately reflective of the views of its sponsors. Equally significant, while most of the Middle East press is owned or controlled by the state, the Lebanese press was privately owned and financed by individuals or groups who represented special religious, political, and economic views. Hence, Lebanese printed media were colored by the particularist interests to which they catered and by which many of them were sponsored. Noteworthy is the fact that Lebanon--alone among Middle East countries--enjoyed freedom of

the press.<sup>19</sup> Finally, the Lebanese press is especially significant because of "...Beirut's status as by far the most important base for foreign correspondents covering the Middle East."<sup>20</sup> Thus, it can be argued that Lebanon's more prestigious papers provided an elite platform for news and opinion of the entire Middle East. The largest and most important papers in Lebanon were *Al Nahar* and *Al Hayat*.

#### Al Ahram

*Al Ahram* is published in Cairo. Despite widespread illiteracy, Egypt's relatively large population supports a well-developed press. In fact, notwithstanding Beirut's key position in commerce, finance, and communications, Cairo is the largest publishing center in the Middle East. The Egyptian press is controlled by the government. All Egyptian newspapers were placed under Revolutionary Command Council authority by President Nasser in 1954. In 1960, control over the press was moved to the Arab Socialist Union. In spite of these and other changes, Egyptian newspapers since 1954 have reflected or deferred to the official government position on issues of substance. Egyptian newspapers are administered separately and are in competition with each other, but all are owned by the government. In February 1974, direct censorship of the press was abolished except in matters relating to the armed forces.

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<sup>19</sup> "Freedom of the press, along with freedom of expression and association, is guaranteed, within the limits of the law, by Article 13 of the Constitution." *The Middle East and North Africa, 1974-1975* (21st ed., London: Europa Publications, 1975), p. 506. The legal limitations stemmed from the basic press laws of 1948 and 1958. These laws granted the interior minister the right to license all periodicals, to withdraw a license for reasons of non-publication or inadequate circulation, and to subject all journalists to a tribunal of discipline. Following the civil disturbances of 1958, press freedoms were extended through the abolition of the government's right to detain journalists pending investigations.

During the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1976, many Lebanese came to believe that the "excesses" of their free press were a principal reason for the conflict. Consequently, relatively little opposition was voiced to the imposition of stricter regulations in 1976 and 1977. These events post-dated data collection for the present research, however.

<sup>20</sup> *The Middle East and North Africa, 1974-1975* (21st ed., London: Europa Publications, 1975), p. 507.

Despite Egypt's liberalized press controls, *Al Ahram* remains the semi-official voice of the Egyptian government. The second largest newspaper in Egypt (after *Al Akhbar*), *Al Ahram* boasts circulation of 400,000 and an international influence second to none in Egypt. The paper averages 12-14 pages a day, most of which focuses on local developments, though several pages each day are usually devoted to international news and commentary. *Al Ahram* is the oldest Arabic-language newspaper in Egypt, having been founded in 1875. During the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, the newspaper was edited by Mohammed Hassanein Haikal, a confidant of President Nasser. This special relationship did not survive the change of regimes, however, and Haikal is now retired. That Haikal's departure reduced somewhat the impact and influence of *Al Ahram* is hardly surprising; Haikal's political sense, access, and timing were extraordinary. Currently, the newspaper is controlled by its director, Ihsan Abd al Quddus, and the editor, 'Ali Hamdi al Gamal, both of whom have extensive backgrounds in journalism, but lack the unusual political insight of Haikal. Al Quddus, who was educated at the University of Cairo, is a well-known Egyptian personality. A lawyer in the early 1940s, he also joined the magazine *Rose al Yusuf* in 1942, and was imprisoned for his nationalist activities in 1945, 1950, and 1951. His publications include several novels. Al Quddus was the editor of *Akhbar al Yom* until 1974 when he joined the *Al Ahram* staff as a writer. *Al Ahram* also enjoys the distinction of having its own military editor.

#### *Al Hayat*

Established in 1946, *Al Hayat* has a daily circulation of 37,800. It is published in Beirut and its circulation and influence is second only to *Al Nahar* among Beirut's newspapers. The average size of *Al Hayat* is eight pages, and its coverage of international news is generally less than that of *Al Nahar*. Although *Al Hayat* is usually considered independent,<sup>21</sup> Saudi Arabia is now a major financial sponsor of

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<sup>21</sup> See *Editor and Publisher International Yearbook* (54th ed., New York: Editor and Publisher Company, 1974), p. 305.

the newspaper. Thus, *Al Hayat* was selected for analysis as a representative of Saudi editorial views.

The editor of *Al Hayat*, Mrs. Salma Kamuel Mrowa, studied political science at the American University of Beirut and the University of Michigan.

#### *Al Nahar*

Founded in 1933, *Al Nahar* has the largest daily circulation (75,000), number of pages (about 14 daily), and amount of space devoted to international news among all Lebanese newspapers. *Al Nahar* is independent in coverage, but generally manifests a sympathy to the West on issues not directly involving the Middle East. Because of its balanced viewpoint and incisive analysis, *Al Nahar* is highly regarded in the region. It is widely circulated throughout the Middle East and read by subscribers around the world. Since 1948, *Al Nahar* has been owned and operated by Ghassan Tueni, an alumnus of the American University of Beirut (A.B.) and Harvard University (M.A.) with a specialty in international affairs.<sup>22</sup> For some time, Tueni was a parliamentary deputy, and in 1970-71 he served as Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister of Education and Information.

#### *Al Sharq*

Least important of the four newspapers selected for analysis, Beirut-based *Al Sharq* is by far the smallest, with a circulation of less than 5,000. Established in 1945, *Al Sharq* is currently sponsored financially by Syria. It was chosen in order to obtain a Syrian viewpoint. *Al Sharq* is published by 'Auni al Ka'ki, and edited by Mu'in al Ka'ki.

#### Newspaper Coverage

A problem encountered in the content analysis phase has been the noncomparability of the newspapers in terms of period covered. As we have already noted, only *Al Aharm* and *Al Nahar* were coded for events before 1975, since *Al Hayat* and *Al Sharq* have not consistently represented the countries currently sponsoring them. Even during 1975,

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<sup>22</sup> *Who's Who in Lebanon* (2nd ed., rev., Beirut: Les Editions Publitec, 1966), p. 403.



however, coverage was a problem. *Al Hayat* arrived regularly from 1 March through 15 September. *Al Ahram* began arriving only on 1 May, but then continued uninterrupted through 31 December. *Al Sharq* arrived for three issues in March, three in July, and consistently only in August. By mid-October, *Al Hayat*, *Al Nahar*, and *Al Sharq* were all delayed and interrupted by the civil disturbances in Lebanon. See Table 3-1 for the final newspaper coverage in this report.

#### FACES Development

Systematic content analysis requires the development of coding methods sufficiently sophisticated to glean the desired information from the communication media used. For this study, a Force Assessment Content and Events Data System (FACES) was developed, drawing to some degree on extant systems.

#### PAMIS

The *PSYOP Automated Management Information System*, developed by Mr. Phillip P. Katz<sup>23</sup> for the U.S. Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, consists of several discrete subsystems, one of which is the Foreign Media Analysis (FMA) file. FMA uses a combination of coding techniques--including a highly developed thesaurus of themes (FMA Subject Index) and a free text abstract.<sup>24</sup>

PAMIS/FMA has been used for a variety of purposes, most of the analyses focusing on Chinese, Korean, Soviet, and Vietnamese media.<sup>25</sup> It was our intent to use PAMIS in the analysis of the impact of U.S. force on Arab audiences.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>23</sup>See Phillip P. Katz, *A Systematic Approach to PSYOP Information* (U) CONFIDENTIAL (Washington, DC: The American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, 1970); *PSYOP Automated Management Information System (PAMIS): PSYOP Foreign Area Data Subsystem (PFADS)*, 2 Vols. (Kensington, MD: American Institutes for Research, 1973); *PSYOP Automated Management Information System (PAMIS): PSYOP Effects Analysis Subsystem (PEAS)* (Washington, DC: American Institutes for Research, 1974).

<sup>24</sup>For a full description, see Phillip P. Katz, *PSYOP Automated Management Information System (PAMIS): Foreign Media Analysis File*.

<sup>25</sup>E.g., Phillip P. Katz, et al., *Survey of Chinese Mass Media Content in 1972: A Quantitative Analysis* (Kensington, MD: American Institutes for Research, 1973).

<sup>26</sup>The only analysis of PAMIS data on Arab media is Jon Cozean et al., *The Arab Elite Worldview: A Report on a Study of Arab Perceptions of Regional Security Issues* (Washington, DC: The American Institutes for Research, 1975).

After coding for some time with FMA code sheets, we determined that FMA could not meet the particular needs of this research. The tone criteria frequently led to wholly anomalous results. At the same time, a number of measures of intensity seemed very useful, so a new system was developed that retained some of the measures but moved part way toward an events data system, or, more accurately, toward a marriage of content and events data analysis.

#### FACES Coding Procedure

The Force Assessment Content and Events Data System coding procedure uses as a unit of analysis an article or article segment discussing an action/reaction pertinent to U.S. military force or the U.S.-Soviet military balance. In place of the PAMIS subject/theme, FACES looks to an event or circumstance. Coding procedures are discussed in detail in Appendix 4.

FACES employs several data fields. Apart from basic data on the communication being subjected to content analysis, FACES codes for

- actor country or theme country
- specific actor (subactor) within theme country
- action
- target country or countries
- third (other) country
- specific subject within third (other) country
- perception of military impact of action
- tone
- presentation
- display
- coverage amount
- original source
- immediate source

The actor or theme country is usually the country in the active or dominant position for an event. In most cases we have tried to place the superpowers in the actor position for this analysis. Thus, when Jordan asks the United States for military assistance, the United States is the actor, "is asked for MA by" is the action, and Jordan is the target. Note

that this emphasis on the superpowers is a departure from traditional events data sets which do not discriminate between actors.

The specific actor in the theme country refers to individuals such as the head of state, head of government, foreign minister, and the like, who carry out the action. Manifestly, there is a specific actor only when the action is of certain types, for example "announce/maintain/defend policy," "visits," or "engages in high-level meeting with."

The action is a dimension that distinguishes this system from content analysis. Content analysis uses themes as the basis of the system. FACES uses both themes and actions within themes. The action dimension uses verbs such as "establishes," "attacks," "seizes," "observes," "denies," and many more. Although the coder selection is most difficult in the action field, the occasional small differences between coder selections in their "action" choices are not as important in FACES as they would be in either event data or content analysis systems where action or theme choices are single keys and are discretely measured. In FACES, theme choice is more basic and clear-cut, and actions (or at least the actions between which coders might hesitate) within theme fields are aggregated into single behavior categories in the analysis.

Like events data systems, FACES uses a target country or countries. However, for FACES there need not be a target. A country can act, as often happens in the real world and its media reflection, without explicit target.

The third (or other) country field was developed specifically for FACES. Frequently, the "event" has to do with a third country comment on or reaction to a theme country action. Specific actor within third (other) country has the same relationship to "third (other) country" as "specific actor" has to "actor (theme) country." For example, when U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Noyes stated that the Soviet Union had established a missile base in Somalia, the Soviet Union (actor) establishes (action) base (theme) in Somalia (target) according to U.S.(other country) senior member of government (specific actor within other country).

The effects or "perception of military impact of action" field relates the action to the nature of the stated impact--the local superpower military balance, local superpower military capabilities, the local military balance (of regional actors excluding superpowers and other extraregional actors), or the global military balance.

Tone in FACES is the coder's assessment of the intended impact of phraseology on the apparent audience. Thus, most news articles are neutral. Editorials are generally favorable or critical. Note that the coder is not coding the substantive content in this field. An article relating Israeli leaders' severe criticism of U.S. military supply policy during the 1975 Middle East policy "reassessment" would be "critical" in PAMIS/FMA. In FACES, it would probably be neutral, and might, depending upon phraseology, be favorable.

Presentation refers to the type of article--news article, analysis, interview, editorial, and so forth. The vast majority of articles coded are, of course, news articles. (Note that a separate field distinguishes between the nature of verbal actions--whether in interview, press conferences, congressional debate, and the like. Each of these would be a "news article" in presentation unless it was the verbatim interview, press conference, excerpts, congressional speech, or the like.)

Display addresses the prominence of the article in terms of its headline or format; coverage amount, in terms of its size; and, of course, page in terms of its placement (whether on the first page or not).

We also considered original and immediate sources, because we wished to see where Arab media obtained their information and if sources differed between themes or actors.

Appendix 4 presents FACES indices, the codes for each data field.

#### Decision Factor Analysis

A second approach to the assessment of Middle East reactions to U.S. military force is to analyze the factors that play a role in the shaping of those responses. For the purposes of this research, we studied both interest groups among the relevant elites and the decision factors that come into play in these elites' reactions to perceived U.S. military force stimuli.



The results of our analysis of Arab Middle East countries in terms of key interest groups and decision factors is presented in Chapter 4.

#### Model-Building

Following and based upon the decision factors and interest group patterns identified in Chapter 4, an action model to support force-relevant decisionmaking was developed. The model is manual and retains a substantial role for expert judgment. Both content and events data can be used in the model developed here, or, alternatively, other data analyses may be substituted. The model is also presented in Chapter 4.

### CHAPTER 3. CONTENT ANALYSIS DATA

#### THE DATA

The four newspapers content analyzed were *Al Ahram*, *Al Hayat*, *Al Nahar*, and *Al Sharq*. Because sponsorship of *Al Hayat* and *Al Sharq* has varied in the past, these newspapers were analyzed only for 1975. Indeed, data collection was hampered by the fact that *Al Sharq* never arrived consistently despite several appeals to the publisher. In only one month--August 1975--did enough issues arrive for any serious coding. By the summer of 1975, however, the civil disturbances in Beirut resulted in sporadic and tardy delivery of *Al Hayat* and *Al Nahar* as well. In addition to the foregoing, several issues of *Al Ahram* and *Al Nahar* were unavailable for the period 1965-1974. (*Al Nahar* was not available at all for 1965-1968.)

Tables 3-1 to 3-5 give an overview of the data set. A total of 1,802 newspaper days were coded, 45 percent of which were from *Al Ahram* and 44 percent of which were from *Al Nahar*. Of the balance (11 percent), most (90 percent) appeared in *Al Hayat*. Over time, 4 percent of the newspaper days derived from the 1965-1967 period (all *Al Ahram*), 55 percent from the 1968-1974 era, and 41 percent were 1975 days.

Each entry was termed an "observation." There were a total of 2,386 observations over the 1965-1975 period. These observations are distributed as shown in Table 3-3.

Thus, *Al Ahram* provided 54 percent of the observations in 45 percent of the time; *Al Nahar*, 35 percent of the observations in 44 percent of the time; *Al Hayat*, 9 percent of total observations in 10 percent of the time; and, finally, *Al Sharq*, 2 percent of the observations in just 1 percent of the time.

Another perspective on coverage considers space allocated to force events across newspapers over time. A format similar to those in Tables 3-1 and 3-3 but based on space (i.e., volume as opposed to frequency) appears in Table 3-4.

Table 3-1.

Newspapers Coded and Analyzed--Days

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>al Ahram</u>	<u>al Hayat</u>	<u>al Nahar</u>	<u>al Sharq</u>	<u>Total Days</u>
Feb 26-Mar 15, 1965	18				18
(Total 1965)	(18)				(18)
Dec 30-Dec 31, 1966	2				2
(Total 1966)	(2)				(2)
Jan 1-Jan 10, 1967	10				10
May 15-Jun 17, 1967	34				34
Nov 3-Nov 12, 1967	10				10
(Total 1967)	(54)				(54)
Jan 23-Feb 23, 1968	32		32		64
Apr 1-Apr 15, 1968	15		8*		23
Jul 1-Jul 13, 1968	13		13		26
Aug 16-Aug 31, 1968	16		16		32
Dec 1-Dec 31, 1968	26*		27*		53
(Total 1968)	(102)		(96)		(198)
Jan 1-Jan 25, 1969	25		20*		45
Jul 15-Aug 15, 1969	31*		32		63
Sep 7-Sep 15, 1969	9		9		18
Oct 25-Nov 10, 1969	17		17		34
(Total 1969)	(82)		(78)		(160)
Mar 23-Mar 31, 1970	9		8*		17
Jun 11-Jun 15, 1970	5		5		10
Aug 30-Sep 30, 1970	32		32		64
(Total 1970)	(46)		(45)		(91)
Mar 31-Apr 7, 1971	8		8		16
Dec 1-Dec 31, 1971	31		29*		60
(Total 1971)	(39)		(37)		(76)
Jan 1-Jan 5, 1972	5		5		10
May 8-May 31, 1972	24		24		48
Jul 15-Aug 15, 1972	32		32		64
Oct 1-Oct 15, 1972	15		15		30
Oct 23-Oct 31, 1972	9		9		18
(Total 1972)	(85)		(85)		(170)
Jan 8-Jan 15, 1973	8		8		16
Feb 22-Feb 28, 1973	7		7		14
Sep 15-Oct 31, 1973	47		47		94
Nov 30-Dec 6, 1973	7		7		14
Dec 24-Dec 31, 1973	7*		8		15
(Total 1973)	(76)		(77)		(153)

Table 3-1 Cont'd

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>al Ahram</u>	<u>al Hayat</u>	<u>al Nahar</u>	<u>Al Sharq</u>	<u>Total Days</u>
Jan 5-Jan 15, 1974	11		11		22
Feb 4-Feb 14, 1974	11		11		22
Feb 19-Mar 5, 1974	15		15		30
Jul 18-Jul 31, 1974	14		14		28
Nov 23-Nov 30, 1974	8		7*		15
Dec 9-Dec 20, 1974	12		12		24
(Total 1974)	(71)		(70)		(141)
Jan 1-Feb 15, 1975			43		43
Mar 1975		17*	28*		45
Apr 1975		28*	26*		54
May 1975	31	26*	28*		85
Jun 1975	29*	30	26*		85
Jul 1975	30*	29*	27*		86
Aug 1975	31	30*	29*	20*	110
Sep 1975	29*	15*	23*		67
Oct 1975	31		20*		51
Nov 1975	30		25*		55
Dec 1975	30*		28*		58
(Total 1975)	(241)	(175)	(303)	(20)	(739)
TOTAL	816	175	791	20	1802

\*Some issues missing



Table 3-2.

Newspaper Days--Percentages

	<u>al Ahram</u>	<u>al Hayat</u>	<u>al Nahar</u>	<u>al Sharq</u>	<u>Total</u>
1965	100.0 2.2	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	100.0 1.0
1966	100.0 0.2	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	100.0 0.1
1967	100.0 6.6	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	100.0 3.0
1968	51.5 12.5	0.0 0.0	48.5 12.1	0.0 0.0	100.0 11.0
1969	51.3 10.0	0.0 0.0	48.8 9.9	0.0 0.0	100.0 8.9
1970	50.5 5.6	0.0 0.0	49.5 5.7	0.0 0.0	100.0 5.0
1971	51.3 4.8	0.0 0.0	48.7 4.7	0.0 0.0	100.0 4.2
1972	50.0 10.4	0.0 0.0	50.0 10.7	0.0 0.0	100.0 9.4
1973	49.7 9.3	0.0 0.0	50.3 9.7	0.0 0.0	100.0 8.5
1974	50.4 8.7	0.0 0.0	49.6 8.8	0.0 0.0	100.0 7.8
1975	32.6 29.5	23.7 100.0	41.0 38.3	2.7 100.0	100.0 41.0
TOTAL	45.3 100.0	9.7 100.0	43.9 100.0	1.1 100.0	100.0 100.0

Top figures are row percentages; bottom figures are column percentages.  
(Totals may not add due to rounding.)

Table 3-3.  
Distribution of Observations

<u>Years</u>	<u>Al Ahram</u>	<u>Al Hayat</u>	<u>Al Nahar</u>	<u>Al Sharq</u>	<u>Total</u>
1965	17	0	0	0	17
Row %	100	0	0	0	100
Column %	1.3	0	0	0	0.7
1966	0	0	0	0	0
Row %	-	-	-	-	-
Column %	-	-	-	-	-
1967	81	0	0	0	81
Row %	100	0	0	0	100
Column %	6.3	0	0	0	3.4
1968	165	0	140	0	305
Row %	54.1	0	45.9	0	100
Column %	12.8	0	16.9	0	12.8
1969	65	0	147	0	212
Row %	30.7	0	69.3	0	100
Column %	5.0	0	17.7	0	8.9
1970	134	0	48	0	182
Row %	73.6	0	26.4	0	100
Column %	10.4	0	5.8	0	7.6
1971	71	0	36	0	107
Row %	66.4	0	33.6	0	100
Column %	5.5	0	4.3	0	4.5
1972	131	0	72	0	203
Row %	64.5	0	35.5	0	100
Column %	10.1	0	8.7	0	8.5
1973	204	0	67	0	281
Row %	76.2	0	23.8	0	100
Column %	16.6	0	8.1	0	11.8
1974	73	0	48	0	121
Row %	60.3	0	39.7	0	100
Column %	5.7	0	5.8	0	5.1
1975	340	215	272	50	877
Row %	38.8	24.5	31.0	5.7	100
Column %	26.3	100	32.8	100	36.8
TOTAL	1,291	215	830	50	2,386
Row %	54.1	215	34.8	2.1	100
Column %	100	100	100	100	100

Table 3-4.

## Space Allocated to Force Events

<u>Years</u>	<u>Al Ahram</u>	<u>Al Hayat</u>	<u>Al Nahar</u>	<u>Al Sharq</u>	<u>Total</u>
1965	5,310	0	0	0	5,310
Row %	100	0	0	0	100
Column %	3	0	0	0	1
1966	0	0	0	0	0
Row %	100	0	0	0	100
Column %	0	0	0	0	0
1967	11,462	0	0	0	11,462
Row %	100	0	0	0	100
Column %	5	0	0	0	3
1968	31,708	0	28,766	0	60,474
Row %	52	0	48	0	100
Column %	15	0	21	0	16
1969	35,460	0	38,194	0	73,654
Row %	48	0	52	0	100
Column %	17	0	28	0	20
1970	19,869	0	6,310	0	26,179
Row %	76	0	24	0	100
Column %	9	0	5	0	7
1971	5,694	0	4,558	0	10,252
Row %	56	0	45	0	100
Column %	3	0	3	0	3
1972	28,836	0	12,730	0	41,566
Row %	69	0	31	0	100
Column %	14	0	9	0	11
1973	26,352	0	8,953	0	35,305
Row %	75	0	25	0	100
Column %	13	0	7	0	9
1974	5,870	0	6,457	0	12,327
Row %	48	0	52	0	100
Column %	3	0	5	0	3
1975	40,067	19,765	32,546	5,290	97,666
Row %	41	20	33	5.4	100
Column %	19	100	24	100	26
TOTAL	210,628	19,765	138,514	5,290	374,197
Row %	53	5	37	1	100
Column %	100	100	100	100	100

Table 3-5, Comparative Coverage Summary, gives an overview of the coverage along the three dimensions of time (newspaper days), events (observations or entries), and space (in square centimeters) by indicating the percentage of the total in each of these categories as provided by each newspaper over time (1965-1974, 1975, and total 1965-1975).

Table 3-5.  
Comparative Coverage Summary (in %)

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Measurement Dimension</u>	<u>Al Ahram</u>	<u>Al Hayat</u>	<u>Al Nahar</u>	<u>Al Sharq</u>
1965-1974					
	Newspaper days	54.1	0.0	45.9	0.0
	Observations	63.0	0.0	37.0	0.0
	Space	61.7	0.0	38.3	0.0
1975					
	Newspaper days	32.6	23.7	41.0	2.7
	Observations	38.8	24.5	31.0	5.7
	Space	41.0	20.2	33.3	5.4
1965-1975					
	Newspaper days	45.3	9.7	43.9	1.1
	Observations	54.1	9.0	34.8	2.1
	Space	56.3	5.3	37.0	1.4

#### THEMES: COMPARATIVE ATTENTION

In analyzing the aggregate data, one of the first questions we sought to answer was the degree of relative attention paid to the different themes against which the newspapers were coded. In other words, which military stimuli attract the most attention and which are most intensively studied? Before discussing the results, it should be noted that because theme development, articulation, and aggregation are necessarily subjective and arbitrary, relative attention figures can be misleading. For example, the themes "technology breakthrough" and "weapons development/performance" might better form one unified theme for some purposes. Thus, in the tables below, we present absolute as well as comparative data in order that the reader can adjust these data categories to his own purposes. Similarly, some themes (weapons develop-



ment/performance) involve the activities of both superpowers more than others (e.g., provision of assistance). The reader should take such considerations into account when reviewing the data.

Themes are listed in Tables 3-6 to 3-8 in order according to the number of total observations applicable to the theme in the total data set. Table 3-6 indicates for each theme the number of observations; the total space of those articles or article segments; the number of first-page articles; the total of editorials; the number of banner headline articles; and the number of major headline stories excluding those identified as banner headline articles. It is interesting to observe one theme--security assistance and foreign military sales--totally dominates all others in number of articles, accounting for more than one-third of the total. No other reasonable aggregation could alter the dominance by this theme of the newspaper coverage. It is clearly the subject attracting the greatest attention over time.

Another interesting datum is the exception to the parallel between total articles and total space by theme--technological breakthrough. The extraordinary length of observations on this theme--an average of over 542 cm<sup>2</sup>--is due in large measure to a number of very lengthy articles on space. So much space is devoted to articles on this subject that if weapons development and technological breakthrough observations are aggregated--a wholly reasonable approach--the aggregate space considerably exceeds that accorded to security assistance and military sales even though the number of observations is over 60 percent fewer.

Table 3-7 ranks theme intensity according to four criteria--page 1 articles as a percentage of total theme articles; editorials as a percentage of total theme articles; banner headlines as a percentage of subject articles; and banner and major headlines as a percentage of total theme articles. (The last two categories were given half the weight of each of the first two categories in determining theme rank.) Although we did not expect "military operations" to be the premier theme, the inherent selection process perhaps accounts for it. Only those operations that were of major perceptual importance--of such impact that they were expected to have some effect on the Middle East or

Table 3-6. Theme Data

	Observations	Total Space (cm) <sup>2</sup>	Page 1 Articles	Editorials	Banner Headlines	Major Headlines
Military assistance and sales	837	105,973	379	66	43	324
U.S.-Soviet strategic balance	198	23,459	42	4	2	98
Maneuvers, movements, deployments	195	18,948	83	5	11	67
Technological breakthroughs	167	90,524	78	4	52	84
Bases	160	18,373	27	7	2	62
Sending of civilian/ military personnel	157	13,725	81	4	13	52
Weapons development/ performance	149	22,851	30	0	5	63
Visits	143	22,665	76	0	13	53
Military operations	87	19,971	43	23	7	43
Threats	82	9,765	34	15	3	41
Airlift/sealift	49	4,540	21	0	4	18
Subject of military intervention	47	5,572	22	9	7	20
Intelligence	39	5,017	18	3	0	15
Recalls, alerts, etc.	32	4,203	18	0	5	16
Military missions	25	7,966	14	0	4	9
Provision of assistance	11	1,719	3	1	0	3
Manpower	8	323	0	0	0	1
TOTAL AVERAGE	2,386	375,324	969	141	171	969

Table 3-7. Theme Intensity			
Page 1 Articles as % Subject Arts.	Editorials as % of Subject Arts.	Banner Headlines as % of Subject Arts.	Banner and Major Headlines as % of Subject Arts.
Rank			
Military assistance and sales	45	8	5
U.S.-Soviet strategic balance	21	2	1
Maneuvers, movements deployments	43	3	6
Technological breakthroughs	47	2	31
Bases	17	4	1
Sending of civilian/ military personnel	52	3	8
Weapons development/ performance	20	0	3
Visits	53	0	9
Military operations	49	26	8
Threats	41	18	4
Airlift/sealift	43	0	8
Subject of military intervention	47	19	15
Intelligence	46	8	0
Recalls, alerts, etc.	56	0	16
Military missions	56	0	16
Provision of assistance	27	9	0
Manpower	0	0	0
TOTAL AVERAGE %	41	6	7
			48

Table 3-8. Theme Frequency and Intensity Over Time							Banner & Major Headlines as % of Tot. Art.		Rank
% of Total Observations	Space/ Art. (cm)	Page 1 Arts. as % of Tot. Art.	Editorials as % of Tot. Art.	Banner Headlines as % of Tot. Art.	Banner & Major Headlines as % of Tot. Art.				
Military assistance and sales	35	126.61	15.9	2.77	1.80	15.4	1		
U.S.-Soviet strategic balance	8	118.48	1.8	0.17	0.08	4.2	6		
Maneuvers, movements, deployments	8	97.17	3.5	0.21	0.46	3.3	4		
Technological breakthroughs	7	542.06	3.3	0.17	2.18	5.7	2		
Bases	7	114.83	1.1	0.29	0.08	2.7	9		
Sending of civilian/military personnel	7	87.42	3.4	0.17	0.54	2.7	6		
Weapons development/performance	6	151.55	1.3	0.00	0.21	2.8	8		
Visits	6	158.50	3.2	0.00	0.54	2.8	5		
Military operations	4	229.55	1.8	0.96	0.29	2.1	3		
Threats	3	119.09	1.4	0.63	0.13	1.8	9		
Airlift/sealift	2	92.65	0.9	0.00	0.17	0.9	15		
Subject of military intervention	2	118.55	0.9	0.38	0.29	1.1	11		
Intelligence	2	128.64	0.8	0.13	0.00	0.6	14		
Recalls, alerts, etc.	1	131.34	0.8	0.00	0.21	0.9	13		
Military missions	1	318.64	0.6	0.00	0.17	0.5	12		
Provision of assistance	0	156.27	0.1	0.04	0.00	0.1	16		
Manpower	0	40.38	0.0	0.00	0.00	0.0	17		
TOTAL AVERAGE %	100	157.30	40.6	5.91	7.17	47.8			



were seen to have implications for superpower behavior in the region--were coded. An example might be the Mayaguez incident in 1975. By their nature, then, such military operations were highly visible and had an important regional impact on perceptions. This is true as well of the fourth ranking theme ("recalls and alerts"), for alerts relating to U.S. or Soviet military activities must be major world news. By contrast, technology breakthrough is an interesting theme that consistently ranked very high. (See Table 3-8). Technology areas--such as the joint Soviet-U.S. space venture both attracted substantial coverage (in allocated space) and was given prominent placing (47 percent of the articles on page 1, 31 percent with banner headlines, and 81 percent with banner or major headlines).

"Military missions" also occupies a surprising prominence in intensity in view of its relative impact on force balance and military capabilities. (See below.) This attention is due largely to spectacular coverage (especially by *Al Ahram*) of the expulsion of the Soviet military mission in Egypt in mid-1972. (For example, all of the banner headlines on this theme appeared in connection with the expulsion of the Russian advisors.)

Theme frequency and intensity over time are ranked in Table 3-8. Predictably, security assistance and foreign military sales commanded the greatest amount of attention. Recognizing that over one-third of all articles coded dealt with this subject, such a rank is hardly surprising. Technological breakthrough observations were accorded much greater attention over time than any other subject except military assistance and sales. The final rankings were the result of summed individual category rankings. If the category rankings had been weighted, technology breakthroughs would have achieved an even more impressive score relative to categories ranking below it.

## HYPOTHESES

- 1a. Arab media follow ship visits systematically only when (1) the visit is to their country of publication or sponsorship, (2) the visit is of especial political importance, or (3) the visit is to a country hostile to their country of publication or sponsorship.

In order to determine the completeness of Arab media coverage of ship visits, some listing of such visits must be compiled. Michael McGwire has compiled such a list for Soviet visits, but it is quite incomplete and plagued by self-avowed lacunae.

- 1b. The amount of space devoted to ship visits except in case 1a(2), above, is minimal.

The size of articles dealing with ship visits tends to be relatively small, averaging  $78.4 \text{ cm}^2$ . In all cases, however, only seven observations exceeded  $100 \text{ cm}^2$ . Thus, if ship visits alone (as opposed to other ceremonial acts and visits) were computed in rank on a space-allocated-per-article basis, it would be one of the lowest ranking subjects. Indeed, only about a third of all "visit" observations deal with ship visits, and only 19 percent of "visit" space is allocated to ship visits.

- 1c. There is little explicit tone variation in ship visits, except in case 4, below.

The tone varied little across all ship visits, although the degree of tone variation was greater in 1975 than in previous years, possibly reflecting the strong reactions evoked by changing international alignments of several Arab states, on the one hand, and the superpowers, on the other. In general, however, this hypothesis is supported by the data. See Table 3-9.

Table 3-9.

Tone of Ship Visits

<u>Tone toward U.S.</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Frequency (%)</u>
Critical	6	23
Neutral	16	62
Favorable	4	15
None (no U.S. involvement)	29	-

- 2a. Aircraft carriers, and particularly nuclear aircraft carriers, receive greater coverage than other vessels.

Only one article coded indicated a visit by an aircraft carrier, a call by the *U.S.S. Constellation* to the Persian Gulf in late 1974. This visit was criticized by *Al Nahar* (the relationship of the visit to perceived American "threats" to take military action against Persian Gulf oil fields must be recognized) and received coverage approximately two times that of the average ship visit. One visit is certainly insufficient to draw any firm conclusions, but the treatment accorded the *U.S.S. Constellation* is certainly not unduly extensive in view of the circumstances.

- 2b. There is no tone variation on the basis of type of vessels making the visit except that nuclear-SLBMed submarines are viewed critically.

Tone does not correlate with vessel type making ship visits. All submarine visits (n = 4) were Soviet and were therefore not coded for tone, and the only critical coverage is not related to type of vessel but rather to the political circumstances of the visit. Table 3-10 displays the tone of ship visits by type of vessel.

Table 3-10.

## Ship Visits: Tone by Vessel

Type of Vessel	(Observ.)	Critical		Neutral		Favorable		No Tone*
		(Observ.)	(%)	(Observ.)	(%)	(Observ.)	(%)	
Destroyer	7	0	0	2	29	0	0	5
Cruiser	8	2	25	3	38	1	13	2
Submarine	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Aircraft carrier	1	1	100	0	0	0	0	0
Helicopter carrier	3	0	0	0	0	1	33	2
Other	5	0	0	1	20	0	0	4
Unknown	27	3	11	10	37	2	7	12

\*Soviet ship visits not coded for tone.

- 3a. Arab media devote more attention to visits of high-ranking military (including civilian leaders of the military) personages than to ships.  
 3b. Greater political weight is attributed to VIP visits than to ship visits.

Because political visits often involve ship and military visits, as ship and military visits frequently involve political activities, distinguishing between military and naval visits, on the one hand, and political visits that involve as an element military or naval visits, on the other, is very difficult. To the extent possible, this problem was addressed through multiple coding. The data support the hypotheses very strongly. Table 3-11 displays the comparison.

Table 3-11.

Nature of Visit	Political, Military, and Naval Visits	
	Average Size of Article (cm <sup>2</sup> )	Average Display*
Political	563.2	1.6
Military	145.5	2.3
Naval	78.4	2.6

\*The lower the display index, the more emphasis was given in headlines for that subject.



4. Media reactions to military/naval visits to countries hostile to the country of media publication or sponsorship reflect the national hostility. Such visits are viewed as threatening.

Inadequate data were collected to support or disprove this hypothesis, largely because "tone" was coded only with respect to the United States. Most newspaper articles on ship visits were neutral irrespective of bilateral relations between sponsoring/publishing country and country visited. Table 3-12 shows ship visits by the United States and the Soviet Union in the data population.

Table 3-12.

Superpower Visits in the Middle East

<u>Visiting Country</u>	<u>Country Visited</u>	<u>No. of Observations</u>
United States	Somalia	1
	Saudi Arabia	10
	Egypt	11
	Jordan	2
	Tunisia	1
	Lebanon	2
	Iran	2
	Persian Gulf states	1
	Persian Gulf	2
	Syria	30
U.S.S.R.	Egypt	31
	Iraq	6
	Somalia	3
	P.D.R.Y.	1
	Libya	1
	Algeria	2
	Lebanon	1

Table 3-13 presents these data broken down by newspaper and year.

Table 3-13.

Superpower Visits in the Middle East: Perceptions

I. United States Visits

<i>Al Ahram</i>				<i>Al Hayat</i>			<i>Al Nahar</i>		
Observ.	Country	Tone (#)		Observ.	Country	Tone (#)	Observ.	Country	Tone (#)
1967	1	Lebanon	1 Critical		xxxxxxxx				
	1	Egypt	1 Critical		xxxxxxxx				
	2	Saudi Arabia	2 Critical		xxxxxxxx				
1968					xxxxxxxx		2	Black Sea	2 Neutral
1969	1	Tunisia	1 Neutral		xxxxxxxx				
					xxxxxxxx		1	Lebanon	1 Neutral
1974	1	Egypt	1 Neutral		xxxxxxxx		1	Egypt	1 Favorable
	1	Jordan	1 Neutral		xxxxxxxx				
					xxxxxxxx		2	Persian Gulf	2 Critical
1975		Somalia	1 Neutral		xxxxxxxx				
		Saudi Arabia	1 Neutral	6	Saudi Arabia	4 Neutral	1	Saudi Arabia	1 Neutral
						2 Favorable			
				3	Egypt	2 Neutral	5	Egypt	2 Neutral
						1 Favorable			3 Favorable
				1	Iran	1 Neutral	1	Iran	1 Neutral
							1	Jordan	1 Neutral
							1	U.A.E.	1 Neutral

II. Soviet Visits

1965	2	Egypt		xxxxxxxx					
1967	1	Egypt		xxxxxxxx					
1968	5	Egypt		xxxxxxxx			4	Egypt	
				xxxxxxxx			2	Syria	
				xxxxxxxx			1	Algeria	
1969	1	P.D.R.Y.		xxxxxxxx					
				xxxxxxxx			1	Lebanon	
1970				xxxxxxxx			1	Algeria	
				xxxxxxxx			1	Syria	
1971	10	Syria	} all in December	xxxxxxxx			5	Syria	
	3	Iraq		xxxxxxxx			3	Iraq	
	2	Somalia		xxxxxxxx			1	Somalia	
	1	Egypt		xxxxxxxx			1	Egypt	

<u>Al Ahram</u>			<u>Al Hayat</u>			<u>Al Nahar</u>		
Observ.	Country	Tone (#)	Observ.	Country	Tone (#)	Observ.	Country	Tone (#)
1972	5	Syria	xxxxxxxxxx			5	Syria	
	8	Egypt	xxxxxxxxxx			5	Egypt	
1974	1	Egypt	xxxxxxxxxx			2	Egypt	
1975			1	Syria		1	Syria	
						1	Libya	

Below, Table 3-14 shows the number of observations of military/naval visits by country and newspaper during periods for which two (1968-1974) or three (May-September 1975) newspapers were coded.

Table 3-14.

Comparative Newspaper Coverage of Visits

		<u>Al Ahram</u>	<u>Al Hayat</u>	<u>Al Nahar</u>
<u>I. United States</u>				
1968-	1 Tunisia	xxxxxxxxxx		
1970		xxxxxxxxxx		1 Lebanon
		xxxxxxxxxx		2 Black Sea
1971-	1 Egypt	xxxxxxxxxx		1 Egypt
1974	1 Jordan	xxxxxxxxxx		
		xxxxxxxxxx		1 Lebanon
		xxxxxxxxxx		2 Persian Gulf
1975	1 Saudi Arabia	6 Saudi Arabia		1 Saudi Arabia
(May-	1 Somalia			
Sept.)		3 Egypt		5 Egypt
		1 Iran		1 Iran
<u>II. Soviet Union</u>				
1968-	5 Egypt	xxxxxxxxxx		4 Egypt
1970	1 P.D.R.Y.	xxxxxxxxxx		
		xxxxxxxxxx		3 Syria
		xxxxxxxxxx		2 Algeria
		xxxxxxxxxx		1 Lebanon
1971-	10 Egypt	xxxxxxxxxx		8 Egypt
1974	15 Syria	xxxxxxxxxx		10 Syria
	3 Iraq	xxxxxxxxxx		3 Iraq
	2 Somalia	xxxxxxxxxx		1 Somalia
1975				
(May-		1 Syria		
Sept.)				

Tables 3-12 to 3-14 do not conclusively support or disprove hypothesis 4. We note the sharp change in tone with respect to *Al Ahram's* U.S. visit coverage seems to reflect the Egyptian-U.S. relationship more than the Egyptian relationship with the host country. In general, military and naval visits in tone and coverage do not appear to be related to national alignment.

- 5a. Arab media attend to other ceremonial acts involving superpower military forces only when (1) the act is related to their country of publication or sponsorship, (2) the act is of especial political importance, or (3) the act is in or for a country hostile to their country of publication or sponsorship.
- 5b. Ceremonial acts are accorded favorable tone in case 5a(1), neutral tone in case 5a(2) except when a 5a(2) case falls under 5a(1), and critical coverage in case 5a(3).

The data on ceremonial acts other than ship visits were so limited that no firm conclusions relative to the hypothesis can be drawn. Fewer than five such acts were coded, precluding analysis. One of the most important ceremonial acts occurred in June 1975, when the U.S. Navy took a dominant role in celebrations of the reopening of the Suez Canal. Unfortunately, *Al Sharq* was not arriving during this period, and the other newspapers under analysis were all published or sponsored by countries that would be expected to view such a role rather favorably.

- 6. Symbolic force events are not related by the media to the local military balance.

We considered two categories of symbolic force events. Of 143 observations of ceremonial acts (visits, etc.), none was considered by the media to have an impact on the local military balance. We also considered war games, exercises, and the like. Similarly, there were no games or exercises linked by the media to the local military balance. If one included other deployments, still only



two observations were so related. Thus, of a total of 338 symbolic force events, only two (0.6%) were explicitly stated by the media to have an influence on the local military balance. See Table 3-15.

Table 3-15.

Symbolic Force Events and the Local Military Balance						
Type of Event	No. of Observ.	Aggregate <sub>2</sub> Space (cm <sup>2</sup> )	No. of Observ. with Effect on Local Balance		Space	
			Observ.	%	(cm <sup>2</sup> )	%
Visits	143	22,665	0	0	0	0
Games, maneuvers, exercises	40	2,401	0	0	0	0
Totals	183	25,066	0	0	0	0
Note: Other Deployments	155	16,547	2	1.3	160	1.0

7. Symbolic force events are not related by the media to the local super-power military balance.

Unrelated to the military balance by Arab media, neither were symbolic force events connected by the newspapers to the U.S.-Soviet balance in the Middle East. Once again, none of the 143 visits or 40 games, maneuvers, or exercises was identified as having an effect on the local superpower balance, while two of the 155 other deployments were considered to influence the balance. Thus, Table 3-16 indicates that the Arab papers do not mistake symbolic force events for critical developments affecting the local superpower balance.

Table 3-16.

## Symbolic Force Events and the Local Superpower Balance

<u>Type of Event</u>	<u>No. of Observ.</u>	<u>Aggregate Space (cm<sup>2</sup>)</u>	<u>Affecting Local Superpower Balance</u>		<u>Space</u>	
			<u>Observ.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>(cm<sup>2</sup>)</u>	<u>%</u>
Visits	143	22,665	0	0	0	0
Games, maneuvers, exercises	40	2,401	0	0	0	0
Totals	183	25,066	0	0	0	0
Note: Other Deployments	155	15,547	2	1.3	686	4.1

8. Symbolic force events are not related by the media to local superpower military capabilities.

Symbolic force events are not perceived to have an affect on local superpower military capabilities. Unlike the other possible affects, local capabilities could conceivably be affected by visits, maneuvers, and the like. Nevertheless, none of the 143 visit observations or the 40 observations relating to maneuvers, games, and exercises was stated by the newspapers to be likely to affect U.S. or Soviet capabilities. Somewhat surprisingly, only one of the other 155 deployments was expected to have such an effect, according to the newspapers. Table 3-17 summarizes the data.

Table 3-17.

## Symbolic Force Events and Local Superpower Military Capabilities

<u>Type of Event</u>	<u>No. of Observ.</u>	<u>Aggregate Space (cm<sup>2</sup>)</u>	<u>Having an Effect</u>		<u>Space</u>	
			<u>Observ.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>(cm<sup>2</sup>)</u>	<u>%</u>
Visits	143	22,665	0	0	0	0
Games, maneuvers, exercises	40	2,401	0	0	0	0
Totals	183	25,066	0	0	0	0
Note: Other deployments	155	16,547	1	0.6	586	3.5

9. Symbolic force events are not related by the media to the global military balance.

Although the final hypothesis concerning symbolic force events is confirmed, as were the preceding three, one visit<sup>1</sup> of the 143 was perceived and stated to have an affect on the global military balance. None of the 40 games, maneuvers, or exercises was so viewed, but two other deployments were seen to have this effect, as Table 3-18 shows.

Table 3-18.

Symbolic Force Events and the Global Military Balance

Type of Event	No. of Observ.	Aggregate Space (cm <sup>2</sup> )	Affecting Global Balance			
			Observ. %		Space %	
Visits	143	22,665	1	0.7	150	0.7
Games, maneuvers, exercises	40	2,401	0	0	0	0
Total	183	25,066	1	0.5	150	0.6
Note: Other deployments	155	16,547	2	1.3	1,745	10.5

10. Arab media pay little heed to superpower military manpower educational levels.
- 11a. Arab media similarly do not discuss superpower military manpower training procedures in specific terms.
- 11b. Arab media, in the context of on-going training of their own military personnel (i.e., that of their country of publication of sponsorship) by a superpower military mission in country, do discuss in general terms training of superpower military personnel in the country providing them training, but primarily to highlight strengths of and contrasts in (modifications of) the training program.
- 12a. Similarly, only in the context of on-going training of their own military personnel by a superpower military mission in country do Arab media discuss the training level of superpower military manpower.
- 12b. Detailed discussion of training cycles, training time, and training rate of superpower military manpower are absent from Arab media.

The Arab press pays even less attention to qualitative manpower factors than we expected. There is virtually no discussion of the subject among the more than 2,000 observations distributed

<sup>1</sup>"The Pentagon Misleads Congress Regarding the Diego Garcia Island," *Al Ahram* (1 October 1975), p. 2.

over ten years.<sup>2</sup> Thus, hypotheses 10, 11a, and 12b are confirmed. Hypotheses 11b and 12a are disconfirmed.

13. There is little discussion of the relationship between military manpower quality and global military balance.

As might be expected from the results of the preceding hypotheses, there is no discussion of the relationship of superpower military manpower quality to the Soviet-American military balance.

Table 3-19.

Relationship of Superpower Military Manpower Quality  
to the Global Military Balance

Manpower Quality Observations	Space	Affecting Global Balance			
		Observ.	%	Space	%
0	0	0	-	0	-

14. The only general discussion in Arab media of superpower military manpower quantity derives from superpower force reduction talks.

This hypothesis is disconfirmed. There is very little attention given in the media to quantitative aspects of superpower military manpower, even if considerably more than that allocated to qualitative aspects. Interestingly, articles were quite brief (only slightly over 40 cm<sup>2</sup> in average length). Of the eight pertinent observations, only one was related to MBFR or SALT.

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<sup>2</sup>But see "Grave Facts in a Congressional Report--One-third of America's Strategic Forces are not in a State of Readiness and the Equipment is at a Minimum Working Condition for Fighting Operations," *Al Ahrām* (23 May 1972), p. 2, reporting a study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). The study indicated a low level of readiness among one-third of American strategic forces and singled out the presence of unqualified personnel and unsuitable military returnees from Vietnam as major human factors in that regard.



- 15a. There is little discussion of the relationship of manpower quantity to the superpower military balance.

We had hypothesized that manpower quantity, like its qualitative counterpart, would not be seen by the media to have an appreciable effect on the U.S.-Soviet force balance. However, fully half of the eight observations dealing with quantitative aspects of American and Soviet manpower indicated some effect of the event on the global balance. See Table 3-20.

Table 3-20.

Superpower Military Manpower Quantity and the Global Balance

<u>Newspaper</u>	<u>Observ.</u>	<u>Space</u>	<u>Affecting Global Balance</u>			
			<u>Observ.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Space</u>	<u>%</u>
<i>Al Ahram</i>	3	103	1	33.3	38	36.9
<i>Al Hayat</i>	3	170	3	100.0	170	100.0
<i>Al Nahar</i>	2	50	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	8	323	4	50	208	64.4

These articles deal with data provided by high-ranking defense-related personnel in the U.K. or the United States, some in interviews or speeches. Given the original or immediate sources of the articles, it is hardly surprising that such a high proportion relate the events to the military balance.

- 15b. There is some discussion of the quantitative superiority of Warsaw Pact forces over NATO forces in Central Europe. The discussion is limited, however, to the balance in Europe.

None of the coded articles dealt in any substantive way with the central European balance or specifically with the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance. However, it should be recalled that in the process of defining the procedures articles that did not make or suggest any relationship to the Middle East were not coded unless they related to the U.S.-Soviet balance itself. Consequently, articles on the central front would probably not have been coded for the purposes of this study.

- 16 & Arab media do not discuss human factors' relationships to military  
18. materiel.

Although the problem of maintainability is a critical one in terms of the Arab-Israeli force balance due to human factors consideration,<sup>3</sup> there is virtually no attention given in our data to human factors aspects of weapons systems. As we have indicated previously, the newspapers did not deal with issues of super-power military manpower quality. This hypothesis is therefore supported by the data.

17. Superpower military manpower quantity and quality are not related by Arab media to the local military balance.

The quantitative and qualitative aspects of superpower military manpower are not tied at all by the media to the local balance of forces. None of the eight U.S. and Soviet manpower observations was stated to affect the regional military balance. Thus, the hypothesis is confirmed.

19. Arab media discuss and compare various items of specific military hardware at approximately the level of specificity of news (not analysis) items on this subject appearing in the major U.S. newspapers.

Arab media as a whole probably do not attend as closely to details about advanced and conventional weapons systems as major U.S. newspapers. The elite papers of the Arab world do, however, give substantial in-depth coverage to these subjects, particularly, it appears, when, like *Al Ahram*, they have a military affairs editor. *Al Nahar*'s detailed coverage of weapons systems were in

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<sup>3</sup>See, for example, R. D. McLaurin and A. R. Wagner, with the assistance of M. Agmon, L. Snider, and C. Wagner, *Critical Indicators of the Net Military Balance in the Middle East: Command, Control, and Manpower Readiness* (U)SECRET/NOFORN/CD/WNSISMI (Beverly Hills: Analytical Assessments Corporation and Alexandria, VA: Abbott Associates, Inc., 1977), *passim*.

articles from UPI,<sup>4</sup> *Aviation Week*,<sup>5</sup> or other publications, or else were discussions of such stories.<sup>6</sup> *Al Ahram*, however, in its series of "military education" articles,

- detailed early warning systems' capabilities and operations<sup>7</sup>
- discussed design and performance characteristics of the B-1<sup>8</sup>
- described the evolution of third generation ATGMs<sup>9</sup>
- provided an overview and analysis of U.S. reconnaissance aircraft,

including details on specific aircraft types such as the SR-71.<sup>10</sup>

In addition, many *Al Ahram* articles drew on various other sources to discuss performance and other aspects of the Soviet bomber,<sup>11</sup> the Chaparral,<sup>12</sup> and the new smart bombs<sup>13</sup> and stand-off weapons systems.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>*Al Nahar* (11 February 1975), p. 13.

<sup>5</sup>"An American Newspaper: The Russians Developed SAM-9 and SAM-10," *Al Nahar* (31 October 1973), p. 8.

<sup>6</sup>"American Nuclear Force as Stipulated by the Treaty," *Al Nahar* (28 May 1972), p. 11.

<sup>7</sup>Military education article. *Al Ahram* (6 September 1975), p. 5.

<sup>8</sup>Military education article. *Al Ahram* (2 August 1975), p. 5.

<sup>9</sup>"The Third Generation of Anti-Tank Missiles," *Al Ahram* (13 September 1975), p. 5.

<sup>10</sup>"The Secret of the Blasting Sound in the Cairo Sky," *Al Ahram* (7 January 1974), p. 3.

<sup>11</sup>"A New Intercontinental and Supersonic Sukhoi," *Al Ahram* (28 November 1974), p. 1.

<sup>12</sup>"New Anti-Aircraft Arms to Counter the Development of the Fighter Bombers. Three Basic Directions that Govern the Development of Air Defense Weapons," *Al Ahram* (2 January 1969), p. 6.

<sup>13</sup>Robert Stevens. *Al Ahram* (21 October 1973), p. 3. Reprinted from the *Observer*.

<sup>14</sup>"Development of Air-to-Surface Guided Missiles. The Second Generation of Missiles Achieves Safety for the Pilot and More Precision in Hitting the Targets. The English-French Missile is the Best Among the Modern Missiles," *Al Ahram* (23 December 1968), p. 6.

- 20a. Weapons performance is considered to have an important relationship to the local military balance.

Relatively few (3%) of the 149 articles dealing with weapons development and performance were explicitly described as likely to impact on the local military balance. This, however, is misleading, because one would expect few developments of such a nature to affect the balance. Another way of considering the issue, however, is to ask which types of developments impact most greatly on the local military equation. The answer is unquestionably that military aid and sales has the greatest effect: 88% of all articles indicating such an effect dealt with military aid or sales. Although only 3 1/2% of the observations considered likely to affect the balance were weapons development and performance articles, the proportion jumps to 28 1/2% if military aid and sales articles are removed from the total. Weapons development and performance then is viewed as bearing some relationship to the local military balance, even though it is not a critical one.

- 20b. U.S. weapons are generally considered superior in design and quality control to Soviet weapons of the same type. Exceptions are some SAM systems, ATGMs, and the Kalashnikov.

The media do not seem to consistently assume U.S. weapons superiority, so the hypothesis does not appear to be supported. In general, the United States is considered to enjoy an overall technology lead over the Soviet Union,<sup>15</sup> and this lead ramifies predictably on certain areas of complex weapons<sup>16</sup> systems such as, for example, aircraft, when even the MIG-23 is considered inferior to many Western aircraft.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> See below.

<sup>16</sup> Cf., however, "The Voices are Louder in America to Save the Space Military Program from Trailing and Collapsing. American Defense Missiles Won't Be Built Before 4 Years. The Soviet Space Bomb would be Ready by Next Year," *Al Ahram* (November 1967), p. 2.

<sup>17</sup> Especially in electronics and ECM. See "The Russian MIG-23," *Al Ahram* (16 December 1975), p. 5.



However, in two areas--air defense systems<sup>18</sup> and ATGMs<sup>19</sup>--the volume of newspaper data suggests Soviet weapons superiority. (Despite substantial coverage of the TOW, evaluative content is minimal.)<sup>20</sup> Although there is relatively little discussion of artillery, Soviet equipment was also considered superior in that field.<sup>21</sup> The Soviet SAMs received particularly abundant laudatory newspaper attention; notwithstanding their overall mission effectiveness, Soviet SAM systems had a very low kill rate in the October War, and newer ECM and better tactics later in the war further reduced SAM-inflicted Israeli aircraft losses. Interestingly, the Arab press totally disregarded this aspect of air defense.<sup>22</sup>

- 20c. Because weapons systems capabilities--particularly in major items of equipment such as attack aircraft and PGM--are related to the military balance, the superpowers are seen to be in a position to control the outcome of military confrontation between local states through control of weapons systems made available.

Although few columns explicitly state that local military outcomes hinge on weapons transfers from the superpower, there is a clear implication throughout the media coverage that the United

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<sup>18</sup>"...Egyptian Air Defense. . .," *Al Ahram* (24 November 1975), pp. 3-4. "Europe is Exposed to a Quick Defeat If Attacked by the Arms with which Egypt Fought," *Al Ahram* (5 December 1973), p. 2. See also Drew Middleton's article in *Al Ahram* (18 October 1973), p. 3.

<sup>19</sup>*Al Ahram* (9 August 1975), p. 5. "The Third Generation of Anti-Tank Missiles," *Al Ahram* (13 September 1975), p. 5.

<sup>20</sup>"The World is Studying the Modern Arms Used in the October War," *Al Ahram* (25 October 1973), p. 3.

<sup>21</sup>"Egypt Used 44-KM Range Cannons in the October War," *Al Ahram* (5 January 1974), p. 1.

<sup>22</sup>Indeed, the U.S. HAWK, used by Israel, which most analysts consider more accurate than Soviet SAMs, was reported to be inferior to the SAM-3 in an *Al Nahar* article. (The article cited "foreign military sources in Tel Aviv" as the basis of the story.) "An Egyptian Campaign Against Nixon's Policy on the Eve of Announcing the Decision Regarding the Phantom. . .," *Al Nahar* (23 March 1970), p. 1.

States and the Soviet Union control the Middle East military conflict through transfers and withholding of military end-items. Considerable weight seems to be given to the ability to withhold equipment from the Arab states and Israel. The media discuss the arms transfer strategies of Washington and Moscow, too, as, for example, when the United States refused to sell AH-1 Cobras (and long-range missile launchers) to Israel largely because such a transaction would be expected to result in the Soviet supply to the Arabs of the Mi-24 Hind, which (the papers alleged) was believed by some U.S. policymakers to be more advanced than the Cobra.<sup>23</sup> Such a reasoning process sounds very much more typical of foreign perceptions of decisionmaking than of the actual transfer assessment.

21. Arab media assume a direct correlation between superpower technological advancement and the weapons systems the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have developed. The implicit media assumption is that while the incremental value of any single new weapons system may be marginal, qualitative factors and the general level of technology as a whole have key roles in the global military balance.

The FACES system was not developed to test implicit assumptions of media and editors and cannot confirm or disconfirm this hypothesis. References to weapons development and technological breakthroughs of the superpowers constituted approximately 300 observations. Of these, slightly over half referred to U.S. developments, and slightly under 45% to Soviet developments. (Approximately 5% dealt with both superpowers rather than either one.) Yet, while about 4% of Soviet developments were explicitly expected by the media to have an effect on the global balance, only 2% of U.S. activities were similarly treated.

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<sup>23</sup> "America Refused to Supply Israel with Advanced Missile Launchers," *Al Nahar* (23 February 1974), p. 1.

Yet, reading the press over the 1965-1975 period, one is left with the strong feeling that the United States does enjoy a technology lead over the Soviet Union, and that this strategic edge confers an important margin of influence on the United States. Certainly, the Arab perception of U.S. ability to support Israel's existence is related to this edge.

- 22a. Arab media pay close attention to the establishment and disestablishment of military missions in Middle East countries.

The data set has 25 observations relating to foreign military missions, certainly a small number in a set that includes almost 2,400 observations over a decade. Although no agreed definition exists for "military mission," we intend by the term to include an institutionalized and organized training or arms transfer presence. American examples might be GENMISH and ARMISH MAAG in Iran, MUSLO (Morocco), and USLOT (Tunisia), as well as the missions in Turkey, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. For the Soviets, the large training efforts in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, and, more recently, Libya clearly qualify.

There were relatively few opportunities for the media to react to the opening or closing of military missions during the decade 1965-1975. USLOT was established during that period, but USLOT always operated in a low-visibility manner. Table 3-21 displays data on military missions.

Table 3-21.

Military Missions: Actions

<u>Action</u>	<u>Observations</u>	<u>Proportion of Total Subject Observations</u>	<u>Space (cm<sup>2</sup>)</u>	<u>Proportion of Total Subject Observations</u>
Establish	6	24.0%	1,323	16.6%
Disestablish	11	44.0%	5,145	64.6%
Request to disestablish	2	8.0%	1,080	13.6%
Maintains	6	24.0%	418	5.2%
Total	25	100.0%	7,966	100.0%

Data in Table 3-22 suggest that although close attention is given to issues associated with the establishment and disestablishment of military missions relative to other aspects of those missions, the media do not devote disproportionate attention to these issues relative to other force events and developments. Table 3-22 identified the coverage provided to specific countries sending and hosting military missions in the Middle East. It should be noted that some missions received absolutely no coverage.

Table 3-22.

Coverage of Military Mission Hosts and Sponsors

<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Host</u>	<u>Observations</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Space</u>	<u>%</u>
United States	Iran	2	8	255	3.2
	Saudi Arabia	1	4	45	0.6
U.S.S.R.	Algeria	1	4	20	0.3
	Egypt	18	72	7,398	92.9
	Libya	1	4	90	1.1
	Somalia	1	4	50	0.6
	Sudan	1	4	78	1.0
	Syria	2	8	35	0.4
	Yemen Arab Rep.	1	4	80	1.0
		<u>25<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>112<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>7,966<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>101.1<sup>a</sup></u>

<sup>a</sup>Several articles dealt with more than one country, so that 25 observations held 28 observations about various countries. Similarly, if one added space by observations-by-country, the total would be 8,051 cm<sup>2</sup>. We have given exact figures by country and subject totals. That is the reason for the percentage totals.

- 22b. A greater proportion of the media attention given to military missions is analytical than the analytical amount of coverage of other issues taken as a whole.

In fact, very little of the press coverage devoted to military missions is analytical, as Table 3-23 demonstrates. This hypothesis, then, is disconfirmed convincingly.



Table 3-23.

## Analytical and Editorial Coverage

Theme	Observ.	Analytical Coverage				Editorial Coverage			
		Observ.	%	Space	%	Observ.	%	Space	%
Intelligence	39	4	10.3	1,948	38.8	3	7.7	338	6.7
Subject of military intervention	47	2	4.3	717	12.9	9	19.1	1,017	18.3
Visits	143	1	0.7	150	0.7	0	0	0	0
Manpower	8	2	25.0	60	18.6	0	0	0	0
Sending of civilian/military personnel	157	5	3.2	600	4.4	4	2.5	515	3.8
Weapons development/performance	149	44	29.5	14,879	65.9	0	0	0	0
Technological breakthrough	167	26	15.6	19,049	21.0	4	2.4	480	0.5
Bases	160	22	13.8	7,105	38.7	7	4.4	495	2.7
Military missions	25	3	12.0	1,943	24.4	0	0	0	0
Threats	82	1	1.2	800	8.2	15	18.3	2,372	24.3
Maneuvers, games, exercises, deployments	195	4	2.1	2,881	15.2	5	2.6	454	2.4
Provision of assistance	11	0	0	0	0	1	9.1	418	24.3
Airlift/sealift	49	4	8.2	1,057	23.3	0	0	0	0
Military assistance and sales	837	25	3.0	11,771	11.1	66	7.9	10,608	10.0
Military operations	87	12	13.8	6,524	32.7	23	26.4	3,083	15.4
U.S.-Soviet strategic balance	198	21	10.6	7,919	33.8	4	2.0	270	1.2
Recalls, alerts, etc.	32	1	3.1	342	8.1	0	0	0	0
	2,386	177	7.4	77,745	20.7	141	5.9	20,050	5.3

- 22c. The favorableness of the tone of the analysis is dependent on the bilateral relations of (1) the country of media publication or sponsorship and (2) the country providing the training. Less important are the bilateral relations of the host and the publishing/sponsoring country.

Not enough articles with a tone other than neutral appeared in this theme to test the hypothesis. However, in both instances where a tone was given, the tone was in accordance with the bilateral relations of the country of media publication and the country providing the training. The bilateral relations of the host and the publishing/sponsoring country accorded on one occasion and were irrelevant in the other.

23. Media react more to the preliminaries of establishment and disestablishment of military missions than to the acts themselves.

Arab media during the parts of the decade covered in this research paid greater attention to actions of opening and closing missions than to the preceding requests and decisions, disconfirming the hypothesis. As Table 3-24 shows, over two-thirds of all actions reflected by the media concerned the establishment or disestablishment of military missions, while less than ten percent addressed preliminaries.

Table 3-24.

Establishment and Termination of Military Missions

<u>Action</u>	<u>Observations</u>	<u>Proportion</u>
Establishment	6	24
Termination	11	44
Preliminaries to establish or terminate	2	8
Other	6	24
Total	25	100.0

- 24a. Arab media do not attend significantly to modifications in the mission, terms of reference, or size of foreign military missions.
- 24b. To the extent Arab newspapers address changes such as those discussed in 24a, the focus is entirely on changes in size.

In support of hypothesis 24a, none of the 25 articles dealing with military missions discussed any of the status or size changes mentioned in the hypothesis. All observations dealt with establishment, disestablishment (termination), or the existence (maintenance) of the missions (see Table 3-24). Consequently, hypothesis 24a was confirmed to such a degree that hypothesis 24b could not be tested as a result of the dearth of pertinent observations.

- 25a. Foreign military missions are not weighed as factors influencing either the local military balance or local superpower military capabilities.

Of the 25 observations addressing the subject of military missions, not one suggests any of the missions is likely to affect the local military balance or the military capabilities of either the United States or the U.S.S.R. In reality, however, the large-scale Soviet military training in Egypt did result in altering local Soviet military reconnaissance capabilities to surveil the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Moreover, the availability of Egyptian ports materially increased the flexibility of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron. Egyptian facilities supporting these activities, while not technically a part of the mission's role, were provided in exchange for the Soviet training effort.<sup>24</sup> In this context, two of the articles (8%) indicated that the military missions concerned did affect the local superpower military balance.

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<sup>24</sup>See R. D. McLaurin and Mohammed Mughisuddin, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: American Institutes for Research, 1975).

- 25b. The existence of foreign military missions does influence Arab media views on the speed, or likelihood of progress, of training and transfer of skills.

None of the 25 articles that address military missions suggests directly or indirectly that the missions may have any impact on the military development of the country receiving training. Moreover, national behavior does not consistently suggest this is the case. The Egyptians acknowledge the success of, but seem to give relatively little credit to, the Soviet training mission in Egypt as a key factor in the improvement of Egyptian military capabilities between 1967 and 1973. When reference is made to the weakness of Tunisia or the strength (or weakness) of Iran, observers do not refer to the U.S. missions in either country as a discrete factor. Rather, they concentrate on weapons acquisition, force size and activity levels, and military budget, or on non-military factors such as ideology, perceived or stated national objectives or interests, foreign alignments, and the like. The hypothesis is not supported by our data.

- 25c. Similarly, media demonstrate an implicit belief that the presence of foreign military missions increases the leverage of the country providing training with respect to the host country.

For the most part, Arab media like their Western counterparts focus on "news," in this case on developments with respect to military missions. There is relatively little analysis in most columns. In general, then, the newspapers did not advance statements making the hypothesized link between foreign military presence and foreign politico-military influence.

However, some columns discussed the relationship of Soviet facilities in certain Arab countries to training provided by the U.S.S.R. to those countries. Thus, it appears the Arab media see



*quid pro quo* for major training efforts not so much in terms of intangible "leverage" as of "tangible" returns. In Egypt, for example, Soviet naval and air facilities supporting strategic requirements (rather than Soviet Middle East needs) were seen to exist in return for the major training mission in Egypt.<sup>25</sup> Soviet missile and aircraft installations in Somalia were seen to represent a similar *quid pro quo*.<sup>26</sup> If the Arab newspapers were the evidence, one would conclude military missions and training provide little leverage. Empirically, we might conclude that this is far from an absurd observation, because many analysts have also concluded that military aid, sales, and training confer more leverage on the recipient than on the provider.

- 26a. Arab media discuss weapons systems research and development being carried on by the superpowers.

The Arabic press does follow weapons research and development. As Table 3-8 indicated, this theme is far from the most prominent, but it received six percent of the total observations and total space coded. Moreover, if one combines "technological breakthrough" and weapons data, the combined theme is easily the second most important in frequency and intensity. We have refrained from effecting such a combined theme analysis because "technological breakthrough" deals very extensively with civilian technology that is perceived to be likely to have an impact on military technology; it does not deal only with military technology.

- 26b. These discussions usually relate to the testing of new systems.  
26c. Coverage of weapons systems research and development is based on announcements by the parties carrying out the tests.

Although there are more observations dealing with weapons systems tests than with any other action on this subject, testing

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<sup>25</sup> "Soviet Soldiers Between the Canal and the Nile," *Al Nahar* (21 December 1971), p. 9.

<sup>26</sup> See *Al Ahram* (17 July 1975), p. 2.

represents 27 percent of the observations. Many (29 percent) address research and development other than testing, and fully 23 percent deal with performance. Table 3-25 shows the proportions of various actions concerning weapons development and performance.

Table 3-25.  
Weapons RDT&E Observations

<u>Action</u>	<u>Observ.</u>	<u>Proportion of Subj. Actions</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Observ.</u>	<u>Proportion of Subj. Action</u>
Tests	37	26.2	Increases	3	2.1
Develops	29	20.6	Changes/modifies	3	2.1
Operates effectively (perform.)	23	16.3	Considers	3	2.1
Deploys	18	12.8	Maintains	2	1.4
Has more than	11	7.8	Decreases	2	1.4
Produces	9	6.4	Requests appropriation	1	0.7

Of the 141 observations noted above,<sup>27</sup> only 30 (21.3 percent) were based on announcements by the party effecting the action. This was even rarer for weapons testing, where only 16.2 percent of the actions were based on announcements of the superpower<sup>28</sup> carrying out the test. Indeed, most observations dealing with superpower testing were based on revelations by the other superpower, viz., U.S. announcements of Soviet tests. See Table 3-26.

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<sup>27</sup>Eight observations on this theme were removed from the data set for the purpose of this analysis because of the nature of the actions which were marginal to this assessment.

<sup>28</sup>We have removed non-superpower actions from the data set for the purpose of the analysis. Non-superpower actions are included in Table 3-25, however.

Table 3-26.

## Announcements of Weapons RDT&amp;E and Performance

	Actor	Announcer	Tests	Develops	Operates effectively	Deploys	More than	Produces	Increases	Changes/modifies	Considers	Maintains	Decreases	Requests appropriation	Total
US	US	2	4	1	4	0	2	1	1	2	0	2	1		20
USSR	USSR	4	3	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0		10
USSR	US	15	8	1	7	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0		34
TOTAL		21	15	2	13	2	3	1	1	2	1	2	1		64

Coverage of Soviet weapons development is greater in Arab newspapers than coverage of its American counterpart, even though the vast majority of the news comes from Western (especially, U.S.) sources. Table 3-27 gives the weapons development and performance actions by superpower, showing the proportion announced.

Table 3-27.

## Weapons RDT&amp;E and Performance by Superpower Actor

Action	U.S.	% Announced	U.S.S.R.	% Announced	
				by U.S.S.R.	by U.S.
Tests	9	22.2	25	16.0	60.0
Develops	11	36.4	17	17.6	47.1
Operates effectively	5	20.0	15	0.0	6.7
Deploys	6	66.7	12	16.7	58.3
Has more than	1	0.0	5	0.0	40.0
Produces	4	50.0	4	0.0	25.0
Increases	2	50.0	1	0.0	0.0
Changes/modifies	3	33.3	0	--	--
Considers	3	66.7	0	--	--
Maintains	1	0.0	1	100.0	0.0
Decreases	2	100.0	0	--	--
Requests apppr.	1	100.0	0	--	--
TOTALS	48	41.7	80	12.5	42.5

27. Superpower R&D is related by Arab media to the local military balance, though even national deployment of these systems is usually years away in a very different military situation.

Of the 149 observations dealing with weapons development and performance, 12.8 percent were perceived to have an effect on the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. This is not particularly surprising, since weapons research is given considerable emphasis by U.S. government spokesmen in testimony before Congress. The media displayed little explicit recognition of the time lags between development and deployment. Less than three percent of the observations on weapons research, development, and performance suggested a major impact on the local force balance.

The relatively limited perceived local "effects" of weapons development and performance, on the one hand, and the very significant local effects level associated with military assistance and sales, on the other, seems highly incongruous. After all, it is the same weapons being discussed in both cases. This anomaly is probably explained by the Arab perception that the superpowers, and particularly the United States, can in large measure control the Arab-Israeli conflict.

28. Weapons R&D is not related to the local superpower military balance. However, Arab media do consider the effect on local superpower military capabilities of weapons systems research.

The media do not give credence to the importance of weapons research with respect to the local force balance of the superpowers, since none of the relevant observations posited any such effect.

Counter-intuitively, neither did the Arab newspapers have a single observation dealing with weapons R&D that stated a likely impact on the regional military capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union. We had expected coverage of Soviet naval carrier procurement or construction or Western aircraft to demonstrate such an effect.



Hypothesis 28, then, is supported, while hypothesis 29 is not. Table 3-28 provides comparative information on four possible effects of force events across themes.

Table 3-28.

Effects by Subject (Frequency)  
(Observations)

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Local Balance</u>	<u>Local Superpower Balance Capabilities</u>	<u>Global Balance</u>	<u>Total</u>	
Military assistance & sales	98	1	1	100	
U.S.-Soviet strategic balance	1	2	2	60	65
Maneuvers, move- ments, deployments	2	2	1	2	7
Technological breakthroughs			2	2	
Bases		2	14	16	
Sending of civilian/ military personnel			1	1	
Weapons development/ performance	4		19	23	
Visits			1	1	
Military Operations					
Threats	1	1		2	
Airlift/sealift	4			4	
Subject of military intervention					
Intelligence	2			2	
Recalls, alerts, etc.			3	3	
Military missions		2		2	
Provision of assistance		1		1	
Manpower			3	3	
	<u>112</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>232</u>

30. In view of the source (26c, above), most R&D is related to the superpower global military balance.

Table 3-29 shows the proportion of observations in each theme category that represent perceptions of impact and the proportion each theme category supplies of the total effect observations of each type. Realistically, one cannot expect--and does not find--any subject in which the majority of observations is expected to have a pronounced effect on any type--global or local, superpower or regional power. This refutes the hypothesis. At the same time a comparatively high percentage of weapons research and development observations is expected to have an impact, particularly on the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Table 3-29.  
Effects by Subject (Proportion)  
(In %)

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Local Balance</u>	<u>Local Superpower Balance Capabilities</u>	<u>Global Balance</u>	<u>Total</u>	
Military assistance and sales	11.7 87.5	0.0 9.1	0.1 25.0	0.0 0.0	11.9 43.1
U.S.-Soviet strategic balance	0.5 0.9	1.0 18.2	1.0 50.0	30.3 57.1	32.8 28.0
Maneuvers, movements, deployments	1.0 1.8	1.0 18.2	0.5 25.0	1.0 1.9	3.5 3.0
Technological breakthroughs	0.0 0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0 1.3	0.0 0.0 0.0	1.1 1.9 8.8	1.1 0.9 10.1
Bases	0.0	18.2	0.0	13.3	6.9
Sending of civilian/military personnel	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.6 1.0	0.6 0.4
Weapons development/performance	2.7 3.6	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	12.8 18.1	15.5 9.9
Visits	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.7 1.0	0.7 0.4
Military operations	0.0 0.0 1.2	0.0 0.0 1.2	0.0 0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0 2.4
Threats	0.9	9.1	0.0	0.0	0.9
Airlift/sealift	8.2 3.6	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	8.2 1.7
Subject of military intervention	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0
Intelligence	5.1 1.8	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	5.1 0.9
Recalls, alerts, etc.	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	9.3 2.9	9.3 1.3
Military missions	0.0 0.0	8.0 18.2	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	8.0 0.9
Provision of assistance	0.0 0.0	9.1 9.1	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	9.1 0.4
Manpower	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	37.5 2.9	37.5 1.3
	48.3 100.0	4.7 100.0	1.7 100.0	45.3 100.0	100.0 100.0

31. Weapons production rates and production schedules are not followed by Arab media except insofar as these schedules may impact adversely on U.S. military aid commitments.

Production rates and schedules are not discussed systematically by the Arab press, but neither are they by most American or Soviet newspapers. There seems to be a much less direct relationship between articles dealing with weapons production and U.S. arms transfers than we had anticipated. Indeed, of the few articles addressing the subject, the balance in U.S.-Soviet inventories<sup>29</sup> was clearly a more frequent issue than arms transfers, and transfers as a subject concerned the effects of past (U.S.) transfers to Israel<sup>30</sup> (and Vietnam)<sup>31</sup> rather than future commitments.

If this journalistic characteristic applies to Arab Middle East leaders, it is likely that production impediments to desired arms transfers might be credible but not persuasive. (Evidence shows that Israeli leaders by contrast are intimately familiar with American production rates and schedules which play an important role in determining the credibility of weapons transfer commitments.)

32. Newspapers of the Arab world discuss major breakthroughs in weapons technology only when appropriate attention is devoted to such breakthroughs in announcements by the national leadership of the country experiencing the breakthrough.

Since the original source of less than 10 percent of observations dealing with technological breakthroughs was a government source, this hypothesis seems to be invalid. Soviet breakthroughs that are reported are frequently

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<sup>29</sup>See *Al Ahram*, 26 August 1975, p. 2.

<sup>30</sup>"Arming Israel and Its Effects," *Al Ahram*, 17 December 1974, p. 1.

<sup>31</sup>"An American Military Report: Arms Shipments to Israel Weakened American Military Readiness," *Al Ahram*, 31 December 1975, p. 1.



announced by Western governments, and Western technology advances in the newspapers derive principally from Western news agency-carried stories.

33. The Arab press has no means for estimating the time lags between technological breakthroughs and application of the breakthrough to weapons through (a) systems design, (b) weapons systems production, and (c) deployment. Consequently, there is little explicit recognition of this lag.

While it may be true that Arab media have no accurate way of determining the extent time lags, 8.2 percent of the articles dealing with technology breakthroughs and weapons development and performance mentioned time lags. Recognizing that most of the articles dealt with subjects only tangentially related to the effect of time lags on new systems' deployments, the figure seems quite high.

Thus, there is a surprising degree of recognition of time lags in weapons research and technology breakthroughs.

- 34a. Arab media attend to deployments of new weapons systems to local  
34b. forces. Only major weapons systems attract Arab newspaper attention in non-local deployments.

There is surprisingly little attention given to the new weapons systems deployments in local (Middle East and Persian Gulf) force structures. This may be due to the security precautions of regional governments which do not publicize new deployment details.

Media attention to non-local deployments is devoted almost exclusively to major weapons systems: 96 percent of the coverage of such deployments concerned major weapons systems. See Table 1-30.

Table 3-30.

## Locus and Effects of Deployments

Weapons Systems			Deployment to			Effects		
Major	Unknown	Other	Local Forces	Non-local Forces	Local Superpower Forces	Local Balance	Local Superpower Capabilities	Global Balance
X			0					
X				22				6
X					62			
		X	1					
		X		1				
		X			8			
X			1					
X				2				
X					47	2		

35a., Research-deployment time lags, because they are not recognized or  
 36a., weighed, are not related by the Arab press to the local military  
 37a., balance, global military balance, local superpower military  
 38a. balance, or to local superpower military capabilities.

With the recognition given time lags between weapons RDT&E and actual deployment, it is not surprising that none of the observations in which time lags well considered suggested that the reported event would have an impact on the local military balance, on the local force balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, or on the local military capabilities. Slightly over 11.5 percent of the observations, however, still foresaw some effect on the global superpower balance. See Table 3- 31.

Table 3- 31.

Effect of RDT&E Time Lags											
<div> <div>No Time Lag (none mentioned)</div> <div>Time Lag</div> </div>											
Action	Observ.	Total	1 <sup>a</sup>	2 <sup>b</sup>	3 <sup>c</sup>	4 <sup>d</sup>	Total	1 <sup>a</sup>	2 <sup>b</sup>	3 <sup>c</sup>	4 <sup>d</sup>
Tests	177	174				5	3				
Develops	35	25			1	2	10				1
Has more than	24	24				1	0				
Operates effectively	22	21			3		1				
Deploys	18	15				5	3				
Produces	9	7					2				1
Other	31	24					7				
	<u>316</u>	<u>265</u>			<u>4</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>26</u>				<u>2</u>

<sup>a</sup>1 signifies that the stated impact is on the local superpower force balance.

<sup>b</sup>2 signifies that the stated impact is on local superpower military capabilities.

<sup>c</sup>3 signifies that the stated impact is on the local military balance.

<sup>d</sup>4 signifies that the stated impact is on the global military balance.

35b, Deployments of new weapons systems to local superpower military  
37b. forces are related by the media to the local military balance and  
to local superpower military capabilities.

New weapons systems deployed to local units of U.S. and Soviet military forces attract considerable attention but excite little concern. Only two observations posited an effect of such a deployment on the local military balance, and, surprisingly, not a single observation was credited with affecting local superpower military capabilities. Table 3-30 showed that over 80 percent of deployments in which areas affected were identifiable were deployments to regional U.S. and Soviet forces. Given the heavy coverage granted regional U.S. and Soviet deployments, the less-than-two percent expected to affect the local military balance is probably a reasonable figure.

- 35c. Deployment of new weapons systems to local superpower forces has no major impact on political or military thinking.

Only major deployments generate any significant level of attention to new weapons systems. Insufficient data precludes drawing any firm conclusions on this subject. The degree of impact depends to some extent, it appears, on perception of the local superpower balance. Thus, it was more difficult for U.S. deployments to create anticipated impact than for Soviet deployments which were more readily assumed to improve the Soviet position.

36. Although such deployments are related by the Arab press to the local superpower military balance also, research-deployment time lags are not.

It is clear from Table 3-31, Effect of RDT&E Time Lags, that the time between development and deployment is not associated with the local superpower military balance in the perceptions of Arab media. Neither, though, as we have seen (Table 3-30), were deployments to local superpower forces correlated to any great degree with perceptions of effects on the local military balance.

- 38b. Deployments of major weapons systems are related by the Arab press to the global military balance. Other deployments are not.

Of 84 deployments of major weapons systems to the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union, six (7.1 percent) were considered to impact the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. Over 70 percent of these major weapons deployments were to the Middle East and Persian Gulf elements of superpower forces, however, and none of these deployments was perceived to bear upon the balance. Thus, slightly over 27 percent of the major systems deployments outside the region were seen to be critical with respect to the global military balance. By contrast, no deployments other than those of major weapons were seen to have such effects. These data give strong support to the hypothesis.



- 39a. Arab media give substantial attention to agreements and negotiations regarding the establishment of foreign military and naval
- 39b. facility agreements in the region. An unusually great proportion of such coverage is of an analytical nature, generally negative.

Of the 160 observations dealing with bases, 7.5 percent dealt with requests to establish facilities; no observation concerned itself with an actual agreement. The 7.5 percent figure is reasonable, but less than we anticipated. More striking, only one observation was editorial in nature, none was an analytical or feature story; the bulk (92 percent) of the observations concerning negotiations toward the establishment of bases was news reporting.

Twenty percent of the observations on bases were critical, a high figure since many of the articles dealt with Soviet bases and thus, given the coding instructions, had no tone. As we hypothesized, an even higher proportion of observations addressing agreements and negotiations toward the establishment of bases was unfavorable: 33.3 percent (including the one editorial).

- 40. News articles concerning the establishment of foreign bases in the Middle East depend upon statements of the foreign power establishing the base to state its purpose. Analytical articles are characterized by independent assessments of the "true" purposes of the facility.

Only 11 of the 47 event observations dealing with the establishment of military and naval bases derived from announcements or disclosures of the establishing power. Thirty-six (77 percent) observations came from other countries or from news services with no original source attribution. There were no feature (or analytical) articles that addressed the establishment of bases.

- 41. The only type of change in foreign bases or facilities attended to by the Arab press is change in size.

Arab media monitor significant changes in terms of reference and status, particularly as they relate to conflict in the Middle East. Of 30 base changes, attention was divided approximately

equally between changes of status and changes in terms of reference. Not a single observation addressed the change in size of a base.

- 42., Superpower military facilities in and around the Middle East are
- 43., related by Arab media to the local military balance, to the local
- 44. superpower military balance, and to local superpower military capabilities.

Bases in the Middle East are not seen to play a critical role in the local politico-military situation. Only 1.25 percent of the bases observations indicated that the event would affect the local military balance of the superpowers, and none of the observations on this subject projected an impact on the local military balance or on the military capabilities of the United States and the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East-Persian Gulf area.

- 45. Regional superpower military facilities are not given great weight in assessments by Arab media of the global military balance.

By contrast, and counter-intuitively, a much greater impact on the strategic balance between the two superpowers was indicated by the base data: 8.75 percent of the observations related events that were perceived to impact the balance. Thus, base events in the Middle East/Persian Gulf area were exceeded in number only by weapons development and performance and, of course, U.S.-Soviet strategic balance observations as categories affecting the global military equation.

- 46a. Local media pay little attention to routine exercises and maneuvers.
- 46b. Deployments during crises attract elite attention.
- 46c. Abnormal deployments during crises attract greater elite attention and introduce uncertainty and worst-case thinking to Middle East elites.

Table 3-32.  
Exercises, Maneuvers, and Deployments

Activity	Crisis		Non-Crisis	
	Observ.	Space (cm <sup>2</sup> )	Observ.	Space (cm <sup>2</sup> )
Exercises & Maneuvers	9	464	32	1,957
Deployments	90	10,749	63	5,758
Total	99	11,213	95	7,715

Surprisingly, exercises and maneuvers do not seem to attract much more attention in crisis than in non-crisis periods. They receive slightly more space in non-crisis periods (61.2 cm<sup>2</sup> to 51.6 cm<sup>2</sup>) and are almost three times as frequently covered. Although the relative rarity of crises (even in the Middle East) is greater than this, one must consider the fact that the articles were selected to focus on such periods as the June and October Wars. Thus, hypothesis 46a appears rather questionable.

However, clearly crisis deployments attract media attention. Almost 60 percent of the deployments recorded occurred during crisis periods. The size of these articles was 31 percent greater than that of non-crisis deployments. Hypothesis 46b is supported by the data. (Hypothesis 46c cannot be conclusively answered on the basis of the data collected, but Table 3-33, "Effects of Force Movements," casts strong doubt on its validity.)

As a whole, 51 percent of the observations were related to crisis, and 59 percent of the space was devoted to crisis-coincident observations. Predictably, also, while only 20 percent of the editorials on the subjects were written for crisis-related or -coincident observations, 75 percent of the banner headlines on this theme accompanied deployments and other movements during crisis.

- 47a., Exercising and maneuvers of forces in non-crisis periods are not
- 48a., related by the media to readiness nor therefore to the local
- 49a. military balance, the local superpower military balance, or to the global military balance.

Of the 95 non-crisis observations of force movements, 32 dealt with exercises and maneuvers. None of these observations was related by the media to the local, global, or local superpower force balances.

- 47b., The Arab press relate exercise and maneuver deployments in crisis  
48b. periods to the balance of forces between local and superpower rivals.

Out of the nine articles focusing on exercises and maneuvers during crisis periods, none identified a relationship to the local or global military balances. Thus, the hypothesis is not supported by the evidence.

- 47c. Middle East newspapers follow U.S. Marine strength in the Sixth Fleet as an indicator of the likelihood of Sixth Fleet employment in the Middle East.

There is no evidence to support this hypothesis. Because 117 observations dealt with Mediterranean events, the hypothesis should have found adequate support if it were valid.

- 47c., Deployments to local forces are related by the media to local,  
48c., local superpower, or global military balances, as appropriate,  
49c. in crisis periods. They are not so related in non-crisis periods.

Surprisingly, none of the 90 crisis deployments observations was explicitly stated to have an expected effect on the military balances at the global or local levels.

No deployments to forces in the Middle East, Persian Gulf, or other nearby areas during crisis ( $n = 72$ ) were perceived to affect the previously mentioned force balances. Surprisingly--and quite counter-intuitively--five non-crisis observations were perceived to have such effects.



Table 3-33.

## Effects of Force Movements

<u>Crisis-Relations</u>	<u>Observ.</u>	<u>Effects</u>		<u>Local Super-power Bal.</u>
		<u>Local Bal.</u>	<u>Global Bal.</u>	
Crisis-coincident	72	0	0	0
Non-crisis-coincident	49	2	2	1

- 49b. Crisis-coincident exercises and maneuvers do not lead local media to relate these acts to the global military balance.

Most deployments occurring during a crisis were not, of course, exercises or maneuvers. However, of the nine maneuvers, games, and exercises recorded during crises, none was expected by the media to affect the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, supporting the hypothesis.

- 50a. Arab media cover the airlift/sealift capabilities of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but depend on American and Soviet sources for their conclusions. Consequently, the Arab press pays substantial attention to events/acts that impact on superpower airlift/sealift capabilities.

Over half the observations on airlift/sealift matters come directly from American or Soviet sources, principally news agencies. If American and Soviet original-source observations are added, the figure grows to 78 percent. Table 3-34 shows that only one of these entries derived from a Soviet source (Tass), and that most of the remaining observations came from other Western sources.

Table 3-34.

## Sources of Airlift/Sealift Observations

<u>Immediate Source</u>	<u>Original Source</u>	<u>Observations</u>	
		(Frequency)	(%)
U.S.	U.S.	11	22.4
U.S.	Non-Western (Turkey)	1	2.0
U.S. and others	U.S.	6	12.2
None	U.S.	4	8.2
Foreign correspondent	U.S.	3	6.1
U.S. and others	None	3	6.1
None	U.S.S.R.	1	2.0
U.S. and others	Western (France)	1	2.0
U.S. and others	Non-Western	2	4.1
Western (U.K. and French)	U.S.	6	12.2
(Western U.K. and French)	None	3	6.1
Foreign correspondent	None	2	4.1
None	None	4	8.2
None	Non-Western	2	4.1
		49	100.0

- 51., Airlift/sealift capabilities of the superpowers are related by
- 52., Arab newspapers to the local military balance, local superpower
- 53., military capabilities, the local superpower military balance,
- 54. and the global military balance.

Articles dealing with airlift and sealift capabilities and operations were in our data population found to affect only the local military balance, as the newspapers perceived them. Four (8.2 percent) of the observations were so related, second most important among those categories impacting on the local military situation. (See Table 3-29.) We were particularly surprised that the media did not address the importance of airlift/sealift capability in the global strategic balance, since Western media discuss the subject frequently.

- 55a. Arab media distinguish clearly between FMS negotiations, agreements, and deliveries when these apply to Middle East FMS.
- 55b. Arms transfers to Israel are followed more closely at the decision stage than at the delivery stage. The media give credit for the delivery before it has been effected.
- 55c. The delivery of U.S. arms to Arab states is given greater attention than the delivery stage commands in U.S.-Israeli FMS. Credit is given both at the agreement and delivery stage, and the sale is not viewed as certain until delivery is accomplished.

Tables 3-35 and 3-36 below display the relative weight given negotiation, agreement/decision, and delivery of U.S. and Soviet grant aid and FMS to the Middle East. The contrasts between American and Soviet treatment are clear and are evidently related to behavior, since Soviet arms transfers are more often unadvertised until delivery is effected.

Table 3-35.

The Stages of U.S. and Soviet Military Aid  
and Sales to the Middle East (in Observations)

Supplier	Recipient	Internal Review	Negotiations	Agreement/ Decision	Deliveries	Total
U.S.	Arab states	18	53	33	11	115
U.S.	Israel	27	117	150	57	351
U.S.S.R.	Arab states	2	24	22	22	70
U.S.S.R.	Israel	0	2	0	0	2
		47	196	205	90	538

Table 3-36.  
The Stages of U.S. and Soviet Military Aid  
and Sales to the Middle East (in %)

<u>Supplier</u>	<u>Recipient</u>	<u>Internal Review</u>	<u>Negotiations</u>	<u>Agreement/ Decision</u>	<u>Deliveries</u>	<u>Total</u>	
U.S.	Arab states	15.7	46.1	28.7	9.6	100.0	Row %
		38.3	27.0	16.1	12.2	21.4	Col. %
U.S.	Israel	7.7	33.3	42.7	16.2	100.0	Row %
		57.4	59.7	73.2	63.3	65.2	Col. %
U.S.S.R.	Arab states	2.9	34.3	31.4	31.4	100.0	Row %
		4.3	12.2	10.7	24.4	13.0	Col. %
U.S.S.R.	Israel	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	Row %
		0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	Col. %
		8.7	36.4	38.1	8.7	100.0	Row %
		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	Col. %

The media do distinguish between the various stages of military assistance and sales to the Middle East. It is also true that decisions seem to attract more attention than deliveries--for both Israel and the Arab states. Credit is given, as we hypothesized for Israel, before the equipment is on line. However, delivery is more emphasized with respect to U.S.-Israeli transactions than in U.S.-Arab transfers, contrary to our expectations. Negotiations relating to U.S.-Arab arms cases are given substantially greater attention than American-Israeli arms negotiations receive.

- 56a. Arab media distinguish between various generations of weapons systems and levels of performance characteristics to the extent such distinctions are germane to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The press is less specific and sophisticated in its treatment of highly advanced systems not employed locally. A second factor in the treatment of weapons systems by the press is the extent to which transfer of specific items of equipment affects the military balance and, particularly, supports the Arab attempt to overcome Israeli military superiority.

Equipment attention is dominated by one type of equipment--fighter/fighter-bomber/attack aircraft--validating Lewis Snider's assertion that such aircraft are the pace-setters of Middle East armament. They account for approximately 29 percent of both observations and space associated with specified equipment or training. Table 3-37 provides a comparative overview of the amount of coverage devoted to different types of equipment (and training) during the coding period.

From Table 3-37 it is clear that the air war dominates Middle East thinking, because the two principal weapons are the attack aircraft, a category of equipment in which Israel's F-4 was long the symbol of Israeli military supremacy, and the Arab answer to the F-4, the surface-to-air missile. The SAM must be viewed in its context as an air weapon, a system designed to significantly reduce the damage the Israeli Air Force (IAF) could otherwise inflict on Arab ground forces.

The sophistication of weapons systems is--rather surprisingly--generally related to the length of the average observation. Table 3-38 gives in descending order the 14 systems with greater space per observation than the median.

It will be noted that all systems above the average point are important in the Middle East military environment. (We shall exclude "civic action" from our consideration here since it is not a weapons system in the generally applied meaning of that term.) Naval systems that may be considered advanced are neglected by Arab military planners.

Below, Table 3-39 shows the relationship of weapons systems to the local military balance in the Arab media. Table 3-39 shows the great change in perception of system effectiveness. Well over half all events expected to affect the balance before 1973 involved fighter/fighter-bomber/attack aircraft, while the role of SAMs and SSM and ATGMs was much less. Since the outset of the October War, however, attack aircraft observations no longer are seen as frequently to affect the balance, while SAMs, SSMs, and ATGMs are much more often expected to play key roles.

Both hypotheses are strongly confirmed by the data.



Table 3-37.  
Equipment and Training Attention in Arab Media

<u>Item</u>	<u>Observations</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Space</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Space/Observ.</u>
Bomber aircraft	15	1.4	1,953	1.3	130.20
Fighter/fighter-bomber/attack a/c	300	30.0	43,447	29.8	144.82
Helicopters	14	1.4	1,370	0.9	97.86
Reconnaissance a/c	27	2.6	7,489	5.1	277.37
Other aircraft	21	2.0	3,712	2.5	176.76
ICBM	14	1.4	776	0.5	55.43
SAM	120	11.6	18,526	12.7	154.38
ASM	16	1.5	4,206	2.9	262.88
AAM	10	1.0	1,694	1.2	169.40
SSM	51	4.9	6,367	4.4	124.84
SLBM	11	1.1	550	0.4	50.00
Other missiles	12	1.2	1,613	1.1	134.42
ATGM	25	2.4	3,324	2.3	132.96
PGM	13	1.3	2,548	1.7	196.00
ECM	7	0.7	1,654	1.1	236.29
Armor	61	5.9	7,296	5.0	119.61
Artillery	22	2.1	3,378	2.3	153.55
Destroyer	44	4.3	2,690	1.8	61.14
Cruiser	17	1.6	1,032	0.7	60.71
Submarine	23	2.2	1,731	1.2	75.26
Aircraft carrier	29	2.8	3,844	2.6	132.55
Helicopter carrier	7	0.7	1,010	0.7	144.29
Other naval	40	3.9	3,668	2.5	91.70
Small arms/ammo/FOS	31	3.0	3,141	2.2	101.32
Non-lethal equipment	34	3.3	4,398	3.0	129.35
Civic action	12	1.2	6,223	4.3	518.58
Training	31	3.0	3,833	2.6	123.65
Satellite	26	2.5	4,064	2.8	156.31
Other	2	0.2	185	0.1	92.50

Table 3-38.

## Intensive Media Coverage and Weapons Sophistication

	<u>Rank</u>	<u>System</u>	<u>Space/Observation</u>
mean	1	(Civic action)	(518.58)
	2	Reconnaissance aircraft	277.37
	3	ASM	262.88
	4	ECM	236.29
	5	PGM	196.00
	6	Other aircraft	176.76
	7	AAM	169.40
	8	Satellite	156.31
	9	SAM	154.38
	10	Artillery	153.55
average point	11	Fighter/FM/Attack aircraft	144.82
	12	Helicopter carrier	144.29
	13	Other missiles	134.42
	14	ATGM	132.96

Table 3-39.

## Weapons Systems Perceived to Affect the Local Balance

<u>System*</u>	<u>Post-1973</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>Pre-1973</u>	<u>% o f T o t a l</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>Effect</u>	<u>Effect</u>	<u>Effect</u>	<u>Pre-1973</u>	<u>Post-1973</u>	
Attack a/c	3	3	41	64.1	12.5	46.5
SAM	12	4	5	7.8	50.0	20.8
SSM & ATGM	8	1	0	0.0	33.3	8.9

\*Only those with five or more observations of "effect" are shown.

57. Arab media do not address sale terms or amounts in any meaningful way. The primary distinction is between grant aid and FMS.

Most articles dealing with U.S. security assistance and military sales do not discuss sale terms, but such a discussion would not be germane in the majority of cases. In a number of articles we found sale terms described in surprising detail.

Terms frequently reported involve

- total cost of the weapons package<sup>32</sup>
- delivery schedules<sup>33</sup>
- equipment modifications (in general terms)<sup>34</sup>
- restrictions on use<sup>35</sup>
- training elements<sup>36</sup>
- restrictions on transfer.<sup>37</sup>

In some cases, unit price is also mentioned in the articles.<sup>38</sup>

Predictably, arms sales with unusual sale terms or transfers that are otherwise controversial are more frequently assessed along this dimension than are other transfers.<sup>39</sup> Thus, Congressional debates such as that concerning the sale of HAWK missiles to Jordan in 1975 tend to arouse unwonted interest in terms of sale.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>"Announcing the Final Agreement of the Phantom Aircraft from America to Israel," *Al Ahram*, 27 December 1968, p. 1.

<sup>33</sup>*Al Nahar*, 18 July 1975, p. 13.

<sup>34</sup>"Israel Will Receive the Advanced Sky Hawk," *Al Ahram*, 9 December 1971, p. 1.

<sup>35</sup>*Al Hayat*, 16 September 1975, p. 6.

<sup>36</sup>*Al Nahar*, 11 January 1975, p. 12.

<sup>37</sup>"Christian Science Monitor: Saudi Arabia will not Buy the American 'Phantom' But the 'Mirage' and the 'Jaguar,'" *Al Nahar*, 5 January 1974, p. 10.

<sup>38</sup>*Al Hayat*, 6 June 1975, p. 7.

<sup>39</sup>"Iran Buys 30 of the Most Modern Fighters Produced by American Weapons Arsenals," *Al Ahram*, 12 January 1974, p. 2.

<sup>40</sup>*Al Hayat*, 12 September 1975, p. 7; *ibid.*, 13 September 1975, p. 6; *ibid.*, 14 September 1975, p. 6; *ibid.*, 16 September 1975, p. 6; *ibid.*, 16 July 1975, p. 6; *ibid.*, 23 July 1975, p. 1.

- 58a. Substantial media attention is paid to the training component of military sales. This is especially true in the case of in-country training. On the other hand, ammunition and FOS are not treated by the Arab press to any significant degree.

The Arab press has not given substantial coverage to training. Only 3.7 percent of observations dealing with military aid and sales address training. In-country training has attracted greater attention than its CONUS counterpart. As a whole, however, training has not been a high-visibility element in the Middle East media.

Ammunition, small arms, and FOS appeared in approximately the same number of observations as training, though with substantially less space devoted to the former. Thus, neither of these hypotheses stands up under analysis.

59. Non-lethal military sales are not viewed by the media as "military" transactions. Consequently, they are given less prominence and are not systematically followed except when the recipient is the country of publication or the country of sponsorship of the newspaper in question.

Non-lethal equipment--motor vehicles, electronic and communications gear, logistics materiel, and the like--received approximately the same amount of coverage as training and small arms/ammunition/FOS. It may be argued, therefore, that none of these items is considered truly "military," but other categories' data contradict such a suggestion. Rather, the political importance of certain international transactions and the critical role outside powers have played in resupply, as well as the growing awareness of the importance of infrastructure in sustained military operations, is believed to have elevated categories such as "non-lethal military sales" substantially.



60. Media do discuss security supporting assistance and other such economic military aid, but without the level of attention and absent the concern over the Congressional approval process.

While it is true that Arab media focus less on security supporting assistance--i.e., economic assistance designed to ease the burden of defense expenditures, or in other words, U.S. subsidies to foreign defense spending--than on other forms of security assistance and military sales, some attention to security supporting assistance to Israel was noted.<sup>41</sup> (There was virtually no other significant reference to security supporting assistance.) The several articles that dealt with security supporting assistance to Israel did, however, give substantial coverage to the role of the United States Congress.<sup>42</sup>

- 61a. Arms sales and deliveries are related directly by the press to the local military balance, particularly in the case of major and high technology weapons systems.
- 61b. Training is less directly related to the balance, probably because of the elusiveness of effectiveness measures. Nevertheless, Arab media frequently refer to the importance of improving training and levels of manpower performance in the Arab-Israeli military balance. (See 25b)

Hypothesis 61a is borne out by the data. Fully 61 observations concerning sophisticated weapons systems--most of them dealing with fighter, fighter-bomber, and attack aircraft or surface-to-air missiles--were related to the local military balance. This figure represents over half of all the observations expected to affect the local balance. Moreover, an additional group of observations projecting local force balance impacts dealt with a mix of high-technology and

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<sup>41</sup> E.g., *Al Ahram*, 20 October 1970, p. 1; *ibid.*, 20 December 1975, p. 2.

<sup>42</sup> See, e.g., "300 Million Dollars for Israel to Buy American Arms," *Al Nahar*, 7 August 1972, p. 1.

other systems, while yet others did not specify particular systems. Approximately two-thirds of all observations in which an effect on the local military balance was anticipated addressed advanced weapons systems in some significant way.

Predictably, training received much less attention. Only about a dozen observations dealt exclusively with training in the context of military assistance and sales, and none of these was viewed as likely to affect the balance. Another small group mentioned the training of arms transfers. (Of all military assistance and sales observations, 97 percent made no major reference to training.) It can safely be stated of these articles that training was not perceived to be a very important issue. (The reader should take care to consider the section on military missions, however, since large-scale training missions are included under that subject.)

- 62a. Arab media watch carefully U.S. national foreign policy debates as they affect the Middle East, and devote considerable editorial attention to such developments. Little heed is paid to similar Soviet debates.
- 62b. Less attention is paid to military strategy debates than to foreign policy questions. This is true of both the Soviet Union and the United States.

Originally, it was hoped that foreign policy articles as well as military affairs articles could be coded. Given the volume of data available and the resources, however, this approach was not feasible. Since foreign policy articles were not coded, comparisons of the type suggested here could not be made with the current data set.

- 63. News coverage of civilian roles related to military affairs is scant, unsystematic, and lacking in prominence.

Generally, civilian activities related to military affairs has attracted little attention. An exception to this general

observation is the stationing of U.S. civilian personnel in "early warning" or "monitoring" stations in the Sinai (following the Sinai II disengagement agreement) which generated substantial coverage in 1975. (See Tables 3-6 to 3-8.)

- 64a. Principal immediate (or secondary) news sources are Western press services.
- 64b. Principal original (or primary) news sources are statements of high-level officials.

The most heavily used immediate sources of news in the Arab newspapers surveyed are Western news agencies (press services). Tables 3-40 and 3-41 give comparative data on this subject.

Table 3-40.  
Immediate Sources of Newspaper Stories by Theme (In %)

1. Row #	2. Col. #	Source	Intelligence	ML Intervent	Visits	Empower	ML Civl	Wops Devl	Techno	Through Break	Bases	ML Missions	Threats	Refugees, Mover	Provs, Deploy	Attility	ML Aid	Sales	ML Ops	US Sov	Balance	MLs	Total
		UPI	3.1	0.6	3.1	0.0	4.3	11.0	3.7	6.7	6.7	0.6	2.5	8.0	0.0	3.7	35.0	1.2	14.7	1.8	100.0		
		AP	0.8	1.7	3.7	0.0	5.0	9.5	2.5	10.7	9.4	0.4	2.5	12.8	1.7	1.2	39.7	0.0	7.0	0.8	100.0		
		Reuters	2.7	1.3	4.0	0.9	4.9	5.3	0.4	8.4	16.2	0.0	5.3	10.2	0.4	1.8	45.1	0.0	8.4	0.9	100.0		
		Agence France Presse	2.3	0.6	5.2	0.6	3.5	6.4	1.7	6.4	9.4	2.9	7.6	11.6	0.0	2.9	38.4	0.6	9.3	0.0	100.0		
		TASS	0.0	4.0	12.0	0.0	8.0	12.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.0	4.0	4.0	36.0	0.0	8.0	0.0	100.0		
		ME News Agcy	0.0	0.0	31.1	0.0	2.2	2.2	0.0	15.6	0.0	0.0	11.1	4.4	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0		
		Palestine News Agcy	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0		
		Saudi News Agcy	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0		
		Syrian News Agcy	0.0	33.3	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0		
		Novosti	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0		
		Combined News Agcy	0.9	1.2	5.2	0.6	10.9	3.9	7.9	3.0	0.6	0.6	10.0	0.3	3.3	30.3	4.2	15.2	1.8	100.0			
		Combined West-ern News Agcy	0.7	1.2	5.9	0.0	9.6	3.0	13.8	5.4	14.3	1.2	2.7	9.4	0.2	2.2	33.3	4.9	5.7	2.5	100.0		
		Other Arab News Agcy	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0		
		NY Times	0.0	0.0	4.3	2.2	0.0	32.6	0.0	10.9	0.0	0.0	2.2	0.0	0.0	6.5	23.9	0.0	17.4	0.0	100.0		
		Times (London)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	83.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0		
		Other	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0		
		TOTAL	1.4	1.2	5.7	0.4	6.8	6.4	5.9	7.0	100.0	0.8	3.3	9.7	0.5	2.0	35.7	2.2	9.5	1.4	100.0		



Table 3-41.  
Ranking of Immediate Sources

<u>Source</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>%</u>
Combined Western News Agency	1	24.2	Saudi News Agency	11	0.2
Combined News Agencies	2	19.7	Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA)	11	0.2
Associated Press (AP)	3	14.4	Other Arab News Agencies	11	0.2
Reuters	4	13.5	Novosti	14	0.1
Agence France-Presse (AFP)	5	10.3	Palestine News Agency (WAFA)	14	0.1
United Press International (UPI)	6	9.7	Le Monde	14	0.1
Middle East News Agency	7	2.7	International Herald Tribune	14	0.1
The New York Times	7	2.7	Al Nahar	14	0.1
TASS	9	1.5	Time (magazine)	14	0.1
The Times (London)	10	0.4			

Thus, Western press services are responsible as immediate sources for 72.1 percent of the observations in the data set, and for 91.8 percent if one adds the "combined news agencies," which is reasonable since they may or may not include Soviet, Chinese, or eastern European agency sources but almost certainly include in every case Western Agencies.

Original sources are also heavily oriented toward the West, as Table 3-42 and 3-43.

Table 3-42.

## Leading Original Source of Newspaper Stories by Theme (in %)

## THEMES

1. Row Z  
2. Col. X

Source	Intelligence	Mil. Intervention	Visits	Manpower	Sending Civl	Performance	Techn. Break-	Threats	Maneuvers, Move-	Prov. Dejoy.	Airline	Mil Adl	Sales	Mil Ops	US Gov	Balance	Alcates	Total
Named Govt	1.9	2.4	1.9	0.5	5.7	6.1	2.8	7.5	0.9	0.9	19.8	0.0	5.2	25.5	6.6	7.1	5.2	100.0
Agency of	13.8	16.1	7.8	14.3	11.3	13.1	14.0	14.0	11.1	11.1	33.9	0.0	30.6	10.1	37.8	12.0	45.8	14.7
Ofcl Source																		
Anonymous																		
Govt Agency	2.6	2.1	6.3	0.0	11.5	5.2	1.6	10.4	0.5	0.5	10.4	0.5	2.6	37.5	2.1	3.6	3.1	100.0
or Ofcl	17.2	12.9	23.5	0.0	20.8	10.1	6.8	17.5	5.6	10.0	16.1	10.0	13.9	13.5	10.8	5.6	25.0	13.3
Source																		
Newspaper	1.7	2.6	4.3	0.0	9.5	3.4	0.9	7.8	1.7	0.9	5.2	0.9	0.9	50.0	2.6	4.3	0.0	100.0
	6.9	9.7	9.8	0.0	10.4	4.0	2.3	7.9	11.1	10.0	4.8	10.0	2.8	10.8	8.1	4.0	0.0	8.0
Other senior																		
member of	0.0	4.7	2.8	0.0	9.4	5.7	0.0	12.3	0.9	0.0	3.8	0.0	1.9	39.6	0.9	9.4	0.0	100.0
government	0.0	16.1	5.9	0.0	9.4	6.1	0.0	11.4	5.6	0.0	3.2	0.0	5.6	7.9	2.7	8.0	0.0	7.3
Head of																		
State	0.0	3.5	1.2	0.0	14.0	0.0	1.2	12.8	3.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	44.2	3.5	8.1	0.0	100.0
	0.0	9.7	2.0	0.0	11.3	0.0	2.3	9.6	16.7	0.0	9.1	0.0	5.6	7.1	8.1	5.6	0.0	6.0
Member of																		
Legislature	1.3	1.3	0.0	0.0	8.0	8.0	0.0	14.7	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	46.7	0.0	10.7	0.0	100.0
	3.4	3.2	0.0	0.0	5.7	6.1	0.0	9.6	5.6	0.0	10.9	0.0	0.0	6.5	0.0	6.4	0.0	5.2
Foreign																		
Minister	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	13.4	0.0	0.0	4.5	0.0	1.5	56.7	1.5	3.0	3.0	100.0
	0.0	3.2	0.0	0.0	5.7	0.0	0.0	7.9	0.0	0.0	3.2	0.0	2.8	7.1	2.7	1.6	8.3	4.6
Defense																		
Minister	0.0	0.0	4.5	3.0	1.5	21.2	0.0	1.5	1.5	0.0	3.0	0.0	3.0	27.3	0.0	27.3	1.5	100.0
	0.0	0.0	5.9	28.6	0.9	14.1	0.0	0.9	5.6	0.0	1.6	0.0	5.6	3.4	0.0	14.4	4.2	4.6
High-ranking																		
Pol/Min	3.4	1.7	0.0	3.4	1.7	13.8	0.0	3.4	0.0	0.0	29.3	0.0	0.0	12.1	0.0	27.6	3.4	100.0
Leader	6.9	3.2	0.0	28.6	0.9	8.1	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	13.7	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	12.8	8.3	4.0
TOTAL ALL	2.0	2.1	3.5	0.5	7.3	6.9	3.6	7.9	1.2	0.7	8.6	0.7	2.5	37.0	2.6	8.7	1.7	100.0
SOURCES	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(53)																		

From this summary table of leading original sources it is clear that the second hypothesis (64b) is also supported. Magazines and newspapers as original sources are relatively minor. (See Table 3-43.)

Table 3-43.

Leading Newspapers and Magazines (% of Original Sources)

<u>Title</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>%</u>
<i>The New York Times</i>	1	3.8
<i>Newsweek</i>	2	1.8
<i>Pravda</i>	3	1.6
<i>Washington Post</i>	4	0.9
<i>Al Ahram</i>	4	0.9
<i>Time</i> (magazine)	4	0.9

65. Although there are variations in sources across subject matter, the prominence of Western news services is clear in every case.

Table 3-41 supported this hypothesis in terms of immediate sources. Even if one combines original and immediate sources, however, Western press services have a dominant position, as the following table shows.

Table 3-44.

Leading Original and Immediate Sources

<u>Source</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>%</u>
Combined Western News Agencies	1	13.0
Combined News Agencies (unspec)	2	10.6
Associated Press	3	7.9
Reuters	4	7.6
Named Government Agency or Official Source	5	6.8
Anonymous Government Agency or Official Source	6	6.2
Agence France-Presse	7	5.8
United Press International	8	5.4

- 66a. There is little understanding of the complex federal decision-making process in the United States. Policies are viewed as facts representing the judgment of the entire federal government.
- 66b. Specifically, the Arab press do not understand the role or the changing role of Congress in foreign and military policy-making. The various types of Congressional acts are too many to be accurately reflected in the Arab press.

Arab media in our sample reflect a surprisingly sophisticated awareness of American federal decisionmaking. The media-- particularly in editorials --recognize that policies are often the expression of but one branch of government and understand that a range of conflicting objectives, priorities, and approaches exists within the government.

Specifically, the amount of coverage given Congress' role in decision- and policymaking exceeded our expectations. The newspapers gave substantial attention to the actions, values, and procedures of the U.S. Congress. Differences between the authorization and appropriation process were not well articulated, but other roles of Congress, and the overall importance of the legislative branch as a resource and constraint in foreign policy were evident in the Arab press.<sup>43</sup>

- 67a. Middle East elites follow the activities of the Sixth Fleet and view it as an ingredient in the Middle East power equation.
- 67b. The Arab press overemphasizes the Middle East aspect of Sixth Fleet objectives.

Newspaper data suggest that Mediterranean activities and movements are followed with some interest: 60 percent of such activities coded in the newspapers were in the Mediterranean. Of this group, about 45 percent of the observations dealt with the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

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<sup>43</sup> See, for example, the stories in 1975 on the Jordan HAWK sale, the Turkish arms/bases debate, and the U.S. Sinai technicians. Some examples are in *Al Hayat*, 31 August 1975, p. 8; *Al Sharq*, 9 August 1975, p. 1; *ibid.*, 13 August 1975; *Al Ahram*, 17 July 1975, p. 11; *Al Nahar*, 29 July 1975, p. 9.



From the ten-year data totals no firm conclusions emerge about relative attention to the Sixth Fleet, perhaps because data for the 1965-1974 period were not randomly selected. It is our impression from Table 3-45 that Arabs give less consideration to the Sixth Fleet as a Middle East actor in later years. If this were true, the 1973 and 1974 figures would be anomalous. However, they are explained by the attention to movements related to the October War, the Golan aftermath, and the Cyprus crisis.

Table 3-45.

Distribution of Sixth Fleet Observations Over Time

Sixth Fleet Movements, Maneuvers			Total Data Set	
Observations	Proportion (%)		Observations	Proportion
	of Theme	of Total		
0	0	0	1965	17
0	0	-	1966	0
12	22.6	14.8	1967	81
10	18.9	3.3	1968	305
1	1.9	0.5	1969	212
10	18.9	5.5	1970	182
0	0	0.0	1971	107
0	0	0.0	1972	203
10	18.9	3.6	1973	281
5	9.4	4.1	1974	121
5	9.4	0.6	1975	877
53	100.0	2.2		2,386
				36.8
				100.1

The data clearly do not support the hypothesis that the Sixth Fleet's Middle East role is exaggerated in the perceptions of the Arab press. The high points of Sixth Fleet coverage are during periods when that group's movements were directly related to major Middle East crises.

- 67c. The Arab press surveyed in this study considers MIDEASTFOR a flag-showing force having little military significance in terms of Middle East political or military events.

Comparative coverage of Sixth Fleet and MIDEASTFOR activities, and indeed of Mediterranean and Persian Gulf activities, tend to support the underlying meaning of this hypothesis--that the naval activities in the Persian Gulf are not salient to Middle East elites--as well as the literal meaning. The data on movements, maneuvers, exercises, and deployments do not contain a single observation relating to the U.S. Middle East Force. Indeed, the only references to MIDEASTFOR deal with the Jufair base.

- 67d. The Sixth Fleet plays a relatively minor role in Middle East political-military relations with the U.S., U.S.S.R. and Western
- 67e. Europe. MIDEASTFOR plays a somewhat greater role in this regard, as a function of the debate over the proper guardian of the security of the Gulf. Even in this case, however, the role is in no way decisive.

The Sixth Fleet plays a less significant role in the international relations of the Middle East than it did two decades ago when, as in 1958, it was seen as a legitimate actor on the Middle East scene. Today, though the fleet has played an active reconnaissance and intelligence role in each Middle East war and has been a major tool for pressure as recently as the Jordanian civil war of 1970, most of the Arab elites seem to exclude the likelihood of interventionary action by the Sixth Fleet. Such action is precluded, they feel, by the changed Middle East political environment, by the growth of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, and by the constraints of U.S. domestic pressures against foreign military operations. Recent Sixth Fleet actions have been of the "rescue-mission" type and do not affect European-Middle East relations.

At the same time, MIDEASTFOR plays an even less prominent political role in Arab Middle East newspapers. It is likely that the Persian Gulf media pay greater attention to MIDEASTFOR, but certainly the newspapers monitored for this study do not follow the activities of MIDEASTFOR, and MIDEASTFOR does not carry any political weight with the Levantine press.

68. In order of attention, the following events are followed most closely by the Arab press: (1) Middle East War (including crisis deployments and maneuvers), (2) foreign military sales, and (3) bases developments.

Because of the selection process used for the dates for which newspaper data were coded, a data-based comparison of these issues is not feasible. Unquestionably, however, newspaper coverage of Middle East war is the most intensive of any subject. Foreign military sales command far more aggregate attention than any other subject. Weapons developments and other technology issues, particularly space technology, receive substantial coverage, much of it very detailed and analytical in nature. Developments relating to foreign military and naval bases are not treated with more attention than many other subjects.

- 69a. Arab media pay attention to press conferences and speeches on the basis of coverage allotted to them by Western news agencies.  
69b. Interviews are covered largely on the bases of (1) their Middle East relevance and (2) the prominence of the interviewee.  
69c. Little weight is accorded to communiques.  
69d. The leaders whose statements attract attention are, for the U.S., the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense.  
69e. For the Soviet Union, attention is focused on statements by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Premier, Foreign Minister, and Defense Minister.

Out of 79 press conferences or speeches reported, 87.3 percent were carried from some direct source. Sixty-two percent of the coverage of speeches and press conferences derives from Western news agencies. The frequency of the direct source is shown in Table 3-46, Direct Source of Speeches and Press Conferences.

Table 3-46.

## Direct Source of Speeches and Press Conferences

<u>Direct Source</u>	<u>Frequency (%)</u>
Combined Western News Agencies	24.1
Reuters	17.7
Combined News Agencies (unspec.)	15.2
UPI	7.6
AP	6.3
AFP	6.3
Staff writer	3.8
Foreign correspondent	3.8
Tass	1.3
<i>The New York Times</i>	1.3
None	12.7

Interviews of key personages from the United States and the Soviet Union shows that neither frequency nor most measures of prominence appear to be correlated with the importance of the interviewee. (Size of the articles does seem to be determined to some extent by interviewee, but placement and headline size do not.) Table 3-47 provides some comparative data on treatment of key newsmakers by the media.

Table 3-47.

## Treatment of Prominent U.S. and Soviet Newsmakers

<u>Country</u>	<u>Official</u>	<u>Forum</u>	<u>Observ.</u>	<u>Total Space (cm<sup>2</sup>)</u>	<u>Space/ Observ.</u>	<u>P. 1 (Observ.) (%)</u>	<u>Banner Headlines (Observ.) (%)</u>
U.S.	President		104	20,461	196.7		
	Interview		5	830	166	4	80
	Press Conf.		9	2,025	225	9	100
	Congr. Test. or Debate		2	40	20	2	100
	Speech		5	955	191	2	40
	Congr. Hearings		0	0	-	-	-



Table 3-47 Cont'd				Total Space (cm <sup>2</sup> )	Space/ Observ.	P. 1 (Observ.) (%)		Banner Headlines (Observ.) (%)	
Country	Official	Forum	Observ.						
	Secretary of State		65	7,332	112.8				
		Interview	1	30	30	0	0	0	0
		Press Conf.	8	807	100.9	5	63	1	13
		Congr. Test. or Debate	4	460	115	2	50	0	0
		Speech	1	55	55	0	0	0	0
		Congr. Hearings	1	180	180	0	0	0	0
	Secretary of Defense		51	4,531	88.8				
		Interview	11	835	75.9	5	45	0	0
		Press Conf.	4	220	55	2	50	0	0
		Congr. Test. or Debate	4	365	91.3	0	0	0	0
		Speech	2	206	103	1	50	0	0
		Congr. Hearings	0	0	-	-	-	-	-
	Other Senior Members of Govt		34	5,098	149.9				
		Interview	2	165	82.5	1	50	0	0
		Press Conf.	1	100	100	1	100	0	0
		Congr. Test. or Debate	5	430	86	0	0	0	0
		Speech	1	60	60	0	0	0	0
		Congr. Hearings	0	0	-	-	-	-	-
	Named Govt Agcy or Ofcl Source		78	6,650	85.3				
		Interview	0	0	-	-	-	-	-
		Press Conf.	1	150	150	0	0	0	0
		Congr. Test. or Debate	1	95	95	0	0	0	0
		Speech	1	30	30	1	100	0	0
		Congr. Hearings	1	105	105	0	0	0	0
	Anonymous Govt Agcy or Ofcl Source		32	3,658	114.3				
		Interview	0	0	-	-	-	-	-
		Press Conf.	0	0	-	-	-	-	-

Table 3-47 Cont'd

Table 3-47 Cont'd				Total	Space/	P. 1		Banner	
Country	Official	Forum	Observ.	Space (cm)	Observ.	(Observ.)	(%)	(Observ.)	(%)
		Congr. Test. or Debate	1	85	85	1	100	0	0
		Speech	0	0	-	-	-	-	-
		Congr. Hearings	1	105	105	0	0	0	0
	High-ranking pol. or mil. leader		22	1,373	62.4				
		Interview	2	267	133.5	0	0	0	0
		Press Conf.	0	0	-	-	-	-	-
		Congr. Test. or Debate	1	180	180	0	0	0	0
		Speech	0	0	-	-	-	-	-
		Congr. Hearings	0	0	-	-	-	-	-
	Member of Congress		204	24,274	119				
		Interview	6	879	146.5	4	66.7	0	0
		Press Conf.	4	615	153.8	0	0	0	0
		Congr. Test. or Debate	11	915	83.2	7	63.6	0	0
		Speech	2	130	65.5	0	0	0	0
		Congr. Hearings	1	45	45	1	100	0	0
U.S.S.R.									
	Prime Minister		3	263	87.7				
	Foreign Minister		5	500	100				
	Defense Minister		35	4,729	135.1				
	Other Senior Member of Government		2	146	73				
	Names Govt Agcy or Official Source		2	144	72				
	High-ranking Pol. or Mil. Leader		5	410	52				

Communiques received by far the greatest weight among various official statements. The length of articles on communiques was particularly great, probably because communiques were quoted verbatim more than other official statements. But the average headline size was also much greater for communiques than for other

statements. Interviews, press conferences, and speeches were given substantially similar weight. Table 3-48 compares these and other statement origins.

Table 3-48.

Origin of Statements: Relative Weight

<u>Origin of Statement</u>	<u>Observations</u>	<u>Average Display*</u>	<u>Average<sub>2</sub> Size (cm<sup>2</sup>)</u>
Interview	81	2.1	100.26
Press Conference	70	2.2	148.03
Congressional Testimony or Debate	53	2.4	77.06
Proposed Bill Before Congress	11	2.5	86.36
Speech, lecture	39	2.3	138.72
Congressional hearings	4	2.8	97.50
Communique	14	1.7	278.36

\*Index is from banner headline, which is 1, to box. Thus, lowest average is most prominent display.

70. Greater editorial reaction follows announcements of (1) military sales and assistance, (2) changes in base status, and (3) the establishment of military missions.

Editorial reaction as a proportion of theme coverage is greatest in respect of military operations, threats, and the subject of military intervention. Overall, and over time the greatest amount of editorial reportage has been generated by military assistance and sales observations. Bases and military missions have generated relatively little editorial coverage. (See Tables 3-6 to 3-8.)

- 71., Middle East elites view the superpowers as being in a strategic stand-off globally. They do not follow the details of new weapons developments, but assume a mutual deterrence capability both globally and regionally.

The analysis of Arabic newspapers suggests that this hypothesis is valid. We have elsewhere written of this perception of strategic stand-off and its implications.<sup>44</sup> We found no suggestion that any newspaper saw either superpower as having a decisive edge in military capabilities. The awareness of and interest in events that are viewed as affecting the local balances of power between Arab countries and between the Arab states and Israel should be contrasted with Table 3-49 below.

Table 3-49.

Events Perceived to Affect the Superpower Strategic Balance

Theme	Observ.	E F F E C T S O N					
		Local Super-power Balance (Observ.) (%)		Local Super-power Capab. (Observ.) (%)		Global Balance (Observ.) (%)	
U.S.-Soviet Strat. Balance	198	2	1.0	2	1.0	1	0.5
Weapons Development/Performance	149	2	1.3	0	0.0	4	2.7
Technological Breakthroughs	167	2	1.2	0	0.0	0	0.0
Airlift/sealift	49	2	4.1	0	0.0	4	8.2
	563	8	1.4	2	0.4	9	1.6

Another way of viewing the small proportion of events expected to impact the U.S.-Soviet balance is that only 3.4 percent of all events dealing with these subject areas were perceived likely to have an effect on either the global or local superpower balance or regional military capabilities of the United States or Soviet Union. Meanwhile, over 11 percent of military assistance and sales observations posited some influence on the local military balance.

<sup>44</sup> R. D. McLaurin, "The Soviet-American Strategic Balance: Arab Elite Views," *International Interactions* (forthcoming).



The different levels of effect suggest that conflict salience dictates perceived effect. Although Arab media pay some attention to weapons systems developments, and the like, they are inclined to see the global rivalry as balanced, partly because of their distance from it, partly because of its complexities, and partly because Arab elites are principally concerned with their own local problems. Consequently, they tend to underestimate the role of specific force events on the global balance and overestimate the role of certain events that may be seen as in the category of a *deus ex machina* on the local balance.

72. The Arab press depends on Western sources, particularly Western news agencies, for information relating to the military balance. For analyses of the balance, the press looks to Western newspapers.

Table 3-50.

Immediate Source of Global Military Balance Articles

<u>Source</u>	<u>Frequency (%)</u>
Combined News agencies (unspec)	25.3
UPI	12.1
Combined Western News Agencies	11.6
Reuters	9.6
AP	8.6
AFP	8.1
Staff Writer/Reporter	5.1
Foreign Correspondent	5.1
<i>New York Times</i>	4.0
Tass	1.0
None	9.6

Exactly half the reports on the superpower military balance derived from Western news agencies (combined, UPI, Reuters, AP and AFP). In addition, much of the coverage by combined unspecified news agencies probably was wholly Western. Of attributed articles, the Western news agency frequency is even greater--55 percent.

Analytical or feature articles show a very different derivation, and one quite divergent from our expectations. Table 3-51 shows that approximately 81 percent of the feature (analytical) articles dealing with the superpower military balance and related issues were original with the newspapers, their staffs, or their correspondents. Only one article was directly attributed to a Western newspaper.

Table 3-51.

Immediate Source of Feature Stories on the Global Balance

<u>Source</u>	<u>Frequency (%)</u>
Staff Writer	47.6
Multi News Agency Sources	19.0
Foreign Correspondent	9.5
<i>International Herald Tribune</i>	4.8
None	19.0

Thus, only the first part of the hypothesis is confirmed.

The original source of observations dealing with this subject shows a similar Western orientation, as Table 3-52 shows.

Table 3-52.

Original Source of Global Military Balance Observations

	<u>% of Total Subj. Observ.</u>	<u>% of Western Source Observ.</u>
Western Origin News Articles	39.9	85.9
Western Origin Analytical Articles	5.6	12.0
Western Origin Other	1.0	2.2
Total Western Origin Observations	46.5	100.0

## CHAPTER 4. DECISION FACTOR ANALYSIS

### INTRODUCTION

An approach to assessment of Middle East reactions to U.S. military force different from empirical methods such as content analysis is to analyze the factors that influence Middle East state behavior. In a single country study, such an approach is frequently used to disaggregate decisionmaking. Similarly, many students have assessed the importance of one or two key factors (e.g., labor, nationalism, pan-Arabism) across several countries.

It is clearly true that decisions are made by people. The question is, to what extent can we generalize about the perceptions/lenses with which key decision-makers approach military force stimuli? What kinds of overlap are there in the cognitive maps of Middle East policy-makers within individual countries? If it is true, as several theoretical approaches to psychology and foreign policy analysis aver, that new data will be fitted into existing belief structures,<sup>1</sup> understanding those structures is clearly important. Various studies have been conducted using content analysis of speeches, writings, and source documents to develop cognitive maps or their equivalent. It is our view that this is vital research, but that detailed cognitive map equivalents cannot be reliably constructed for key regional decision-makers. When they do articulate views, the substance of the

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<sup>1</sup>Alternative hypotheses address the significance of belief/value change induced by increments of new information to the extent such information apparently conflicts with those extant belief/value structures. Does new information lead directly through its integration into model adjustment as the rational actor should expect (causal learning)? Or do modifications require time, the development of standard operating procedures, and reinforcement through success/failure experiences (instrumental learning)? Or, in yet another explanation (constrained learning), does the analyst avoid major adjustments in belief structures through ignoring (or seeking contradictions to) discrepant data, modifying only peripheral beliefs? In each of these approaches, some results attach to the introduction of discrepant information and the issue is the degree of belief modification that occurs. See J. D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); R. P. Abelson et al., *Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968); Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).



# Audience/Subject Country




Figure 1.




Figure 2.

talks (usually written by others, after all) may be intended to appeal to various audiences with belief structures perceived by the communicator to require certain approaches different from his own.

Thus, instead of plotting detailed cognitive maps, we have endeavored to determine gross belief structures owing to (1) allegiances (interest groups) and (2) group political culture relating to interaction with non-regional powers such as the United States. These are among the primary belief and value structures that come into play.<sup>2</sup> Using a model adapted from Shannon,<sup>3</sup> Deutsch,<sup>4</sup> Singer,<sup>5</sup> and Bonham, Trumble, and Shapiro,<sup>6</sup> a process like that portrayed in Figure 1 is suggested.

Introducing feedback mechanisms and processes at appropriate points into the model is refined as in Figure 2.

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<sup>2</sup>See also Marshall R. Singer, *Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships* (New York: The Free Press, 1972).

<sup>3</sup>Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, *The Mathematical Theory of Communication* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1949).

<sup>4</sup>Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (3rd edition, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966).

<sup>5</sup>Singer, *Weak States*, Chapter 1.

<sup>6</sup>G. Matthew Bonham, Thomas L. Trumble, and Michael J. Shapiro, "The October War: Congealed Beliefs and Historical Analogizing," paper presented to the annual convention of the International Studies Association, 1976; Shapiro and Bonham, "Cognitive Process and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," *International Studies Quarterly*, XVII, No. 2 (June 1973), pp. 147-174.

It should be recognized that this model is not theoretically limited to the two conditioning fields to which we are restricting ourselves; the preceding figures are designed to serve as a paradigm for the decisionmaking process of reaction. Nevertheless, because we believe interest groups and national/group political culture to be the most significant and--fortunately--reasonably identifiable factors, we shall operate as if they were the sole determinants of decisionmaking behavior.

Our initial intention was to identify decision factors--the lenses through which events are perceived--in isolation from interest groups. We anticipated that the factors would play a prominent role in the coalescence and dissolution of interest groups. As we studied the Middle East more carefully, however, it became apparent that interest group formation is as country specific in some respects as other decision factors. Thus, we decided to compare both interest groups and other decision factors relevant to U.S. military force issues across Arab Middle East countries.

#### Country Disaggregation

All Middle East Arab countries were first disaggregated into interest groups. The primary interest groups in the four primary countries in this study--Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria--were identified as follows:

##### Egypt

Arab Socialist Union Executive Committees  
Businessmen  
Cabinet  
Christian Clergy  
Military  
Press  
Technocrats  
*Ulama*  
University students

##### Lebanon

Armenians  
Druzes  
Greek Orthodox  
Maronites/Phalangists  
Middle Class/Merchants  
Shi'as  
Sunnis  
Palestinians

Saudi Arabia

Cabinet

*Majlis Shur'a*

Royal Family

Technocrats

*Ulema*

(Security forces)

Syria

Alawis

Baath

Executive

Middle Class/Merchants

Military

Palestinians

Sunnis

From these and the interest groups in the other Arab states, we collapsed the groups into the following types:

1. Executive
  - a. Executive (Chief of State and his immediate advisors)
  - b. Cabinet
2. Political parties
3. Military
4. Parliament/*Majlis*
5. Subcultural identity groups
  - a. Students
  - b. Technocrats
  - c. Press
6. Economic groups
7. Ethnic/religious groups
8. Palestinians

Key interest groups were compared across the Middle East the results shown in Table 4-1.

Decision Factors

Similarly, we constructed for each Arab Middle East country a list of perceived force uses that were expected to be salient, given specific military event stimuli. The categories of force used were as follows:

1. Arab-Israeli hostilities
2. other hostilities
3. external action-external effect
4. external action-internal effect



Table 4-1.  
Key Interest Groups in the Arab Middle East

	<u>EGY</u>	<u>IRQ</u>	<u>JOR</u>	<u>LEB</u>	<u>SAUDI ARABIA</u>	<u>SYR</u>
Executive	X	X	X		X	X
Cabinet	X	X			X	
Parties	X	X				
Military	X		X		X	X
Parliament					X	
Students	X					
Technocrats	X				X	
Press	X					
Economic Groups				X		X
Ethnic/religions	X	X		X	X	X
Palestinians			X	X		X

5. internal action

6. covert internal action

"Arab-Israeli hostilities" suggests that the most salient issue area concerning the use of U.S. force to the elites of a given country relates to the employment of U.S. force in connection with Arab-Israeli hostilities. (It is not necessary either that the action take place in the subject country or that the subject country take an active part in the hostilities.) Similarly, "other bilateral hostilities" means that the most salient issue area concerning the use of U.S. force to the elites of a given country relates to the employment of U.S. force in connection with military hostilities other than of an Arab-Israeli nature. "External action with external effect" is used to indicate a situation in which the most salient issue area concerning the use of U.S. force to the elites of a given country relates to the employment of U.S. force outside the subject country in such a way that the country's regional allies/supporters or enemies/opponents are strengthened or weakened. Use of force in connection with military hostilities is not included, since it is covered in the first two categories. Moreover, we do not distinguish between political and military effect. The next category, "external action with internal effects," means that the most salient issue area concerning the use of U.S. force to the elites of a given country relates to the employment of U.S. force outside the subject country in such a way that the subject country's political balance is affected. "Internal action" simply refers to a situation in which the most salient issue area concerning the use of U.S. force to the elites of a given country relates to the employment of that force within the subject country. "Covert internal action" is similar to the "internal action" category except that the fear/hope refers to a covert employment of force.

Examples are as in Table 4-2.

Table 4-2.

## Examples of Force Issue Areas

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Subject Country</u>	<u>Place Force Employed</u>	<u>Use of Force</u>	<u>Effect of Employment</u>
Arab-Israeli hostilities	Saudi Arabia	Israel	Transport of arms	Support Egyptian-Israeli war effort
Other Hostilities	PDRY	Iran	Transfer of arms	PDRY ally, Iraq, affected by sophisticated U.S. arms transferred to Iran and used in war.
External action- External effect	Egypt	Israel	Transfer of arms	Effect on Egyptian-Israeli relations of U.S. sending significant amounts of sophisticated arms to Israel.
External action- Internal effect	Syria	Egypt	Transfer of arms	Effect on Syrian politics of U.S. sending significant amounts of sophisticated arms to Egypt.
Internal action	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia	Seizure of oil fields	Seizure of Saudi oil fields.
Covert internal action	Iraq	Iraq	Supply arms to insurgents	Support Kurdish rebellion

For the four key countries examined here, the most salient force uses were:

Egypt

Arab-Israeli hostilities  
Internal action  
External action-external effect  
External action-internal effect

Lebanon

Internal action  
Arab-Israeli hostilities  
Covert internal action  
External action-external effect  
External action-internal effect

Saudi Arabia

Internal action  
External action-external effect  
External action-internal effect

Syria

Arab-Israeli hostilities  
Covert internal action  
External action-internal effect

By "Arab-Israeli hostilities" it is meant that the most salient "concern" of relevant Egyptian elites concerning the use of U.S. force is that that force will be used to participate in some way in the course of on-going Arab-Israeli military hostilities. "Most salient concern" is an elusive concept. We are not addressing likelihood or threat/support alone. Rather, "most salient concern" is a function of the combination of the two perceptions. That is, Syrian elites are not at all concerned with direct U.S. military intervention in Syria (except as a result of Arab-Israeli hostilities). This is clearly not a function solely of "threat," for American capabilities permit such a use of U.S. force, and Syrians have certainly perceived the U.S. to be sufficiently hostile to Syria at times that intervention might have seemed (to them) to be an attractive alternative for the United States. Yet, direct military intervention has probably not been a "most salient concern" in Syria during the past twenty or more years. Why? Because such a course of action by the United States has not seemed likely to most Syrians. Given their own political culture, including the history of recent U.S.-Syrian dyadic interaction since World War II, Syrians do not expect the United States to use military force to intervene in Syria. It has never happened. It has never been threatened. On the other hand, there have been a number of acts of covert intervention, and these have had a significant effect on Syrian



perceptions.<sup>7</sup> Similarly, U.S. force has been used to influence Syrian regional political objectives and initiatives. For example, the Syrian-Turkish crisis of 1957 resulted from U.S. politico-military actions,<sup>8</sup> and the Lebanese crisis of 1958 was also perceived as a use of American military force that affected Syria's bilateral relations with its neighbors. Thus, the "most salient concerns" may be seen as a reflection of likelihood based on past events.

Saudi Arabian salient concerns reflect more recent developments, specifically the importance of a domestic resource to the United States, and the series of "implied threats" used in late 1974 and early 1975 that the United States might stage an intervention to secure access to the Kingdom's oil resources, particularly in the event of another oil embargo. While these are recent fears, it is only the direction of reaction that has changed. United States intervention within Saudi Arabia has consistently and widely been considered a greater possibility than intervention inside Syria. In the past, however, the Saudi elites looked upon the possibility of U.S. intervention favorably, since it was assumed that such an action would eventuate only in response to a threat to the regime that might imperil the major U.S. investments in the Kingdom.<sup>9</sup> Decision factors can, of course, as in that case, be positive as well as negative.

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<sup>7</sup>R. D. McLaurin and Mohammed Mughisuddin, *Cooperation and Conflict: Egyptian, Iraqi, and Syrian Objectives and U.S. Policy* (Washington, D.C.: American Institutes for Research, 1975), pp. 283-285; Miles Copeland, *The Game of Nations* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp. 36-46.

<sup>8</sup>The most detailed account of the crisis is in Tabitha Petran, *Syria* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp. 118-125. See also Richard Nyrop et al., *Area Handbook for Syria* (Washington, D.C.: The American University, Foreign Area Studies, 1971), pp. 181-182; William R. Polk, *The United States and the Arab World* (Revised edition, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 281-282; Copeland, *The Game*, p. 187; Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 203-205; and Kenneth Love, *Suez: The Twice-Fought War* (London: Longmans Green, 1969), p. 653. For a very different interpretation, see Gordon H. Torrey, *Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964), Chapter 11; and George Lenczowski, *Soviet Advances in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1971), pp. 105-106.

<sup>9</sup>R. D. McLaurin and Mohammed Mughisuddin, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: American Institutes for Research, 1974), pp. 317-319.

Table 4-3.  
Comparative Saliency of Force Issue Areas

Force Issue Areas						
Countries	Arab-Israeli Hostilities	Other Hostilities	External action-external effect	External action-internal effect	Internal action	Covert internal action
Bahrain	4		2	1	3	
Egypt	1		3	4	2	
Iraq	5	3	4	2		1
Jordan	1		2	3		
Kuwait	4		1	3	2	
Lebanon	2				1	3
Oman			1	2	3	
Qatar			1	2	3	
Saudi Arabia	2		3		1	4
Syria	1		3	2	5	4
U.A.E.	3	5	1	4	2	
Y.A.R.						
P.D.R.Y.						

Based on a small survey of American and Arab Middle East specialists' views on Arab perceptions, as well as on our own previous work, the decision factors of Middle East countries relating to the regional use of military force by the United States is as in Table 4-3 above.

The leading issues at any particular moment can be viewed within this framework without great difficulty. Content analysis of the appropriate newspapers using an approach like the Force Assessment Content/Events Data System can support the kind of continuous monitoring and analysis recommended. But whether FACES, some other content analysis, or a wholly different approach to maintaining abreast of the most salient concerns of Middle East states should be used, the results must be integrated into a simple process to which decision-makers can look for readily available answers.

#### IMPACT OF FORCE STIMULI: A MODEL

On the basis of the conceptual approach indicated above, a model of the Impact of Force Stimuli (IFS) was developed. This model involves six separate steps displayed in Figure 3.

##### U.S. Action

The first step in using the model is to determine the U.S. action--some use or threat of military force, in the broadest sense--that will have potential impact in the Middle East. The action once identified will have a place of employment which may be the target country or some other area. This place of employment will be identified on the appropriate coding sheet (Figure 4). The action should also be described in every aspect that may have relevance to any country in the Middle East.

##### Effects of Action

The second stage in the use of the IFS model is effect identification. This step is more complex than the previous one, because it requires reference not only to the process formulae of the IFS model but to interest group and decision factor data as well. In order to complete the coding sheet for effects identification, the analyst will need to know both the key interest groups and the comparative salience of force uses. Although these are both contained within this report, it is important to monitor both for evolution over time. Interest groups change slowly in most cases, but sudden regime changes may alter social and political coalition patterns. The salience of force uses is also usually subject only to slow rates of change so far as it is affected by political culture. However, major alterations of the external environment can have a direct and pronounced effect, as Arab oil-producing countries realized when suggestions that the use of force against them could not be ruled out were advanced.

With an understanding of comparative force use salience and comparative interest group importance, the analyst can complete the effects identification coding sheet (Figure 5). One coding sheet is completed for each country likely to be affected. Analysts should be as specific as possible in completing the




Figure 3.



1. U. S. ACTION

Place of Employment :

\_\_\_\_\_

Describe Action :

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Figure 4.

## 2. EFFECTS OF U.S. ACTION

INTERNAL EFFECT?    YES ☐    NO ☐

WHICH GROUPS ARE AFFECTED? How?

	-	<input type="checkbox"/>	o	<input type="checkbox"/>	+	<input type="checkbox"/>	?	<input type="checkbox"/>
	-	<input type="checkbox"/>	o	<input type="checkbox"/>	+	<input type="checkbox"/>	?	<input type="checkbox"/>
	-	<input type="checkbox"/>	o	<input type="checkbox"/>	+	<input type="checkbox"/>	?	<input type="checkbox"/>
	-	<input type="checkbox"/>	o	<input type="checkbox"/>	+	<input type="checkbox"/>	?	<input type="checkbox"/>

EXTERNAL EFFECT?    YES ☐    NO ☐

WHICH COUNTRIES ARE AFFECTED?

How WILL THIS AFFECT \_\_\_\_\_ ?

	-	<input type="checkbox"/>	o	<input type="checkbox"/>	+	<input type="checkbox"/>	?	<input type="checkbox"/>
	-	<input type="checkbox"/>	o	<input type="checkbox"/>	+	<input type="checkbox"/>	?	<input type="checkbox"/>
	-	<input type="checkbox"/>	o	<input type="checkbox"/>	+	<input type="checkbox"/>	?	<input type="checkbox"/>
	-	<input type="checkbox"/>	o	<input type="checkbox"/>	+	<input type="checkbox"/>	?	<input type="checkbox"/>

Figure 5.

coding sheet. For "internal effect," the analyst should remember to address both external and internal actions with internal effects. The unusually high level of transnational interaction in the Middle East underlines the importance of the external action-internal effect dimension.

The "external effect" section refers to general strategic, economic, political, or military considerations that cannot properly be considered in terms of specific internal interest groups.

#### Response

Thirdly, the anticipated response of each subject Middle East country is considered. The anticipated "response" of each subject country is the outcome of the discrete considerations of internal and external effects on that country, and should be cast (in Figure 6) in terms of a five- or seven-point continuum from strong opposition, on the one hand, to strong support, on the other (including strong opposition, opposition, mild opposition, neutrality, mild support, support, strong support; or strong opposition, mild opposition, neutrality, mild support, strong support). Any additional detail of anticipated response at the policy level should also be described.

#### Resulting Actions

Potential or likely action alternatives for the subject country should be identified and analyzed, as suggested in Figure 7. Regional expertise can play a useful role at this stage in identifying potential courses of action open to subject countries. Such alternatives involving bilateral relations with the United States may be readily apparent to the analyst/advisor, but the complex fabric of regional and global relations allows of a multiplicity of action responses, many of them indirect. Although forecasting specific actions will be impossible, the direction of possible actions and the potential action targets (internal and external) should be identified to the greatest extent possible.

#### Action Effects

At this point, a secondary analysis of action effects, an analysis parallel to the one undertaken against the original U.S. stimulus action, is undertaken. The same type of assessment is called for, recognizing however

### 3. RESPONSE (ANTICIPATED)

Describe Response

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Figure 6.

USE ONE SHEET FOR EACH DECISION ALTERNATIVE



4. ACTIONS RESULTING FROM RESPONSE  
(ANTICIPATED)

Action: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Action: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Action: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Action: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Action: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Figure 7.

USE ONE SHEET FOR EACH DECISION ALTERNATIVE

that the much vaguer understanding of the secondary stimulus action will make this step--Figure 8--considerably more elusive and difficult.

#### Feedback

Following the analysis of secondary action effects, anticipated feedback to subsequent U.S. actions should be analyzed and described both in general terms and in specifics as regards the consequences for the initial U.S. action decision. If the process initiated has been one of selection among alternative decisions, separate assessments--along the lines of Figure 9--should be made for each alternative.

#### Summary

The approach to decisionmaking described here is really the marriage of a prescriptive model to an extant process. The steps identified in the IFS model are implicit, for the most part, in rational decisionmaking. Our purpose is to make the steps purposive and explicit, and to integrate with them at an early stage useful empirical data.

Once the process has been completed through the identification of anticipated feedback, findings should be reviewed, made more concise, and synthesized along the conceptual lines of Figure 10. All the data necessary for a decision--data which might have seemed too complex for articulation if collected and analyzed at once--are present in Figure 11.

#### Policy Recommendations

The final step (see Figure 11) is to formulate recommendations for policy. In this case the policy issue is the likely impact of the use or threat of force. Whether the policy decision that is contemplated is aimed specifically at the Middle East or is merely expected to have effects there, the high level of interconnection between the Middle East's regional states suggests that in virtually every case action recommendations must be accompanied by recommendations for accompanying actions to mitigate effects on "unintended audiences." These accompanying actions should, of course, be subjected to the same type of analysis applicable to other action alternatives.

5. ACTION EFFECTS (ANTICIPATED)

INTERNAL EFFECT? YES ☐ NO ☐

WHICH GROUPS ARE AFFECTED? HOW?

_____	- <input type="checkbox"/> • <input type="checkbox"/> + <input type="checkbox"/> ? <input type="checkbox"/>
_____	- <input type="checkbox"/> • <input type="checkbox"/> + <input type="checkbox"/> ? <input type="checkbox"/>
_____	- <input type="checkbox"/> • <input type="checkbox"/> + <input type="checkbox"/> ? <input type="checkbox"/>
_____	- <input type="checkbox"/> • <input type="checkbox"/> + <input type="checkbox"/> ? <input type="checkbox"/>

EXTERNAL EFFECT? YES ☐ NO ☐

WHICH COUNTRIES ARE AFFECTED?  
HOW WILL THIS AFFECT \_\_\_\_\_?

_____	- <input type="checkbox"/> • <input type="checkbox"/> + <input type="checkbox"/> ? <input type="checkbox"/>
_____	- <input type="checkbox"/> • <input type="checkbox"/> + <input type="checkbox"/> ? <input type="checkbox"/>
_____	- <input type="checkbox"/> • <input type="checkbox"/> + <input type="checkbox"/> ? <input type="checkbox"/>
_____	- <input type="checkbox"/> • <input type="checkbox"/> + <input type="checkbox"/> ? <input type="checkbox"/>

Figure 8.

6. FEEDBACK TO SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS  
(ANTICIPATED)

How Do You THINK THE ACTION WILL  
AFFECT SUBSEQUENT U.S. ACTIONS?

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Figure 9.

USE ONE SHEET FOR EACH <sup>125</sup> ~~DECISION~~ DECISION ALTERNATIVE

# 7. SUMMARY SHEET

U.S. ACTION \_\_\_\_\_

OVERALL EFFECTS:

INTERNAL - ☐ 0 ☐ + ☐ ? ☐

EXTERNAL - ☐ 0 ☐ + ☐ ? ☐

ACTION EFFECTS (Enter 0, -, +, or ?)

DECISION ALTERNATIVES	ACTIONS	INTERNAL EFFECTS	EXTERNAL EFFECTS	FEEDBACK
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				

Figure 10.



## 8. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommended Action: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Recommended Mitigating Actions: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

## IMPLEMENTATION

The process of decisionmaking in crises operates under opposing constraints that may be posited as questions:

- (1) Who should be included?
- (2) Who should be excluded?

Given the breadth of virtually all national security crises or critical issues in terms of their implications for and ramifications on diverse interests, the "affected" policy public can never be the active policy public. The process is not unlike that of academic research dealing with international relations: the drive for isomorphism must not lead to the replication of reality. If reality were not so complex, one would not need to undertake the research necessary to understand it. Simulation must simplify reality. If reality were not so complex, one would not need to undertake the research necessary to understand it. Simulation must simplify reality, critical decisionmaking must act on oversimplified reality.

As a consequence of the foregoing, relevant policy publics will continue to be omitted from the policy process in the future, as in the past, and, at least at this level of general observation, one cannot, from a practical standpoint, realistically criticize such a pattern. This must not, however, be taken as a suggestion that readiness to participate in policy decisionmaking--whether on critical, one-time issues, or on recurring or continuous matters--should be neglected. Quite to the contrary, it is our belief that policy relevant offices should be prepared to represent their views as forcefully as practicable within the framework dictated by the issue. And that constraint is the point of reference for this research.

The present study provides a means to assess some of the impacts of various one-time and continuing uses of U.S. military force in the Middle East and of the perceived presence and potential of U.S. forces. These reactions can be gauged and to an extent measured prior to a use of force that may serve to precipitate such responses in the region.

Ideally, base-line data might be collected for 1975-1976, as we have done for 1975, and the effects of change over time studied.

Although the data we have collected for 1975 would support such an effort, this study collected general force-relevant media data for 1975 and for selected periods in the past. These periods, because they were intentionally selected around certain incidents--some mundane (e.g., visits, bureaucratic changes), others central to Middle East developments--cannot legitimately be viewed as a sample. Rather, they are the population of the data base. Nevertheless, such data could be relatively easily up-dated and supplemented using 1975 as a base-point.

It is one belief that the perceptions held by Arab elites of U.S. force have changed over time, and the data support this conclusion. Consequently, there is good reason to believe that continued flux in these views is likely. Insistence on the importance of psychological factors in international politics does not risk being termed a startling innovation. We have elsewhere described many of both the potentials and constraints in the psychological aspects of international relations and international use of military forces short of war. Influence--whether for deterrent or other purposes--is, after all, of the essence of international politics and is a primary *raison d'etre* of the armed forces. Effective use of this resource requires an awareness of the likely political reaction--including the psychological and perceptual responses--to specific uses.

An awareness such as we believe important depends upon an accurate tool to measure both the state of, and the changes in, how force stimuli are perceived and reacted to over time. Although one cannot replace the analyst in this respect, systematic content analysis of public media can provide good indications of shifts in attitudes and intensities over time and across countries. It is our belief that the combination of area elite analysis and content analysis provides a useful adjunct to traditional qualitative assessment.

Assuming the existence and currency of data collected along the lines we have discussed, the issue of implementation becomes one of interfacing decision processes--which are by their nature non-standard in many cases--with the data analysts. Certainly, it would be naive to assume that the data will drive decisionmaking or, in many cases, have a major impact upon it. But the availability of likely response (or

effect) information in the hands of those actively seized with a specific question may be a significant input to decision processes in some cases, with the possible and desirable result of a decision chosen in a more informed atmosphere where the costs and benefits of options may be weighed at least somewhat more accurately.

With such a limited but reasonable (and in our view desirable) objective in mind, the analytical output of such an on-going project should be the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) and, within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-5 (Plans and Policy). Many other offices might benefit from and, therefore, should receive the analysis, but JCS/J-5 and OASD (ISA) are the two principal organizations within DOD normally involved in policy-relevant decisions dealing with foreign areas. ISA and J-5 personnel have the broadness of interest and responsibility, the mission, and the continuing need to be best placed to optimally exploit data on attitudes, attitude change, and the like, relative to U.S. force.

The work of monitoring the media to be analyzed could be adequately performed inside or outside DOD providing adequate language capabilities exist on the staff accomplishing the work. Translators must be able to gauge tone and translate the measures widely used in the press in some areas of the world. Reporting could be feasibly done every three to six months and should focus on (1) current attitudes and perceptions, (2) changes from the past, and (3) suggested trends. Monitor/analysts should not advance policy-relevant prescriptions but should be expected to answer specific supplementary requests.

A second alternative, should ISA and J-5 desk officers begin to use the computer facilities of DOD more heavily, is to move into interactive programming that would enable country officers to do their own analysis and use or provide to higher officials data-based assessments of competing options. Such an approach has a number of advantages over the principal alternative but is of little practical value until ISA and J-5 personnel begin to depend upon computer support in their work.

In sum, the reactions and attitudes toward U.S. force developments and events can be systematically monitored, measured, and analyzed with substantial pay-off in terms of routine and crises decisionmaking. The results of this process can easily be made available to the principal DOD offices dealing in international affairs. The product cannot as easily and should not in any event be automatically inserted into decision processes in which superabundance of data is often as much a management problem as the lack of it. There are options as to product availability, but the best alternatives involve the ISA and J-5 desk officer in the use and manipulation of the data.



## CHAPTER 5. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

This final report provides an overview of the methods and approach that are part of our research on the political impact of U.S. military force in the Middle East. The present chapter will review some of the principal conceptual directions and a few of the major conclusions, based on the data analyzed to date.

### CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES

Foreign and military policies are response-based. That is, decisions in the realms of foreign policy and military affairs are taken with a view to influencing (whether in a deterrent or coercive manner) others' behavior. Because we have less control over response than over perception, decisions are made to influence response through perception. But on what kind of empirical data are these actions based? And consequently, how adequate is feedback on policy decisions?

This study used rigorous content analysis to assess the perceptual impact of events relating to broadly defined U.S. force. The content analysis is principally applied to two Arabic newspapers with different points of views. From the systematic analysis of media content emerges an empirically grounded assessment of the impact of force events.

Although the major focus of this research has been to develop, test, refine, and implement a systematic content analysis of selected Arabic language media in order to evaluate the impact of force events, we have also attempted to develop a framework model within which the empirical content data could be used.

### FINDINGS

Arab media see the United States and the Soviet Union in a situation of mutual deterrence. Neither superpower is believed to have a decisive margin in the global strategic balance. However, given this orientation, Arab commentators and media do not pay careful attention to the superpower military balance. They are relatively inattentive to strategic arms control and vague about (though interested in) weapons

development. Small deployment changes do not generally attract the attention of Arab newspapers except when they are associated with a crisis or are singled out by others for special consideration. Only about nine percent of all coverage was completely original (i.e., had neither immediate nor original sources), while another nine percent came from foreign or special correspondents and since only *Al Ahram* among the newspapers monitored has its own military affairs editor, it is hardly surprising that the implications for the Middle East of global military events with little immediate meaning specific to the region are overlooked. (*Al Nahar* and *Al Hayat* use the science and technology staff for military affairs.)

All the newspapers surveyed depended heavily on Western sources--particularly AP, UPI, AFP, and Reuters--for their news. Even on issues such as the global balance, Western "news" is the source for most articles. Few articles originated outside the West--even on Soviet military developments.

For articles on the strategic balance, the reader is virtually forced to depend upon *Al Ahram*, the only newspaper to give the subject any substantial coverage. (81 percent of all observations on the strategic balance appeared in *Al Ahram*.) We assume this reflects Egypt's comparatively greater international role by contrast with Lebanon, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.

Yet, if Arab newspapers pay little attention to the global superpower strategic balance, they pay far less to most other aspects of the regional military forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. What the newspapers do watch carefully is military assistance and arms transfers in and to the Middle East. Over one third of the total "force" coverage during the periods the newspapers were monitored was occupied by articles on this subject. No other subjects individually attracted substantial (ten percent or more of articles or space) attention.

When subjects were analyzed in terms of the space rather than the frequency of the analysis, complex or topical subjects ranked first--technology and weapons development, military missions, and military operations. This hierarchy could suggest either that the subjects'

complexities required longer articles or that the subjects were perceived to be important by newspaper editors. Articles on space technology--in which references to military applications of space technology appeared at times--tended to be particularly long.

American and Soviet weapons are both highly regarded, if the newspapers are any guide. In general, Soviet weapons are lauded more than overall Soviet technology. American weapons systems received both favorable--especially in high technology systems--and critical--in air defense and ATGM--comparisons to Soviet equipment. American high technology amenable to military application received an extraordinarily high proportion of favorable treatment.

Visits were rather non-controversial. They elicited some favorable coverage and little critical coverage. Political visits were treated as clearly the most important type, followed by military and naval visits.

Military assistance and sales, the largest single topic in both number of articles and space, is, of course, a subject of vital interest to the countries of the Middle East. Well over half the articles (56 percent) concerned U.S. arms transfers to Israel, and other measures of intensity, similarly indicated a primary concern with military materiel sent to the Jewish state. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria were the Arab recipients receiving most of the press attention. With respect to arms transfers, the media understand and follow the different stages of decisionmaking in the executive and legislative branches, but for the most part pay greater attention to decisions than deliveries.

The air war dominates elite attention in the Middle East, but air defense systems have come to play an important role in this concept. Thus, arms transfers dealing with aircraft and air defense systems capture the greatest press coverage.

The superpowers control the pace, tenor, and course of the Middle East arms race and of war in the Middle East, in the view of the Arab press. Arms transfers play an important role in this control.

In general, newspapers displayed an unwillingness or inability to forecast in the subject area of U.S. military force. We found a rather surprisingly sound understanding of U.S. federal decisionmaking processes, and very little understanding of organizational (i.e., inter-branch and intra-departmental) politics. Newspapers carried straight news for the most part and did relatively little editorializing on most military subjects. Indeed, more editorial commentary might help the readers place news in better perspective.

The four newspapers monitored carried little anti-American rhetoric. The few editorials suggest a dominant view that the United States is committed to only one state in the Middle East--Israel--and that this commitment is to Israel's existence. That the United States "owes" its Arab clients in the Middle East some support is, however, also believed. United States clients or "friends" are seen to include most prominently Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sadat's Egypt, and, in a different sense, Lebanon.

The sense of credibility of American "commitments" per se was not measured, but the newspapers manifested a belief in the United States, a feeling implicit and explicit in many articles that the United States was a very credible power--a state that had, and in appropriate cases was willing to use, adequate military force, yet one that would not overplay its hand in the Middle East.

Arab newspapers displayed a reasonably sophisticated understanding of the relationship between threat, action, and credibility. Criticism of the United States for the Mayaguez operation, for example, was mild, and was accompanied by several comments that demonstrated an understanding of the necessity for the United States to reassert itself, to regain its credibility, following the debacle in Vietnam.

In summary, we believe the systematic content analysis of printed media can be useful to an understanding of salient features of key interest groups' cognitive maps. This report provides data useful in establishing the principal features of these maps in the Middle East.



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APPENDIX 1  
QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS

Appendix 1  
Questions for Analysis

Symbolic Force

1. Do Arab media follow (react to) ship visits?
2. Does the type of vessel affect media coverage of ship visits?
3. Do Arab media follow (react to) visits of (a) high-ranking military personnel or (b) civilian leaders of the military?
4. Do media reactions to military/naval visits to countries hostile to the media publishers/sponsors reflect this hostility?
5. Do Arab media follow (react to) other ceremonial acts involving U.S. military forces?
6. Are symbolic force events related by the media to the local military balance?
7. Are symbolic force events related by the media to the local superpower military balance?
8. Are symbolic force events related by the media to local superpower military capabilities?
9. Are symbolic force events related by the media to the global military balance?

Military Manpower and Equipment

10. Do Arab media discuss (follow) superpower military manpower educational level?
11. Do Arab media discuss (follow) superpower military manpower training procedures?
12. Do Arab media discuss (follow) superpower military manpower training levels?
13. Are superpower military manpower quality factors related by the media to the global military balance?
14. Do Arab media discuss (follow) superpower military manpower quantity?
15. Are quantitative superpower military manpower factors related by the media to the global military balance?
16. Do Arab media relate superpower military manpower quality to the specific weapons systems?

17. Are superpower military manpower factors related by the media to the local military balance?
18. Do Arab media relate superpower military manpower quality to the appropriateness of weapons systems transferred to Arab states or Israel?
19. Do Arab media compare and analyze military equipment?
20. Are weapons and other equipment quality related by the media to the local military balance?
21. Is the quality of weapons and other equipment related by the media to the superpower military balance?

#### Military Missions

22. Do Arab media follow agreements on and negotiations toward the establishment and disestablishment of military missions?
23. Do the media react more to the agreements and other preliminaries or to actual establishment (disestablishment) of missions?
24. Do Arab media pay attention to changes in mission, terms of reference, or size?
25. Are military missions related by the media to the local military balance or to local superpower military capabilities?

#### Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

26. Do Arab media cover weapons systems research and development?
27. Do they relate R&D to the local military balance?
28. Do they relate R&D to the local superpower military balance?
29. Do they relate R&D to local superpower military capabilities?
30. Do they relate R&D to the global military balance?
31. Are production rates and schedules followed by Arab media?
32. Do Arab media recognize the lags between R&D, production, and deployment?
33. Do Arab media discuss major technological breakthroughs?
34. Do Arab media follow deployment of new weapons systems?
35. Are production schedules, research-deployment time lags, and deployments of new weapons related by the media to the local military balance?
36. Are they related to the local superpower military balance?



37. Are they related to local superpower military capabilities?
38. Are they related to the global military balance?

#### Military Bases and Facilities

39. Do Arab media report agreements on and negotiations for the establishment of bases and facilities?
40. Is the purpose of foreign bases a subject of Arab media?
41. Do Arab media address changes in purposes, size, or terms of reference of military bases and facilities?
42. Are military bases and facilities related by Arab media to the local military balance?
43. Are military bases and facilities related by Arab media to local superpower military capabilities?
44. Are military bases and facilities related by Arab media to the local superpower military balance?
45. Are military bases and facilities related by Arab media to the global military balance?

#### Force Deployments and Employments

46. Do the media cover changes in personnel and other force deployments (including maneuvers and exercises as well as regular deployments)?
47. Are deployments related by the Arab media to the local military balance?
48. Are deployments related by the Arab media to the local superpower military balance?
49. Are deployments related by the Arab media to the global military balance?
50. Do Arab media discuss airlift/sealift capabilities?
51. Are airlift/sealift capabilities related by the Arab media to the local military balance?
52. Are airlift/sealift capabilities related by the Arab media to the global military balance?
53. Are airlift/sealift capabilities related by the Arab media to local superpower military capabilities?

54. Are airlift/sealift capabilities related by the Arab media to the local superpower military balance?

Security Assistance and Foreign Military Sales

55. Do Arab media distinguish between sale negotiations, agreements, and deliveries?
56. Do Arab media distinguish between more and less sophisticated weapons systems?
57. Do Arab media discuss sale terms and prices?
58. Do Arab media follow the training and ammunition component of arms sales?
59. Are sales of non-lethal military equipment covered by Arab media?
60. Do Arab media discuss security supporting assistance?
61. Are arms sales, arms deliveries, and training related to the local military balance by Arab media?

Other

62. Do Arab media discuss national military strategy/policy debates and changes of the superpowers?
63. Is the civilian role covered to the extent it may ramify on military affairs (e.g., surveillance technology, presence related to military activities)?

General

64. What are the Arab media's principal sources of news information?
65. Are different sources used for different types of events?
66. Do Arab media follow Congressional debates relating to U.S. military force?
67. Which U.S. regional military forces--including MIDEASTFOR, the Sixth Fleet, and other NATO forces--are perceived as "local" in terms of the Middle East?
68. Which types of events are followed most closely?
69. Do Arab media pay attention to press conferences, interviews, speeches, and communiques? By which leaders?

70. From which types of issues (events) does the greatest editorial reaction result?
71. Is there are an identifiable Arab perception of the global superpower military balance?
72. Which information source seems to be most influential in shaping Arab perceptions of the global military balance?
73. Do the Arab media follow and place emphasis on distant military/political events in relation to local superpower military intentions and capabilities?

APPENDIX 2

HYPOTHESES

## Appendix 2

### Hypotheses

- 1a. Arab media follow ship visits systematically only when (1) the visit is to their country of publication or sponsorship, (2) the visit is of especial political importance, or (3) the visit is to a country hostile to their country of publication or sponsorship.
- 1b. The amount of space devoted to ship visits except in case 1a(2), above, is minimal.
- 1c. There is little explicit tone variation in ship visits, except in case 4, below.
- 2a. Aircraft carriers, and particularly nuclear aircraft carriers, receive greater coverage than other vessels.
- 2b. There is no tone variation on the basis of type of vessels making the visit except that nuclear-SLBMed submarines are viewed critically.
- 3a. Arab media devote more attention to visits of high-ranking military (including civilian leaders of the military) personages than to ships.
- 3b. Greater political weight is attributed to VIP visits than to ship visits.
4. Media reactions to military/naval visits to countries hostile to the country of media publication or sponsorship reflect the national hostility. Such visits are viewed as threatening.
- 5a. Arab media attend to other ceremonial acts involving superpower military forces only when (1) the act is related to their country of publication or sponsorship, (2) the act is of especial political importance, or (3) the act is in or for a country hostile to their country of publication or sponsorship.
- 5b. Ceremonial acts are accorded favorable tone in case 5a(1), neutral tone in case 5a(2) except when a 5a(2) case falls also under 5a(1), and critical coverage in case 5a(3).
6. Symbolic force events are not related by the media to the local military balance.
7. Symbolic force events are not related by the media to the local super-power military balance.



8. Symbolic force events are not related by the media to local superpower military capabilities.
9. Symbolic force events are not related by the media to the global military balance.
10. Arab media pay little heed to superpower military manpower educational levels.
- 11a. Arab media similarly do not discuss superpower military manpower training procedures in specific terms.
- 11b. Arab media, in the context of on-going training of their own military personnel (i.e., that of their country of publication or sponsorship) by a superpower military mission in country, do discuss in general terms training of superpower military personnel in the country providing them training, but primarily to highlight strengths of and contrasts in (modifications of) the training program.
- 12a. Similarly, only in the context of on-going training of their own military personnel by a superpower military mission in country do Arab media discuss the training level of superpower military manpower.
- 12b. Detailed discussion of training cycles, training time, and training rate of superpower military manpower are absent from Arab media.
13. There is little discussion of the relationship between military manpower quality and the global military balance.
14. The only general discussion in Arab media of superpower military manpower quantity derives from superpower force reduction talks.
- 15a. There is little discussion of the relationship of manpower quantity to the superpower military balance.
- 15b. There is some discussion of the quantitative superiority of Warsaw Pact forces over NATO forces in Central Europe. The discussion is limited, however, to the balance in Europe.
- 16 & 18. Arab media do not discuss human factors' relationships to military materiel.
17. Superpower military manpower quantity and quality are not related by Arab media to the local military balance.
19. Arab media discuss and compare various items of specific military hardware at approximately the level of specificity of news (not analysis) items on this subject appearing in the major U.S. newspapers.
- 20a. Weapons performance is considered to have an important relationship to the local military balance.

- 20b. U.S. weapons are generally considered superior in design and quality control to Soviet weapons of the same type. Exceptions are some SAM systems, ATGMs, and the Kalashnikov.
- 20c. Because weapons systems capabilities--particularly in major items of equipment such as attack aircraft and PGM--are related to the military balance, the superpowers are seen to be in a position to control the outcome of military confrontations between local states through control of weapons systems made available.
- 21. Arab media assume a direct correlation between superpower technological advancement and the weapons systems the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have developed. The implicit media assumption is that while the incremental value of any single new weapons system may be marginal, qualitative factors and the general level of technology as a whole have key roles in the global military balance.
- 22a. Arab media pay close attention to the establishment and disestablishment of military missions in Middle East countries.
- 22b. A greater proportion of the media attention given to military missions is analytical than the analytical amount of coverage of other issues taken as a whole.
- 22c. The favorableness of the tone of the analysis is dependent on the bilateral relations of (1) the country of media publication or sponsorship and (2) the country providing the training. Less important are the bilateral relations of the host and the publishing/sponsoring country.
- 23. Media react more to the preliminaries of establishment and disestablishment of military missions than to the acts themselves.
- 24a. Arab media do not attend significantly to modifications in the mission, terms of reference, or size of foreign military missions.
- 24b. To the extent Arab newspapers address changes such as those discussed in 24a, the focus is entirely on changes in size.
- 25a. Foreign military missions are not weighed as factors influencing either the local military balance or local superpower military capabilities.
- 25b. The existence of foreign military missions does influence Arab media views on the speed, or likelihood of progress, of training and transfer of skills.
- 25c. Similarly, media demonstrate an implicit belief that the presence of foreign military missions increases the leverage of the country providing training with respect to the host country.
- 26a. Arab media discuss weapons systems research and development being carried on by the superpowers.

- 26b. These discussions usually relate to the testing of new systems.
- 26c. Coverage of weapons systems research and development is based on announcements by the parties carrying out the tests.
- 27. Superpower R&D is related by Arab media to the local military balance, though even national deployment of these systems is usually years away in a very different military situation.
- 28. Weapons R&D is not related to the local superpower military balance.
- 29. However, Arab media do consider the effect on local superpower military capabilities of weapons systems research.
- 30. In view of the source (26c, above), most R&D is related to the superpower global military balance.
- 31. Weapons production rates and production schedules are not followed by Arab media except insofar as these schedules may impact adversely on U.S. military aid commitments.
- 32. Newspapers of the Arab world discuss major breakthroughs in weapons technology only when appropriate attention is devoted to such breakthroughs in announcements by the national leadership of the country experiencing the breakthrough.
- 33. The Arab press has no means for estimating the time lags between technological breakthrough, and application of the breakthrough to weapons through (a) systems design, (b) weapons systems production, and (c) deployment. Consequently, there is little explicit recognition of this lag.
- 34a. Arab media attend to deployments of new weapons systems to local forces.
- 34b. Only major weapons systems attract Arab newspaper attention in non-local deployments.
- 35a., 36a., 37a., 38a. Research-deployment time lags, because they are not recognized or weighed, are not related by the Arab press to the local military balance, global military balance, local superpower military balance, or to local superpower military capabilities.
- 35b. Deployments of new weapons systems to local superpower military forces
- 37b. are related by the media to the local military balance and to local superpower military capabilities.
- 35c. Deployment of new weapons systems to local superpower forces has no major impact on political or military thinking.
- 36. Although such deployments are related by the Arab press to the local superpower military balance also, research-deployment time lags are not.

- 38b. Deployments of major weapons systems are related by the Arab press to the global military balance. Other deployments are not.
- 39a. Arab media give substantial attention to agreements and negotiations regarding the establishment of foreign military and naval facility agreements in the region.
- 39b. An unusually great proportion of such coverage is of an analytical nature, generally negative.
- 40. News articles concerning the establishment of foreign bases in the Middle East depend upon statements of the foreign power establishing the base to state its purpose. Analytical articles are characterized by independent assessments of the "true" purposes of the facility.
- 41. The only type of change in foreign bases or facilities attended to by the Arab press is change in size.
- 42. Superpower military facilities in and around the Middle East are related
- 43. by Arab media to the local military balance, to the local superpower
- 44. military balance, and to local superpower military capabilities.
- 45. Regional superpower military facilities are not given great weight in assessments by Arab media of the global military balance.
- 46a. Local media pay little attention to routine exercises and maneuvers.
- 46b. Deployments during crises attract elite attention.
- 46c. Abnormal deployments during crises attract greater elite attention and introduce uncertainty and worst-case thinking to Middle East elites.
- 47a., Exercising and maneuvers of forces in non-crisis periods are not related
- 48a., by the media to readiness nor therefore to the local military balance,
- 49a. the local superpower military balance, or to the global military balance.
- 47b., The Arab press relate exercise and maneuver deployments in crisis periods
- 48b. to the balance of forces between local and superpower rivals.
- 47c., Deployments to local forces are related by the media to local, local
- 48c., superpower, or global military balances, as appropriate, in crisis
- 49c. periods. They are not so related in non-crisis periods.
- 47c. Middle East newspapers follow U.S. Marine strength in the Sixth Fleet as an indicator of the likelihood of Sixth Fleet employment in the Middle East.
- 49b. Crisis-coincident exercises and maneuvers do not lead local media to relate these acts to the global military balance.



- 50a. Arab media cover the airlift/sealift capabilities of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but depend on American and Soviet forces for their conclusions.
- 50b. Consequently, the Arab press pays substantial attention to events/acts that impact on superpower airlift/sealift capabilities.
- 51., Airlift/sealift capabilities of the superpowers are related by Arab  
52., newspapers to the local military balance, local superpower military  
53., capabilities, the local superpower military balance, and the global  
54. military balance.
- 55a. Arab media distinguish clearly between FMS negotiations, agreements, and deliveries when these apply to Middle East FMS.
- 55b. Arms transfers to Israel are followed more closely at the decision stage than at the delivery stage. The media give credit for the delivery before it has been effected.
- 55c. The delivery of U.S. arms to Arab states is given greater attention than the delivery stage commands in U.S.-Israeli FMS. Credit is given both at the agreement and delivery stage, and the sale is not viewed as certain until delivery is accomplished.
- 56a. Arab media distinguish between various generations of weapons systems and levels of performance characteristics to the extent such distinctions are germane to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The press is less specific and sophisticated in its treatment of highly advanced systems not employed locally.
- 56b. A second factor in the treatment of weapons systems by the press is the extent to which transfer of specific items of equipment affects the military balance and, particularly, supports the Arab attempt to overcome Israeli military superiority.
- 57. Arab media do not address sale terms or amounts in any meaningful way. The primary distinction is between grant aid and FMS.
- 58a. Substantial media attention is paid to the training component of military sales. This is especially true in the case of in-country training.
- 58b. On the other hand, ammunition and FOS are not treated by the Arab press to any significant degree.
- 59. Non-lethal military sales are not viewed by the media as "military" transactions. Consequently, they are given less prominence and are not systematically followed except when the recipient is the country of publication or the country of sponsorship of the newspaper in question.
- 60. Media do discuss security supporting assistance and other such economic military aid, but without the level of attention and absent the concern over the Congressional approval process.



- 61a. Arms sales and deliveries are related directly by the press to the local military balance, particularly in the case of major and high technology weapons systems.
- 61b. Training is less directly related to the balance, probably because of the elusiveness of effectiveness measures. Nevertheless, Arab media frequently refer to the importance of improving training and levels of manpower performance in the Arab-Israeli military balance. (See 25b)
- 62a. Arab media watch carefully U.S. national foreign policy debates as they affect the Middle East, and devote considerable editorial attention to such developments. Little heed is paid to similar Soviet debates.
- 62b. Less attention is paid to military strategy debates than to foreign policy questions. This is true of both the Soviet Union and the United States.
- 63. News coverage of civilian roles related to military affairs is scant, unsystematic, and lacking in prominence.
- 64a. Principal immediate (or secondary) news sources are Western press services.
- 64b. Principal original (or primary) news sources are statements of high-level officials.
- 65. Although there are variations in sources across subject matter, the prominence of Western news services is clear in every case.
- 66a. There is little understanding of the complex federal decisionmaking process in the United States. Policies are viewed as facts representing the judgment of the entire federal government.
- 66b. Specifically, the Arab press do not understand the role or the changing role of Congress in foreign and military policy making. The various types of Congressional acts are too many to be accurately reflected in the Arab press.
- 67a. Middle East elites follow the activities of the Sixth Fleet and view it as an ingredient in the Middle East power equation.
- 67b. The Arab press overemphasizes the Middle East aspect of Sixth Fleet objectives.
- 67c. The Arab press surveyed in this study considers MIDEASTFOR a flag-showing force having little military significance in terms of Middle East political or military events.
- 67d. The Sixth Fleet plays a relatively minor role in Middle East political-military relations with the U.S., U.S.S.R., and Western Europe.

- 67e. MIDEASTFOR plays a somewhat greater role in this regard, as a function of the debate over the proper guardian of the security of the Gulf. Even in this case, however, the role is in no way decisive.
- 68. In order of attention, the following events are followed most closely by the Arab press: (1) Middle East War (including crisis deployments and maneuvers), (2) foreign military sales, and (3) bases developments.
- 69a. Arab media pay attention to press conferences and speeches on the basis of coverage allotted to them by Western news agencies.
- 69b. Interviews are covered largely on the bases of (1) their Middle East relevance and (2) the prominence of the interviewee.
- 69c. Little weight is accorded to communiqués.
- 69d. The leaders whose statements attract attention are, for the U.S., the president, the vice president, the secretary of state, and the secretary of defense.
- 69e. For the Soviet Union, attention is focused on statements by the chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the premier, foreign minister, and defense minister.
- 70. Greater editorial reaction follows announcements of (1) military sales and assistance, (2) changes in base status, and (3) the establishment of military missions.
- 71., 73. Middle East elites view the superpowers as being in a strategic stand-off globally. They do not follow the details of new weapons developments, but assume a mutual deterrence capability both globally and regionally.
- 72. The Arab press depends on Western sources, particularly Western news agencies, for information relating to the military balance. For analyses of the balance, the press looks to Western newspapers.

APPENDIX 3

EVENTS DURING PERIODS CODED

### Appendix 3

#### Events During Periods Coded

##### ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES

10 June 1967	Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance resigns.
11 December 1968	Nixon announces cabinet.
20 January 1969	President Nixon inaugurated.
10 October 1973	U.S. Vice President Agnew resigns.
12 October 1973	Gerald Ford appointed Vice President.
3 November 1975	Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to be replaced, President Ford announces.
18 November 1975	D. Rumsfeld confirmed as new Secretary of Defense.

##### ARMS CONTROL

1 July 1968	Non-Proliferation Treaty signed by U.S., United Kingdom, U.S.S.R.
1 July 1968	President Johnson announces U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement to begin missile control talks.
20 January 1969	U.S.S.R. willing to begin SALT talks.
25 October 1969	U.S. and U.S.S.R. agree to begin SALT talks on 17 November in Helsinki.
17 May 1972	Seabed Arms Control Treaty enters into force (ratifications exchanged).
22-29 May 1972	U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreements on prevention of naval incidents, SALT-ABM, SALT-Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms.
3 August 1972	U.S. Senate ratifies SALT-ABM agreement.
2-3 October 1972	U.S.-U.S.S.R. exchange ratifications of SALT-ABM Treaty and bring into force Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Missiles.
19 February 1974	SALT II talks resume.
23-24 November 1974	Vladivostok agreement.
31 January 1975	SALT II talks resume in Geneva.
7 May 1975	SALT II talks recess.

ARMS TRANSFERS/SECURITY ASSISTANCE

14 February 1968.	U.S. announces resumption of security assistance to Jordan.
6 July 1968	DoD announces supply of additional HAWK missiles to Israel.
27 December 1968	U.S. announces sale of 50 F-4s to Israel.
7 September 1969	U.S. begins to deliver F-4s to Israel.
23 March 1970	U.S. announces U.S. rejects Israeli request for additional A-4s and F-4s.
22 September 1970	U.S. announces decision to resume security assistance to Greece.
1 December 1971	U.S. cancels \$2 million arms shipment to India; suspends licenses.
2 December 1971	Nixon and Golda Meir meet, discuss Israeli military needs.
31 December 1971	U.S. announces U.S. will resume F-4 sales to Israel.
10 August 1972	Turkey signs new security assistance agreement with U.S. (including 40 F-4s by 1976).
22 February 1973	Iran orders 70 F-4s, 115 F-5Es, 489 helicopters, and 20 C-130s.
19 October 1973	President Nixon requests \$2.2 billion for Israel security assistance.
11 January 1974	DoD announces Iran to buy 30 F-14A aircraft.
9-17 December 1974	Turkish security assistance debate in U.S. Congress.
1 January 1975	GAO report criticizes U.S. security assistance to Iran.
8 January 1975	Egyptian president reveals Soviet decision to deny Egypt security assistance.
9 January 1975	U.S. announces Saudi decision to buy 60 F-5s.
16 January 1975	Report of TOW sale to Lebanon.
20 January 1975	Israel requests over \$2 billion in economic assistance and security assistance from U.S.
22 January 1975	Secretary of Defense says U.S. can provide adequate supplies to Israel in case of war.
23 January 1975	DoD announces sale to Israel of 200 Lance missiles.
5 February 1975	U.S. suspends security assistance to Turkey.
8 February 1975	Vinnell Corporation announces Saudi training program.
9 February 1975	Iran purchase of six destroyers from U.S. disclosed.



10 February 1975	DoD confirms Vinnell announcement.
11 February 1975	Bell Helicopter discloses helo training program in Iran.
18-26 March 1975	U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee approves bill to resume security assistance to Turkey.
5 May 1975	U.S. State Department announces U.S. will sell Jordan 14 batteries of HAWK missiles.
19 May 1975	U.S. Senate votes to end embargo on security assistance to Turkey.
21 May 1975	76 Senators send letter to President Ford urging economic and security assistance for Israel.
23 May 1975	Egypt reports conclusion of major Soviet-Libyan arms agreement.
16 June 1975	Turkish NSC decides U.S. arms ban violates U.S.-Turkish agreement.
17 June 1975	Turkey announces it will take over U.S. bases if arms ban not lifted in 30 days.
24 July 1975	U.S. House of Representatives votes against lifting Turkish security assistance embargo.
28 July 1975	U.S. informs Congress it will defer sale of HAWKs to Jordan.
17 Sept 1975	President Ford assures Congress HAWKs for Jordan will be stationary.
20,26 September 1975	U.S. announces it may sell arms to Egypt.
2 October 1975	U.S. House of Representatives relaxes security assistance embargo to Turkey.

#### BASES AND FACILITIES

30 December 1966	U.S.-United Kingdom agreement on BIOT.
17 July 1969	U.S. withdraws from Peshawar.
27 October 1969	Secretary of Defense announces many overseas base closures.
29-30 October 1969	Libya asks U.S. to leave Wheelus.
11 June 1970	Last U.S. personnel leave Wheelus.
10-14 December 1971	U.S. and Portugal agree on Azores base.
23 December 1971	U.S.-Bahrain exchange of notes on Jufair.
15 May 1972	Okinawa reverts to Japanese administrative control.
6 October 1972	Italian Foreign Minister confirms U.S. Sixth Fleet homeporting agreement.

8 January 1973	U.S. and Greece sign homeporting agreement.
20 October 1973	Bahrain cancels U.S. Navy dock/facilities in Bahrain.
5 February 1974	U.S.-United Kingdom agreement on expansion of Diego Garcia announced.
10 June 1975	Secretary of Defense charges U.S.S.R. stores missiles at Somali base.
10 June 1975	Somali Foreign Minister denies there is Soviet base in Somalia.
16 June 1975	Turkish NSC decides U.S. arms ban violates U.S.-Turkish agreements.
17 June 1975	Turkey announces it will take over U.S. bases if U.S. arms ban not lifted in 30 days.
6 July 1975	Senator Bartlett confirms Soviet Somali base.
26 July 1975	Turkey takes over U.S. bases.
4 October 1975	U.S., Spain agree on renewal of U.S. bases.

#### CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS

29 January 1968	President Johnson submits FY 69 U.S. budget to Congress.
24 September 1970	Congress authorizes expansion of Safeguard ABM program.
11 October 1972	Congress passes FY 73 DoD appropriation.
9-17 December 1974	Turkish security assistance debate in Congress.
1 January 1975	GAO report criticizing FMS to Iran made public.
9 February 1975	Congressman discloses sale to Iran of six destroyers.
26 March 1975	U.S. Foreign Relations Committee approves resumption of Turkish security assistance.
19 May 1975	Senate votes to end security assistance embargo to Turkey.
21 May 1975	76 Senators send letter to President Ford urging economic and security assistance for Israel.
6 July 1975	Senator Bartlett confirms Soviet Somali base.
24 July 1975	U.S. House of Representatives votes against removing arms ban to Turkey.
28 July 1975	U.S. informs Congress HAWK sale to Jordan will be deferred.
17 September 1975	President Ford assures Congress HAWK missiles for Jordan will be stationary.
2 October 1975	U.S. House of Representatives relaxes embargo on security assistance for Turkey.

8 October 1975 U.S. House of Representatives approves U.S. Sinai disengagement role.  
 9 October 1975 U.S. Senate approves U.S. Sinai disengagement role.

#### FOREIGN MILITARY OPERATIONS/EVENTS

8 March 1965 Marines land in Vietnam.  
 June 1967 Israeli attack on U.S.S. Liberty.  
 23 January 1968 North Korea seizes S.S. Pueblo.  
 25 January 1968 President Johnson calls up air reservists (Pueblo crisis).  
 13 February 1968 U.S. Department of the Army orders 10,500 more combat troops to Vietnam.  
 20-21 August 1968 Czechoslovakia invaded by U.S.S.R., Poland, Hungary, Belgium, German Democratic Republic.  
 25 December 1971 Heavy U.S. raids on North Vietnam.  
 8-11 May 1972 U.S. mines in Hanoi/Haiphong and other harbors laid.  
 11 May 1972 Mines in North Vietnam activated. Supply routes from PRC attacked.  
 11 August 1972 Last U.S. ground combat unit leaves Vietnam.  
 23 October 1972 U.S. suspends air attacks on North Vietnam above 20th parallel.  
 10 October 1973 Soviet airlift of security assistance to Egypt, Syria begins.  
 13 October 1973 U.S. airlift of security assistance to Israel begins.  
 25 October 1973 U.S. alerts its global forces at level of Defense Condition 3.  
 8 February 1974 Suez Canal clearing operation begins.  
 16 April 1975 Cambodian government surrenders to Khmer Rouge.  
 30 April 1975 Republic of Vietnam government surrenders to Provisional Revolutionary Government/National Liberation Front.  
 12 May 1975 S. S. Mayaguez seized by Cambodia.  
 14 May 1975 U.S. air, land, and sea forces rescue ship and free crewmen of Mayaguez.

FOREIGN POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGY/EVENTS

23 December 1968	<u>S. S. Pueblo</u> released with crew.
18 January 1969	Paris peace talks on Vietnam begin.
25 July 1969	Guam Doctrine.
8 May 1972	U.S. announces decision to mine North Vietnamese harbors and attack supply routes from PRC.
15 July 1972	Pakistan President Bhutto announces Pakistan will withdraw from SEATO.
19 July 1972	U.S. resumes secret negotiations with North Vietnam.
23 October 1972	U.S. suspends air attacks on North Vietnam above 20th parallel.
26 October 1972	Hanoi announces draft agreement to end Vietnam War.
27 October 1972	Secretary of State's "Peace is at Hand" announcement.
30 November 1973	Secretary of Defense announces U.S. will increase naval presence in Indian Ocean.
24 December 1973	CINCUSNAVEUR warns of the growing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
6 January 1974	Secretary of Defense warns Arab oil producers of military reprisals if industrial world is crippled by oil prices.
10 January 1974	Secretary of Defense announces change in strategic nuclear targeting doctrine.
2 January 1975	Secretary of State hints U.S. use of force against oil producers cannot be excluded.
12 January 1975	President reaffirms possible use of force to prevent economic strangulation.
22 January 1975	Secretary of Defense can provide adequate security assistance to Israel in case of another war.
24 March 1975	State Department announces Middle East policy "reassessment."
23 April 1975	U.S.S.R. offers to guarantee Israel's existence if Israel withdraws from Arab territory.
7 June 1975	Belgian government chooses F-16 over Mirage F-1.
10 June 1975	Secretary of Defense signs documents completing \$2 billion F-16 sale to Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway.
12 June 1975	Belgian parliament approves government decision to buy F-16.



4 September 1975	Egypt, Israel sign second-stage Sinai withdrawal agreement that includes U.S. monitor role.
24 November 1975	Secretary of State warns that Soviet and Cuban activities in Angola might threaten the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

LOCAL/REGIONAL WAR

5-10 June 1967	June Middle East war.
30 August - 26 September 1970	Jordan civil war.
1-17 December 1971	India-Pakistan war.
6-22 October 1973	October Middle East war.
18-31 July 1974	Cyprus war (first stage).

MILITARY BUDGETS

29 January 1968	President Johnson submits FY 69 federal (incl. military) budget to Congress.
11 December 1968	Soviet defense budget for 1969 announced.
15 January 1969	President Johnson submits FY 70 federal (incl. military) budget to Congress.
11 October 1972	U.S. Congress passes FY 73 DoD appropriation.
4 February 1974	U.S. defense budget announced.
18 December 1974	Soviet defense budget for 1975 announced.
January 1975	President Ford submits FY 76 federal (incl. military) budget to Congress.

MILITARY GAMES, EXERCISES, MANEUVERS

6 December 1968	NATO announces U.S. ships to maneuver in Black Sea.
9 December 1968	Two destroyers from U.S. Sixth Fleet enter Black Sea.
10-16 April 1975	Most extensive air-sea exercise in Soviet history. Global.

MILITARY MISSIONS (MAAG)

1 April 1968	U.S. establishes USLOT in Tunis.
18 July 1972	Sadat orders withdrawal of all U.S.S.R. military advisors and experts by 6 August.



21 May 1975

Iran terrorists kill two U.S. officers assigned to MAAG Tehran.

#### OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS

10 October 1973

Turkey and Yugoslavia grant U.S.S.R. overflight rights.

13 October 1973

Portugal grants U.S. overflight rights.

#### SUMMIT CONFERENCES

23-25 June 1975

Glassboro summit.

22-24 May 1972

President Nixon visits U.S.S.R.

#### TECHNOLOGY/SPACE

21-27 December 1968

Apollo XI.

27 December 1968

China explodes second thermonuclear device.

20-21 July 1969

Apollo XI astronauts land on moon.

22-29 May 1972

U.S.-Soviet agreement on joint space exploration.

27 September 1973

Soyuz 12 launched.

9 February 1975

Soyuz 17 space capsule lands.

15 July 1975

Apollo-Soyuz joint space flight begins.

#### WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

16-31 August 1968

U.S.S.R. tests multiple warhead for SS-9.

16 August 1968

U.S. tests Poseidon and Minutemen with MIRVs.

29 October 1969

Secretary of Defense announces phase-out of B-58.

24 September 1970

U.S. Congress authorizes expansion of Safeguard ABM system.

31 March 1971

U.S. deploys Poseidon.

9 August 1972	DoD proposes accelerated development of extremely accurate strategic missile warheads.
19 February 1974	U.S.S.R. test fires new missile (SS-X-18).
27 February 1974	U.S.S.R. test fires new missile (SS-X-17).
12 December 1974	U.S.S.R. announces new missile test series in Pacific.
21 January 1975	U.S. intelligence reports Soviet Union deploying Backfire Bomber.
1 June 1975	U.S.S.R. begins seven day tests of MIRVed SS-18 missiles in Pacific.
20 June 1975	Secretary of Defense announces U.S.S.R. has deployed 60 MIRVed ICBMs.

APPENDIX 4

DATA

# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977<sup>1</sup>

OBS ID	THINE	DATE	N	P	EI ACT	SPACT	ACTION	TARI	TAR2	TAR3	INDTR	SPINT	EFCT	TORE	ORSR	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EUP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
1	1	11	750607	3	6	2	2	18	651	.	.	.	0	2	.	42	1	.	4	70	13	1	.	1	.
2	2	11	750610	3	1	2	2	18	651	.	.	.	0	3	.	42	1	.	3	45	1	.	.	.	
3	3	11	750610	3	6	2	2	18	670	.	.	.	0	3	67011	.	.	.	4	20	.	1	.	.	
4	4	11	750726	3	7	2	2	18	670	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	3	30	.	1	.	.	
5	5	11	750803	3	8	2	2	18	670	630	.	.	0	2	.	44	1	.	3	35	.	1	.	.	
6	6	11	750803	3	6	2	2	18	670	.	.	.	0	2	.	44	1	.	3	25	.	1	.	.	
7	7	11	750705	1	2	2	2	18	520	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	40	40	.	1	.	.	
8	7	11	750705	1	2	2	2	18	520	.	.	.	0	2	230	49	1	.	3	40	.	3	.	2	
9	8	11	750801	1	2	2	2	18	670	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	3	20	.	1	.	.	
10	9	11	750607	5	9	2	2	18	651	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	180	13	1	1	.	
11	10	11	750608	5	9	2	2	18	651	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	80	13	1	1	.	
12	11	11	750610	5	10	2	2	18	651	.	.	.	0	3	.	42	1	.	2	40	13	1	1	.	
13	12	11	750611	5	10	2	2	18	651	.	.	.	0	3	.	37	1	.	2	70	.	1	.	.	
14	13	11	750726	5	12	2	2	18	670	630	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	3	25	.	1	.	.	
15	14	11	750426	5	1	365	7	18	652	.	.	.	0	2	.	45	.	.	2	20	.	0	.	.	
16	15	11	750426	3	6	365	7	18	652	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	.	.	3	110	.	1	.	.	
17	16	11	750428	3	7	2	2	18	670	.	.	.	0	2	.	42	1	.	3	70	.	1	.	.	
18	17	21	750905	3	7	2	2	56	.	.	.	.	1	2	20026	.	2	.	4	30	.	1	.	.	
19	17	22	750905	3	7	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	1	2	20026	47	2	4	30	.	.	1	.	.	
20	18	21	750810	1	2	365	.	33	2	.	.	.	1	2	233	47	1	5	38	.	.	1	.	.	
21	18	22	750810	1	2	2	2	33	.	.	.	.	0	2	233	47	1	5	38	.	.	2	9	.	
22	19	37	750710	3	7	3	3	33	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	40	1	.	2	270	.	1	.	.	
23	20	37	750711	3	7	3	3	33	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	1	.	2	315	.	1	.	.	
24	21	2	750716	3	7	3	3	53	520	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	2	4	4	60	31	.	1	.	
25	22	2	750627	1	3	3	3	33	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	2	.	1	1360	.	1	.	.	
26	22	37	750627	1	3	3	3	33	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	2	.	1	630	.	1	.	.	
27	23	37	750716	1	2	3	3	33	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	1	.	2	375	.	1	.	.	
28	24	37	750718	1	10	3	3	33	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	1	.	2	400	.	1	.	.	
29	25	37	750718	1	10	3	3	33	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	1	.	2	560	.	1	.	.	
30	25	38	750715	5	11	2	3	32	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	2	.	2	190	.	1	.	.	
31	26	37	750718	1	10	3	3	33	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	5	.	2	305	.	1	.	.	
32	27	37	750718	5	12	3	3	33	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	1	.	2	110	.	1	.	.	
33	28	37	750721	5	11	3	3	33	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	1	.	2	110	.	1	.	.	
34	29	3	750620	3	6	365	.	53	396	.	.	.	0	2	33813	39	1	.	2	110	.	1	.	.	
35	29	42	750620	3	6	365	.	22	335	.	.	.	0	2	33813	39	1	.	2	110	.	1	.	.	
36	29	61	750620	3	6	396	.	22	335	.	.	.	0	2	33813	39	1	.	2	110	.	1	.	.	
37	30	61	750912	3	7	2	2	22	335	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	4	60	.	1	.	.	
38	31	3	750620	1	1	365	.	53	396	.	.	.	0	2	33813	49	1	.	2	140	.	1	.	.	
39	31	42	750620	1	1	365	.	1	620	.	.	.	0	2	33813	49	1	.	2	140	.	1	.	.	
40	31	61	750620	1	1	396	.	22	335	.	.	.	0	2	33813	49	1	.	2	140	.	1	.	.	
41	32	61	750827	7	8	396	.	22	335	.	.	.	0	2	39615	38	1	.	3	75	.	1	.	.	
42	33	61	750315	3	7	2	2	22	335	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	3	50	12	1	3	2	
43	34	61	750416	3	7	2	2	22	335	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	3	50	12	1	3	2	
44	35	41	750607	3	6	365	.	5	795	.	.	.	0	2	231	.	1	.	4	40	.	5	3	2	
45	36	41	750607	3	6	365	.	5	795	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	3	20	.	5	3	2	
46	37	41	750609	3	8	365	.	1	520	.	.	.	0	2	52031	39	1	.	3	55	.	5	3	2	
47	38	41	750621	3	7	365	.	54	520	.	.	.	0	2	36582	38	1	.	3	50	.	5	3	2	
48	39	41	750622	3	1	365	.	10	651	.	.	.	0	2	65114	39	1	.	4	54	.	2	3	2	
49	40	41	750704	3	6	365	.	5	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	4	35	.	2	3	2	
50	41	41	750708	3	7	365	.	1	520	.	.	.	0	2	232	38	1	.	4	140	.	5	3	2	
51	42	41	750709	3	7	365	.	1	520	.	.	.	0	2	232	38	1	.	4	140	.	5	3	2	
52	43	41	750716	3	6	365	.	1	520	.	.	.	0	2	288	38	1	.	2	120	.	5	3	2	

# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977

OBS ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	LIAC	SPACT	ACTICN	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDTR	SPINT	EPCT	ZONE	OSR	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EQP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
54	45	41	750717	3	7	640	51	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	64013	38	1	.	2	110	.	6	1	.	.
55	45	82	750717	3	7	640	44	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	64013	38	1	.	3	110	.	6	1	.	.
56	46	41	750718	3	8	640	13	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	3	35	.	6	1	.	.
57	46	82	750718	3	8	640	44	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	64014	38	1	.	4	55	.	6	1	.	.
58	47	41	750727	3	1	640	31	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	64014	38	1	.	4	420	.	6	1	.	.
59	46	41	750727	3	7	640	44	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	227	49	1	.	3	65	.	6	1	.	.
60	46	82	750727	3	7	640	31	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	65201	45	1	.	2	150	.	6	1	.	.
61	49	41	750728	3	6	640	31	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	64014	38	1	.	2	150	.	6	1	.	.
62	50	41	750729	3	7	640	31	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	214	38	1	.	2	150	.	6	1	.	.
63	51	41	750730	3	7	640	31	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	64029	38	1	.	2	100	.	6	1	.	.
64	52	41	750809	3	7	640	44	2	.	.	.	.	0	1	64029	38	1	.	2	100	.	6	1	.	.
65	52	82	750809	3	7	640	44	2	.	.	.	.	0	1	64028	38	1	.	2	110	.	6	1	.	.
66	53	82	750805	7	8	640	44	2	.	.	.	.	0	1	64029	38	1	.	2	110	.	6	1	.	.
67	53	82	750805	7	8	640	44	2	.	.	.	.	0	1	64029	38	1	.	2	100	.	6	1	.	.
68	54	41	750809	7	1	640	44	2	.	.	.	.	0	1	69001	49	1	.	2	100	.	6	1	.	.
69	54	82	750827	7	8	672	51	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	69001	49	1	.	2	75	.	6	1	.	.
70	55	41	750605	1	2	230	51	2	.	.	.	.	0	1	36580	40	1	.	2	25	.	6	1	.	.
71	56	41	750704	1	2	396	51	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	69001	49	1	.	2	50	.	6	1	.	.
72	57	41	750709	1	2	365	51	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	232	49	1	.	2	25	.	6	1	.	.
73	58	41	750709	1	2	365	51	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	232	49	1	.	2	25	.	6	1	.	.
74	59	41	750709	1	2	365	51	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	232	49	1	.	2	25	.	6	1	.	.
75	60	41	750710	1	2	365	51	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	232	49	1	.	2	25	.	6	1	.	.
76	61	41	750711	1	2	365	51	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	232	49	1	.	2	25	.	6	1	.	.
77	61	42	750711	1	2	365	51	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	232	49	1	.	2	25	.	6	1	.	.
78	62	41	750717	1	2	365	51	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	288	38	1	.	2	50	.	6	1	.	.
79	62	48	750717	1	2	365	51	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	288	38	1	.	2	50	.	6	1	.	.
80	63	41	750727	1	2	640	31	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	64031	49	1	.	2	70	.	6	1	.	.
81	63	82	750727	1	2	640	31	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	64031	49	1	.	2	70	.	6	1	.	.
82	64	41	750727	1	2	640	31	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	64031	49	1	.	2	70	.	6	1	.	.
83	64	82	750727	1	2	640	31	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	64031	49	1	.	2	70	.	6	1	.	.
84	65	41	750731	1	2	640	44	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	64031	49	1	.	2	70	.	6	1	.	.
85	65	82	750731	1	2	640	44	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	64031	49	1	.	2	70	.	6	1	.	.
86	66	41	750802	1	2	640	31	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	64031	49	1	.	2	70	.	6	1	.	.
87	67	12	750114	5	12	2	16	795	.	.	.	.	0	2	69001	37	1	.	2	60	.	6	1	.	.
88	67	41	750114	5	12	2	16	795	.	.	.	.	0	2	69001	37	1	.	2	60	.	6	1	.	.
89	66	41	750122	5	12	750	17	698	.	.	.	.	0	2	69834	39	1	.	2	130	.	6	1	.	.
90	66	41	750122	5	12	750	17	698	.	.	.	.	0	2	69834	39	1	.	2	130	.	6	1	.	.
91	70	41	750125	5	15	2	5	698	.	.	.	.	0	2	36580	39	1	.	2	50	.	6	1	.	.
92	71	41	750127	5	10	2	5	698	.	.	.	.	0	2	20032	40	1	.	2	75	.	6	1	.	.
93	72	41	750131	5	14	2	5	698	.	.	.	.	0	2	20032	40	1	.	2	75	.	6	1	.	.
94	73	41	750519	5	9	2	1	795	.	.	.	.	0	2	289	40	1	.	2	20	.	6	1	.	.
95	74	41	750519	5	9	2	1	795	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	40	1	.	2	25	.	6	1	.	.
96	75	41	750607	5	9	365	1	795	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	40	1	.	2	25	.	6	1	.	.
97	76	41	750607	5	9	365	1	795	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	40	1	.	2	25	.	6	1	.	.
98	77	41	750612	5	13	365	1	795	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	40	1	.	2	25	.	6	1	.	.
99	78	41	750622	5	12	365	1	795	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	40	1	.	2	25	.	6	1	.	.
100	78	42	751024	1	12	365	7	693	.	.	.	.	0	1	52027	40	1	.	2	165	.	6	1	.	.
101	79	41	750708	5	11	365	1	795	.	.	.	.	0	1	52029	40	1	.	2	165	.	6	1	.	.
102	80	41	750708	5	11	365	1	795	.	.	.	.	0	1	52029	40	1	.	2	165	.	6	1	.	.
103	80	42	750708	5	11	365	1	795	.	.	.	.	0	1	52029	40	1	.	2	165	.	6	1	.	.
104	81	41	750708	5	11	365	1	795	.	.	.	.	0	1	52029	40	1	.	2	165	.	6	1	.	.
105	82	41	750710	5	13	365	1	795	.	.	.	.	0	2	232	39	1	.	2	80	.	6	1	.	.
106	83	41	750715	5	10	2	51	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	232	39	1	.	2	80	.	6	1	.	.



# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977

OBS	ID	THREME	DATE	N	P	LIAC	SPACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDTR	SPINT	EPCT	TOPE	ORSH	DSOUR	PRRS	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EUP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
107	84	41	750726	5	1	640	.	31	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	120	.	6	1	.	.
108	84	82	750726	5	1	2	6	44	640	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	120	.	6	1	.	.
109	85	41	750727	5	13	640	.	31	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	260	.	6	1	.	.
110	86	41	750408	5	12	365	.	1	520	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	120	.	5	3	.	.
111	87	41	750404	3	8	350	.	13	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	42	1	.	2	20	.	2	1	.	.
112	88	41	750301	5	16	640	.	40	2	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	38	1	.	2	45	.	6	1	.	.
113	89	41	750430	3	7	350	.	2	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	2	45	.	1	1	.	.
114	89	42	750430	3	7	350	.	2	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	2	45	.	1	1	.	.
115	90	41	750420	3	7	365	.	1	795	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	95	.	2	3	2	.
116	91	41	750416	3	6	2	16	5	672	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	2	75	.	2	1	.	.
117	92	41	750418	3	6	2	5	19	672	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	2	40	.	2	1	.	.
118	93	52	750519	3	1	2	4	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	2	40	.	2	1	.	.
119	93	71	750519	3	1	2	4	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	2	40	.	2	1	.	.
120	93	83	750519	3	1	2	4	50	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	2	40	.	2	1	.	.
121	94	52	750519	5	9	2	4	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	2	90	.	2	1	.	.
122	94	71	750519	5	9	2	4	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	2	90	.	2	1	.	.
123	94	83	750519	5	9	2	4	50	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	2	90	.	2	1	.	.
124	95	31	750521	3	8	365	.	35	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	2	45	.	3	6	7	.
125	96	31	750521	3	8	365	.	35	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	2	45	.	3	6	7	.
126	97	31	750812	3	7	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	2	20	.	3	5	2	.
127	98	31	750819	3	7	365	.	33	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	2	180	.	4	18	1	.
128	98	32	750819	3	7	365	.	33	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	2	200	.	4	18	1	.
129	99	31	750820	3	7	365	.	34	7	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	2	70	.	4	5	.	.
130	100	31	750827	3	1	2	.	7	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	2	190	.	18	3	.	.
131	101	31	750905	3	7	2	.	32	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20026	2	.	2	140	.	3	9	7	2
132	101	32	750905	3	7	2	.	32	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20026	2	.	2	140	.	4	8	4	1
133	101	38	750905	3	7	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20026	2	.	2	140	.	3	9	2	1
134	102	31	750905	3	7	365	.	35	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20026	2	.	2	150	.	4	9	2	2
135	102	32	750905	3	7	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20026	2	.	2	150	.	4	8	7	2
136	102	33	750905	3	7	365	.	34	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20026	2	.	2	150	.	4	15	6	2
137	103	31	750905	3	7	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20026	2	.	2	30	.	4	10	.	.
138	103	32	750905	3	7	365	.	34	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20026	2	.	2	30	.	4	13	.	.
139	103	33	750905	3	7	365	.	35	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20026	2	.	2	30	.	4	16	.	.
140	104	31	750602	1	2	365	.	33	950	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	41	1	.	2	30	.	3	6	7	2
141	105	31	750606	1	2	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	80	.	3	17	6	2
142	106	31	750604	1	2	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	60	.	7	7	2	2
143	107	31	750622	1	2	365	.	35	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	60	.	7	7	2	2
144	107	32	750622	1	2	2	.	35	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	60	.	7	7	2	2
145	108	31	750802	1	5	2	.	32	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	290	.	2	15	.	1
146	108	32	750802	1	5	365	.	32	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	290	.	2	15	.	1
147	109	31	750809	1	5	2	.	13	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	165	.	3	11	.	2
148	109	32	750809	1	5	2	.	13	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	165	.	3	11	.	2
149	110	31	750821	5	14	365	.	34	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	2	120	.	5	.	.	.
150	111	81	750518	1	7	2	.	42	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	2	120	.	5	.	.	.
151	112	81	750522	3	6	2	.	42	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	2	120	.	5	.	.	.
152	113	81	750527	3	6	2	.	43	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	2	62	.	7	3	.	.
153	114	81	750606	3	7	2	.	43	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	2	95	.	2	.	.	.
154	115	81	750606	3	7	2	.	42	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	2	15	.	2	.	.	.
155	116	81	750608	3	1	2	.	52	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	2	260	.	2	.	.	.
156	117	81	750609	3	6	220	.	390	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	38	1	.	2	95	.	2	.	.	.
157	118	81	750609	3	7	2	.	215	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	2	90	.	2	.	.	.
158	119	81	750611	3	7	2	.	600	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	2	50	.	14	.	.	.
159	120	81	750612	3	8	2	.	51	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	201	1	.	2	60	.	4	.	.	.







# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977

OBS ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	DIAGN	SPACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDTR	SPINT	EFCT	TOPE	ORSR	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	LUP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
266	215	81	750704	1	1	2	51	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	66601	49	1	.	.	25	.	.	.	.	.
267	216	81	750704	1	1	2	38	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	.	35	.	.	.	.	.
268	217	81	750710	1	1	2	39	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	214	49	1	.	.	20	.	.	.	.	.
269	218	81	750712	1	1	2	52	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	39	39	1	.	.	35	20	.	.	.	.
270	219	81	750713	1	1	2	17	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	47	1	.	.	60	20	2	.	.	.
271	220	81	750717	1	1	2	52	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	49	1	.	.	65	20	2	11	.	.
272	221	81	750720	1	1	2	41	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	66611	49	1	.	.	115	.	.	.	.	.
273	222	81	750723	1	1	2	17	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	37	37	1	.	.	40	20	2	.	.	.
274	223	81	750724	1	1	2	40	660	.	.	.	.	0	2	49	49	1	.	.	30	19	.	.	.	.
275	224	81	750727	1	1	2	40	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	40	1	.	.	25	.	.	.	.	.
276	225	42	750728	1	2	640	31	2	.	.	.	.	0	3	232	49	1	.	.	110	.	.	.	.	.
277	225	81	750728	1	2	2	51	640	.	.	.	.	0	2	49	49	1	.	.	110	.	.	.	.	.
278	226	81	750720	1	2	2	44	640	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	5	.	.	15	.	.	.	.	.
279	227	81	750802	1	2	2	51	640	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	.	190	.	.	.	.	.
280	228	81	750803	1	1	2	17	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	.	30	20	.	.	.	.
281	229	81	750805	1	1	2	19	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	66314	39	1	.	.	85	.	.	.	.	.
282	230	81	750807	1	1	2	40	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	47	47	1	.	.	85	.	.	.	.	.
283	230	82	750807	1	1	666	19	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	66631	47	1	.	.	85	.	.	.	.	.
284	231	81	750807	1	2	2	52	630	670	690	.	.	0	2	232	39	1	.	.	110	15	.	.	.	.
285	232	81	750809	1	1	2	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	39	1	.	.	300	.	.	.	.	.
286	232	95	750809	1	1	2	11	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	39	1	.	.	300	.	.	.	.	.
287	233	42	750809	1	2	640	31	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	227	37	1	.	.	120	.	.	.	.	.
288	233	81	750809	1	2	2	44	640	.	.	.	.	0	2	227	37	1	.	.	120	.	.	.	.	.
289	234	81	750814	1	1	2	45	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	214	.	1	.	.	25	.	.	.	.	.
290	235	42	750814	1	2	640	2	2	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	.	65	.	.	.	.	.
291	235	81	750814	1	2	2	44	640	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	.	65	.	.	.	.	.
292	236	81	750817	1	5	2	17	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	2	.	.	450	20	.	.	.	.
293	237	81	750818	1	1	2	48	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	.	35	3	.	.	.	.
294	238	81	750819	1	1	2	48	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	.	30	3	.	.	.	.
295	239	81	750829	1	1	2	45	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	6	.	.	15	.	.	.	.	.
296	240	81	750829	1	3	2	45	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	.	108	2	.	.	.	.
297	241	81	750126	5	15	220	52	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	288	.	1	.	.	115	20	.	.	.	.
298	242	81	750520	5	1	2	43	663	.	.	.	.	10	2	66629	38	1	.	.	50	20	.	.	.	.
299	243	81	750527	5	7	2	52	663	670	.	.	.	0	2	211	4	1	.	.	110	.	.	.	.	.
300	244	81	750608	5	8	2	52	211	210	390	.	.	0	2	25591	40	1	.	.	405	.	.	.	.	.
301	244	82	750608	5	8	2	52	385	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	.	405	.	.	.	.	.
302	245	81	750608	5	9	2	58	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	.	100	.	.	.	.	.
303	245	95	750608	5	9	2	59	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	.	100	.	.	.	.	.
304	246	81	750608	5	9	2	58	.	.	.	.	.	10	1	65201	49	1	.	.	75	.	.	.	.	.
305	247	81	750609	5	9	2	52	211	385	390	.	.	0	2	227	49	1	.	.	70	.	.	.	.	.
306	247	82	750609	5	9	2	52	210	.	.	.	.	0	2	227	49	1	.	.	70	.	.	.	.	.
307	248	81	750610	5	9	2	52	211	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	40	1	.	.	115	2	.	.	.	.
308	249	81	750611	5	11	2	52	630	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	39	1	.	.	65	14	.	.	.	.
309	250	81	750611	5	11	2	52	630	670	.	.	.	0	2	231	39	1	.	.	105	.	.	.	.	.
310	251	81	750612	5	13	2	52	630	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	38	1	.	.	20	13	.	.	.	.
311	252	81	750612	5	13	2	52	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	38	1	.	.	20	13	.	.	.	.
312	253	81	750612	5	13	2	51	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	38	1	.	.	5	28	.	.	.	.
313	254	81	750613	5	11	2	52	396	.	.	.	.	0	2	264	.	2	.	.	420	.	.	.	.	.
314	255	81	750624	5	11	2	52	630	666	670	.	.	0	2	214	38	1	.	.	105	.	.	.	.	.
315	256	81	750702	5	7	365	43	620	.	.	.	.	0	2	65170	40	1	.	.	120	14	.	.	.	.
316	257	81	750705	5	7	2	48	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	40	1	.	.	35	.	.	.	.	.
317	258	81	750711	5	1	2	48	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	.	35	.	.	.	.	.
318	259	81	750714	5	9	2	45	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	.	25	.	.	.	.	.

# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977

OBS ID	THRENE	DATE	N P	DIAC	SPACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDTR	SPINT	EFCT	TOPE	ORSR	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EOP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
319	260	81	750716	5	10	2	1	25	666	666	666	0	1	264	49	5	1	2	22	2	1	1	1	1
320	261	81	750716	5	10	2	1	51	666	666	666	0	3	264	37	5	1	2	80	2	1	1	1	1
321	262	81	750716	5	11	2	6	52	620	620	620	0	2	263	49	1	1	3	80	6	1	1	1	1
322	263	81	750717	5	10	2	6	17	663	663	663	0	2	263	49	1	1	2	185	20	2	11	1	1
323	264	81	750718	5	13	2	7	16	663	663	663	0	2	263	49	1	1	2	180	20	2	1	1	1
324	265	81	750725	5	10	2	6	17	663	663	663	0	2	263	37	1	1	3	50	20	2	1	1	1
325	266	81	750726	5	10	2	6	17	663	663	663	0	2	263	39	1	1	2	80	20	3	1	1	1
326	267	81	750727	5	12	2	6	17	663	663	663	0	2	263	38	1	1	2	100	20	2	1	1	1
327	268	81	750729	5	11	2	6	17	663	663	663	0	2	263	37	1	1	3	55	20	2	1	1	1
328	269	81	750729	5	9	2	6	17	663	663	663	0	2	263	37	1	1	4	209	20	2	1	1	1
329	269	82	750729	5	9	2	6	17	663	663	663	0	2	263	37	1	1	4	209	20	2	1	1	1
330	270	81	750729	5	10	2	6	17	663	663	663	0	2	263	37	1	1	2	150	20	2	1	1	1
331	271	81	750730	5	9	2	6	17	663	663	663	0	2	263	37	1	1	2	132	20	2	1	1	1
332	272	81	750730	5	10	2	6	17	663	663	663	0	2	263	37	1	1	2	330	20	2	1	1	1
333	273	81	750731	5	9	2	6	17	663	663	663	0	2	263	37	1	1	4	363	20	2	1	1	1
334	274	81	750736	5	14	2	6	44	666	666	666	0	2	260	39	1	1	2	125	29	1	1	1	1
335	275	81	750739	5	14	2	6	44	666	666	666	0	2	260	39	1	1	2	35	29	1	1	1	1
336	276	81	750740	5	11	2	6	8	666	666	666	0	2	214	49	1	1	2	105	29	1	1	1	1
337	277	81	750746	5	11	2	6	16	666	666	666	0	2	214	49	1	1	2	105	29	1	1	1	1
338	278	81	750746	5	11	2	6	16	666	666	666	0	2	214	49	1	1	2	1566	29	1	1	1	1
339	279	81	750746	5	14	2	6	16	666	666	666	0	2	214	49	1	1	2	1566	29	1	1	1	1
340	280	81	750746	5	14	2	6	16	666	666	666	0	2	214	49	1	1	2	1566	29	1	1	1	1
341	281	81	750746	5	14	2	6	16	666	666	666	0	2	214	49	1	1	2	1566	29	1	1	1	1
342	282	81	750746	5	14	2	6	16	666	666	666	0	2	214	49	1	1	2	1566	29	1	1	1	1
343	283	81	750746	5	14	2	6	16	666	666	666	0	2	214	49	1	1	2	1566	29	1	1	1	1
344	284	81	750746	5	14	2	6	16	666	666	666	0	2	214	49	1	1	2	1566	29	1	1	1	1
345	284	82	750746	5	12	2	6	43	651	651	651	0	2	651	49	1	1	2	100	29	1	1	1	1
346	285	81	750746	5	12	2	6	48	666	666	666	0	2	651	49	1	1	2	100	29	1	1	1	1
347	286	81	750746	5	12	2	6	48	666	666	666	0	2	651	49	1	1	2	100	29	1	1	1	1
348	287	81	750746	5	12	2	6	48	666	666	666	0	2	651	49	1	1	2	100	29	1	1	1	1
349	288	81	750746	5	12	2	6	48	666	666	666	0	2	651	49	1	1	2	100	29	1	1	1	1
350	289	12	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
351	289	81	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
352	290	81	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
353	291	81	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
354	292	81	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
355	293	81	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
356	294	81	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
357	295	81	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
358	296	81	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
359	297	81	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
360	298	81	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
361	298	82	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
362	299	12	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
363	299	81	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
364	300	81	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
365	301	12	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
366	301	81	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
367	302	81	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
368	303	81	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
369	304	81	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
370	304	82	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1
371	305	91	750746	5	6	2	6	18	620	620	620	0	2	666	49	1	1	2	70	29	1	1	1	1





STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977

OBS ID	THEMS	DATE	N	P	LIAC	SPAC	ACTION	TAB1	TAB2	TAB3	INDR	SPINT	EFCT	TOPE	ORSR	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EOP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
425 347	51	750108	5	12	2	3	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	65101	.	1	.	2	80	.	.	.	.	.
426 348	51	750108	5	12	2	3	45	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	36580	.	1	.	2	15	.	.	.	.	.
427 349	51	750109	5	11	2	3	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	36502	40	1	.	2	75	.	.	.	.	.
428 350	51	750109	5	11	2	3	45	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	232	38	1	.	3	35	.	.	.	.	.
429 351	51	750111	5	12	2	3	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	69031	39	1	2	155	.	.	.	.	.	.
430 351	82	750111	5	12	2	3	46	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	69031	39	1	2	155	.	.	.	.	.	.
431 352	51	750111	5	12	2	3	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	66631	40	1	.	110	.	.	.	.	.	.
432 353	51	750111	5	12	2	3	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	22029	39	1	.	40	.	.	.	.	.	.
433 354	51	750112	5	15	2	3	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	22017	60	1	1	200	.	.	.	.	.	.
434 355	51	750113	5	11	2	3	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	62027	.	3	1	30	.	.	.	.	.	.
435 356	51	750114	5	11	2	3	45	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	1	363	.	.	.	.	.	.
436 357	51	750122	5	1	2	3	45	996	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	2	2	65	.	.	.	.	.	.
437 358	51	750127	5	1	2	3	45	993	.	.	.	.	0	1	61531	.	1	2	159	.	.	.	.	.	.
438 359	42	750128	5	11	2	3	45	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	67232	38	1	.	50	.	.	.	.	.	.
439 359	51	750128	5	11	2	3	45	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	67232	38	1	.	50	.	.	.	.	.	.
440 360	51	750202	5	13	2	3	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	232	38	1	.	65	.	.	.	.	.	.
441 361	51	750204	5	12	396	3	40	693	.	.	.	.	0	2	39627	40	1	.	70	.	.	.	.	.	.
442 362	51	750205	5	1	2	3	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	65102	42	5	.	184	.	.	.	.	.	.
443 363	51	750207	5	12	2	3	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	100	.	.	.	.	.	.
444 364	51	750208	5	11	2	3	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	67031	39	1	.	198	.	.	.	.	.	.
445 365	51	750209	5	13	2	3	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	289	39	1	2	25	.	.	.	.	.	.
446 366	51	750519	5	1	2	4	45	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	1	2	55	.	.	.	.	.	.
447 367	51	750519	5	9	2	4	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	1	1	115	.	.	.	.	.	.
448 368	51	750520	5	1	2	4	45	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	65101	39	1	4	184	.	.	.	.	.	.
449 369	51	750520	5	13	2	4	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	2	67031	39	1	3	50	.	.	.	.	.	.
450 370	51	750320	5	1	2	2	54	670	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	2	125	.	.	.	.	.	.
451 371	51	750402	5	1	2	2	54	693	.	.	.	.	0	1	69301	40	1	.	80	.	.	.	.	.	.
452 372	51	750520	1	1	2	4	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	35	.	.	.	.	.	.
453 373	51	750520	1	5	2	4	49	693	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	1	.	95	.	.	.	.	.	.
454 374	51	750520	1	1	2	4	49	693	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	1	.	35	.	.	.	.	.	.
455 375	51	750320	3	1	2	3	54	670	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	47	1	.	418	.	.	.	.	.	.
456 376	67	750602	1	2	630	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	.	5	.	80	.	.	.	.	.	.
457 377	67	750604	5	9	630	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	.	1	.	418	.	.	.	.	.	.
458 378	67	750703	5	7	670	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	.	1	.	50	.	.	.	.	.	.
459 379	26	750625	3	6	2	.	95	630	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	38	1	.	130	.	.	.	.	.	.
460 380	26	750709	3	6	2	.	46	665	.	.	.	.	0	2	66613	49	1	.	15	.	.	.	.	.	.
461 381	26	750710	3	8	2	.	97	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	201	49	1	1	25	.	.	.	.	.	.
462 382	26	750710	3	8	2	.	97	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	201	49	1	.	30	.	.	.	.	.	.
463 383	26	750711	3	6	2	.	46	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	66614	49	1	.	15	.	.	.	.	.	.
464 384	26	750713	3	8	2	.	51	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	49	1	.	20	.	.	.	.	.	.
465 384	82	750713	3	8	2	3	46	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	15	.	.	.	.	.	.
466 385	26	750724	3	6	2	2	97	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	66614	40	1	.	35	.	.	.	.	.	.
467 386	26	750725	3	6	2	2	41	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	66601	49	1	.	45	.	.	.	.	.	.
468 387	26	750726	3	6	2	2	46	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	20	.	.	.	.	.	.
469 388	26	750726	3	6	2	2	46	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	66614	49	1	.	15	.	.	.	.	.	.
470 389	26	750731	3	6	2	.	41	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	66617	49	1	.	55	.	.	.	.	.	.
471 390	26	750814	3	1	2	.	19	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	49	1	.	160	.	.	.	.	.	.
472 391	26	750815	3	1	2	.	46	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	66614	49	1	.	25	.	.	.	.	.	.
473 392	26	750816	3	1	2	2	97	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	10	.	.	.	.	.	.
474 393	26	750816	3	6	2	2	95	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	2	25	.	.	.	.	.	.
475 394	26	750816	3	6	2	2	97	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	65170	49	1	.	140	.	.	.	.	.	.
476 395	26	750820	3	6	2	2	97	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	66629	49	1	5	75	.	.	.	.	.	.
477 396	26	750821	3	6	2	2	97	651	.	.	.	.	0	1	66050	.	1	.	76	.	.	.	.	.	.

# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977

OBS ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	DIAGN	SPACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDT	SPINT	EFT	TONE	ORSH	ISOUR	PREP	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EUP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
478	357	26	750823	3	1	2	97	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	214	.	1	.	4	60	.	1	3	.	.
479	398	26	750823	3	1	2	97	651	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	.	10	.	1	3	.	.
480	399	26	750823	3	2	2	97	651	666	.	660	8	0	1	.	.	1	2	.	35	.	1	3	.	.
481	399	82	750823	3	2	2	25	666	.	660	.	8	0	1	66034	.	1	2	.	35	.	1	3	.	.
482	400	26	750825	3	1	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	2	35	.	1	3	.	.
483	401	26	750827	3	6	2	40	651	666	.	.	.	0	2	217	49	1	.	4	70	.	1	3	.	.
484	402	26	750829	3	6	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	66611	49	1	.	.	35	.	1	3	.	.
485	402	82	750829	3	6	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	65131	.	1	.	2	10	.	1	3	.	.
486	403	26	750901	3	1	2	97	651	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	2	65	.	1	3	.	.
487	404	26	750901	3	6	2	97	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	227	39	1	2	4	126	.	1	3	.	.
488	405	26	750901	3	6	2	97	651	666	.	.	.	0	2	227	39	1	.	.	40	.	1	3	.	.
489	406	26	750905	3	6	2	97	651	666	.	.	.	0	2	227	49	1	.	2	70	.	1	3	.	.
490	407	26	750909	3	6	2	51	651	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	3	2	135	.	1	3	.	.
491	408	26	750909	3	8	2	97	651	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	3	2	100	.	1	3	.	.
492	409	26	750911	3	6	2	17	651	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	2	35	.	1	3	.	.
493	410	26	750912	3	6	2	97	651	666	.	.	.	0	2	214	49	1	.	2	60	.	1	3	.	.
494	411	82	750915	3	6	2	45	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	39	1	.	2	60	.	1	3	.	.
495	411	26	750915	3	6	2	97	651	666	.	.	.	0	2	260	39	1	.	.	15	.	1	3	.	.
496	412	26	750801	7	1	2	46	651	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	.	15	.	1	3	.	.
497	413	26	750809	7	7	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	.	15	.	1	3	.	.
498	414	26	750812	7	1	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	213	47	1	.	.	30	.	1	3	.	.
499	415	26	750814	7	1	2	97	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	.	45	.	1	3	.	.
500	416	26	750820	7	6	2	97	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	5	.	.	20	.	1	3	.	.
501	417	26	750821	7	7	2	97	651	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	5	.	40	.	1	3	.	.
502	418	26	750823	7	7	2	97	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	.	20	.	1	3	.	.
503	419	26	750827	7	1	2	40	651	666	.	.	.	0	2	22077	38	1	.	3	60	.	1	3	.	.
504	420	2	750827	7	6	2	53	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	22077	.	1	.	.	20	.	1	3	.	.
505	420	26	750827	7	6	2	53	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	22077	.	1	.	.	35	.	1	3	.	.
506	420	3	750828	7	1	2	53	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	65101	47	1	.	.	15	.	1	3	.	.
507	421	26	750830	7	1	2	97	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	2	65	.	1	3	.	.
508	422	26	750830	7	1	2	98	675	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	38	1	.	3	35	.	1	3	.	.
509	423	26	750714	1	1	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	20014	49	1	.	.	10	.	1	3	.	.
510	424	26	750714	1	1	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	20014	49	1	.	.	10	.	1	3	.	.
511	424	82	750714	1	1	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	66614	47	1	.	.	10	.	1	3	.	.
512	425	26	750729	1	1	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	66601	47	1	.	.	25	.	1	3	.	.
513	426	26	750807	1	1	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	66601	47	1	.	.	15	.	1	3	.	.
514	427	26	750816	1	1	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	231	47	1	.	.	15	.	1	3	.	.
515	428	26	750818	1	1	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	66614	47	1	.	.	30	.	1	3	.	.
516	429	26	750820	1	1	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	66614	47	1	.	.	16	.	1	3	.	.
517	430	26	750821	1	1	2	97	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	213	47	1	.	.	20	.	1	3	.	.
518	431	82	750828	1	1	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	66611	.	1	.	.	10	.	1	3	.	.
519	431	26	750828	1	1	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	.	37	1	.	.	55	.	1	3	.	.
520	432	26	750830	1	1	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	66611	.	1	.	.	10	.	1	3	.	.
521	433	26	750831	1	1	2	97	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	214	49	1	.	.	45	.	1	3	.	.
522	434	26	750820	3	6	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	20099	.	1	.	.	15	.	1	3	.	.
523	435	26	750709	5	11	2	99	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	66601	.	2	.	.	50	.	1	3	.	.
524	436	26	750718	5	12	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	66601	.	2	.	.	20	.	1	3	.	.
525	436	82	750722	5	12	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	217	.	2	.	.	10	.	1	3	.	.
526	437	26	750722	5	1	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	1	.	30	.	1	3	.	.
527	438	26	750726	5	1	2	46	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	.	30	.	1	3	.	.
528	439	26	750728	5	1	2	97	666	651	.	.	.	0	2	66614	49	1	.	.	30	.	1	3	.	.
529	440	61	730924	1	1	396	22	335	.	.	365	.	0	2	36582	47	1	.	1	60	.	1	3	.	.
530	441	81	730926	1	1	2	48	660	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	.	1	.	3	35	.	1	3	.	.



# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977

OBS ID	THREE	DATE	N	P	DIAC	SPACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAB3	INDR	SPINT	EFCT	TONE	ORSE	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EXP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
531	441	82	730926	1	1	2	48	670	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	37	1	.	.	35	2	.	.	.	.
532	442	81	730929	1	2	2	58	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	.	30	.	.	.	.	.
533	443	81	730930	1	1	2	35	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	.	35	.	.	.	.	.
534	444	62	731007	1	3	2	35	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	.	63	.	.	.	.	.
535	444	97	731007	1	3	2	62	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	.	63	.	.	.	.	.
536	444	63	731007	1	3	365	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	.	63	.	.	.	.	.
537	445	4	731009	1	3	2	61	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	217	47	1	.	.	75	.	.	.	.	.
538	446	81	731011	1	1	2	25	666	.	.	.	.	10	2	22040	47	1	.	.	40	.	.	.	.	.
539	446	82	731011	1	1	365	25	651	652	.	.	.	0	2	201	39	1	.	.	40	.	.	.	.	.
540	447	81	731011	1	1	2	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	25	1	.	.	40	.	.	.	.	.
541	448	27	731011	1	2	2	98	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	25	1	.	.	40	.	.	.	.	.
542	448	81	731011	1	2	2	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	.	12	.	.	.	.	.
543	449	81	731011	1	2	2	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	201	47	1	.	.	35	.	.	.	.	.
544	450	81	731012	1	1	2	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	40	1	.	.	92	.	.	.	.	.
545	450	82	731012	1	1	2	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	.	92	.	.	.	.	.
546	451	81	731012	1	1	2	35	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	20039	38	1	.	.	20	.	.	.	.	.
547	452	61	731012	1	1	2	35	651	652	.	.	.	0	2	33814	47	1	.	.	85	.	.	.	.	.
548	453	71	731012	1	1	365	26	651	652	.	.	.	10	1	20039	47	1	.	.	85	.	.	.	.	.
549	453	82	731012	1	1	2	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	.	70	.	.	.	.	.
550	454	81	731012	1	1	2	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	.	414	.	.	.	.	.
551	455	81	731013	1	1	2	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	.	30	.	.	.	.	.
552	456	81	731013	1	1	2	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	.	30	.	.	.	.	.
553	457	81	731013	1	1	2	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	.	30	.	.	.	.	.
554	458	81	731013	1	1	2	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	.	60	.	.	.	.	.
555	459	81	731013	1	5	2	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	.	60	.	.	.	.	.
556	460	81	731013	1	5	2	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	.	60	.	.	.	.	.
557	461	1	731014	1	1	2	53	651	652	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	1	.	.	229	.	.	.	.	.
558	462	81	731014	1	1	2	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	238	47	1	.	.	35	.	.	.	.	.
559	463	61	731014	1	2	2	22	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	64018	40	1	.	.	30	.	.	.	.	.
560	464	91	731014	1	2	2	28	652	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	40	1	.	.	45	.	.	.	.	.
561	465	81	731014	1	5	2	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	201	47	1	.	.	12	.	.	.	.	.
562	466	71	731015	1	2	365	27	651	652	.	.	.	0	2	64018	47	1	.	.	12	.	.	.	.	.
563	466	72	731015	1	2	365	26	651	652	.	.	.	0	2	64018	47	1	.	.	12	.	.	.	.	.
564	467	71	731015	1	3	365	26	651	652	.	.	.	0	1	260	.	1	.	.	40	.	.	.	.	.
565	467	82	731015	1	3	2	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	1	.	.	40	.	.	.	.	.
566	468	81	731015	1	5	2	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	.	75	.	.	.	.	.
567	468	82	731015	1	5	365	25	651	652	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	.	75	.	.	.	.	.
568	469	51	731016	1	1	2	49	695	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	41	1	.	.	63	.	.	.	.	.
569	470	81	731016	1	1	365	40	693	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	.	80	.	.	.	.	.
570	471	51	731016	1	1	2	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	.	60	.	.	.	.	.
571	472	71	731016	1	1	2	26	666	.	.	.	.	10	2	.	47	1	.	.	60	.	.	.	.	.
572	472	82	731016	1	1	2	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	.	60	.	.	.	.	.
573	473	73	731016	1	3	365	26	651	652	.	.	.	0	2	260	.	1	.	.	193	.	.	.	.	.
574	473	81	731016	1	3	2	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	.	1	.	.	193	.	.	.	.	.
575	473	82	731016	1	3	2	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	.	1	.	.	193	.	.	.	.	.
576	474	81	731016	1	3	2	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	38	38	1	.	.	67	.	.	.	.	.
577	475	81	731016	1	3	2	51	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	.	67	.	.	.	.	.
578	476	72	731017	1	1	2	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	.	116	.	.	.	.	.
579	476	61	731017	1	1	2	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	.	116	.	.	.	.	.
580	476	73	731017	1	1	2	27	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	.	116	.	.	.	.	.
581	477	72	731017	1	2	2	27	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	265	47	1	.	.	111	.	.	.	.	.
582	477	81	731017	1	2	2	27	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	.	111	.	.	.	.	.
583	478	71	731017	1	2	2	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	22040	47	1	.	.	111	.	.	.	.	.

# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977

OBS ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	DIAGN	SFACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDTR	SPINT	EFCT	ZONE	OBSR	ESOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EUP	V1	V2	V3	V4
584	478	82	731017	1	2	2	43	666	.	.	666	14	0	2	201	47	1	.	2	111	19	.	.	.	.
585	479	26	731017	1	2	2	9E	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	2	10	.	.	.	.	.
586	480	1	731017	1	2	365	53	695	.	.	.	.	0	.	202	39	1	.	3	10	31	.	.	.	.
587	481	1	731017	1	2	2	53	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	202	39	1	.	3	20	31	.	.	.	.
588	482	61	731018	1	2	2	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	80	.	4	3	1	6
589	483	72	731018	1	1	2	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	41	1	.	2	70	.	.	.	.	.
590	483	72	731018	1	1	365	25	651	652	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	2	70	.	.	.	.	.
591	484	72	731018	1	1	2	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	2	158	2	.	21	10	.
592	484	81	731018	1	1	2	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	2	158	2	.	.	.	.
593	485	81	731018	1	1	2	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	37	1	.	2	20	10	.	3	1	6
594	486	61	731018	1	1	2	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	2	81	.	4	3	1	6
595	487	61	731018	1	1	365	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	3	35	.	4	3	1	6
596	487	62	731018	1	1	2	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	3	35	.	4	3	1	6
597	488	31	731018	1	1	365	63	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	37	2	.	2	145	20	3	10	2	.
598	489	31	731018	1	3	365	26	666	.	.	.	.	10	2	.	.	2	.	2	437	20	3	10	2	.
599	489	72	731018	1	3	2	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	2	.	2	437	20	3	10	2	.
600	490	51	731018	1	5	2	45	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	5	.	4	75	.	.	.	.	.
601	491	31	731018	1	8	2	35	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	24	1	.	1	668	5	2	17	3	.
602	492	71	731019	1	5	2	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	25	1	.	4	155	2	.	25	21	.
603	492	83	731019	1	5	2	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	25	1	.	4	155	22	.	.	.	.
604	492	83	731019	1	5	2	27	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	25	1	.	4	155	2	.	.	.	.
605	492	72	731019	1	5	2	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	25	1	.	4	155	2	.	.	.	.
606	493	61	731019	1	5	3	35	10	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	25	1	.	4	35	.	4	3	1	4
607	493	62	731019	1	5	2	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	2	100	2	.	.	.	.
608	494	72	731019	1	8	2	27	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	1	55	2	.	.	.	.
609	494	81	731020	1	1	2	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	1	130	.	.	.	.	.
610	495	71	731020	1	1	2	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	1	61	.	.	.	.	.
611	496	81	731020	1	1	2	26	666	.	.	.	.	10	2	.	47	1	.	1	61	19	.	20	11	10
612	497	72	731020	1	1	2	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	1	61	22	.	2	19	.
613	497	81	731020	1	1	2	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	1	61	22	.	2	19	.
614	498	81	731020	1	1	2	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	1	61	22	.	2	19	.
615	499	26	731020	1	1	2	98	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	1	61	.	.	.	.	.
616	499	27	731020	1	1	666	65	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	1	61	.	.	.	.	.
617	500	1	731020	1	3	365	53	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	201	47	1	2	171	31	.	1	5	.
618	500	2	731020	1	3	2	53	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	260	.	1	2	171	31	.	1	5	.
619	501	41	731021	1	1	672	2	2	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	3	80	.	2	1	9	8
620	502	81	731021	1	1	2	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	3	25	10	.	6	19	8
621	503	28	731021	1	2	2	98	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	2	133	.	4	4	4	4
622	503	81	731021	1	2	2	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	2	133	2	.	10	11	22
623	503	82	731021	1	2	2	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	2	133	21	.	25	26	.
624	504	81	731021	1	2	2	64	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	2	153	.	2	.	.	.
625	505	81	731021	1	5	2	64	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	5	80	.	.	.	.	.
626	506	31	731021	1	3	365	65	695	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	4	470	20	3	10	2	.
627	506	32	731021	1	3	2	63	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	2	.	2	470	25	2	.	2	.
628	506	33	731021	1	3	3	63	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	2	.	2	470	26	3	.	.	.
629	507	48	750104	5	12	2	1	630	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	213	47	1	2	210	.	.	.	.	.
630	507	81	750104	5	12	2	42	630	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	213	47	1	2	210	.	.	.	.	.
631	508	81	750109	5	11	2	45	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	40	1	2	130	2	.	26	30	.
632	509	81	750110	5	13	2	52	670	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	1	2	365	2	.	28	.	.
633	510	81	750111	5	11	2	42	670	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	1	2	65	2	.	.	.	.
634	511	81	750109	5	11	630	52	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	50	1	1	2	30	.	.	.	.	.
635	512	11	750112	5	14	2	18	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	2	100	26	.	.	.	.
636	513	81	750118	5	1	2	43	660	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	2	100	26	.	.	.	.



# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977

OBS ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	DIRECT	SPACE	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDL	SPINT	EFFECT	TOPE	ONSR	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EUP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
637	514	81	750119	5	1	2	42	660	.	.	2	14	0	2	20039	25	1	.	2	240	26	.	.	.	.
638	515	81	750119	5	1	365	42	645	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	25	1	.	4	130	11	.	.	.	.
639	516	51	750119	5	12	2	49	996	.	.	.	14	0	1	.	25	1	.	.	50	.	.	.	.	.
640	517	81	750119	5	12	2	17	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	3	55	26	.	.	.	.
641	518	82	750119	5	12	2	17	660	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	3	55	26	.	.	.	.
642	519	81	750122	5	1	365	44	651	.	.	.	1	0	.	22076	25	1	.	110	.	.	.	.	.	.
643	519	31	750122	5	13	365	35	691	.	.	.	14	0	1	63001	40	1	.	50	.	.	2	15	4	1
644	520	61	750123	5	1	2	35	335	.	.	.	7	0	1	63001	.	1	.	60	.	.	3	2	7	.
645	520	62	750123	5	1	2	45	666	.	.	.	14	0	2	63001	25	1	.	20	.	.	2	2	6	.
646	521	81	750124	5	1	2	45	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	39	1	.	100	23	.	.	.	.	.
647	522	81	750125	5	15	2	50	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	39	1	.	100	.	.	.	.	.	.
648	522	82	750125	5	15	2	17	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	40	1	.	90	.	.	.	.	.	.
649	523	11	750128	5	11	350	97	651	.	.	.	16	0	2	69001	40	1	.	352	2	.	.	.	.	.
650	524	81	750129	5	11	365	42	670	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	.	1	.	352	2	.	.	.	.	.
651	525	81	750131	5	13	2	42	645	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	.	1	.	352	2	.	.	.	.	.
652	525	83	750131	5	13	365	43	652	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	.	1	.	352	2	.	.	.	.	.
653	525	83	750131	5	13	365	48	660	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	.	1	.	352	2	.	.	.	.	.
654	525	82	750131	5	13	2	44	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	66611	49	1	.	90	2	.	.	.	.	.
655	526	81	750202	5	1	2	44	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	55	.	.	.	.	.	.
656	527	94	750202	5	13	2	19	651	.	.	.	14	0	2	.	49	1	.	60	.	.	.	.	.	.
657	528	81	750203	5	12	666	15	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	25	1	.	80	19	.	.	.	.	.
658	529	81	750205	5	1	365	43	651	.	.	.	14	0	1	61550	40	1	.	90	.	.	.	.	.	.
659	529	82	750205	5	1	365	45	993	.	.	.	1	0	1	65102	42	1	.	80	30	.	.	.	.	.
660	530	51	750206	5	11	2	49	996	.	.	.	1	0	2	.	38	1	.	55	30	.	.	.	.	.
661	531	51	750207	5	12	2	96	670	.	.	.	6	0	2	.	25	3	.	109	.	.	.	.	.	.
662	532	81	750209	5	16	2	96	670	.	.	.	6	0	2	.	37	1	.	65	20	.	.	.	.	.
663	533	81	750211	5	12	2	98	670	.	.	.	6	0	2	.	40	1	.	45	30	.	.	.	.	.
664	534	81	750211	5	11	3	6	695	.	.	.	6	0	2	.	25	3	.	109	.	.	.	.	.	.
665	535	31	750211	5	13	365	32	652	.	.	.	.	0	2	20014	37	1	.	65	20	.	.	.	.	.
666	535	82	750211	5	13	365	43	670	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	45	30	.	.	.	.	.
667	536	81	750212	5	10	2	97	670	.	.	.	4	0	2	.	49	1	.	45	30	.	.	.	.	.
668	536	48	750212	5	10	2	1	670	.	.	.	4	0	2	.	49	1	.	45	30	.	.	.	.	.
669	537	81	750215	5	13	2	44	640	.	.	.	1	0	1	.	49	1	.	50	.	.	.	.	.	.
670	538	26	750902	1	1	2	99	651	.	.	.	1	0	2	.	37	1	.	52	.	.	.	.	.	.
671	539	26	750902	1	1	2	99	651	.	.	.	1	0	2	.	37	1	.	210	.	.	.	.	.	.
672	540	26	750902	1	1	2	99	666	.	.	.	1	0	2	.	37	1	.	210	.	.	.	.	.	.
673	541	26	750902	1	3	2	13	651	.	.	.	3	0	2	.	25	1	.	255	.	.	.	.	.	.
674	542	43	750903	1	2	640	6	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	25	2	.	255	.	.	.	.	.	.
675	542	42	750903	1	2	640	31	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	25	2	.	255	.	.	.	.	.	.
676	542	41	750903	1	2	640	53	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	25	2	.	255	.	.	.	.	.	.
677	542	42	750903	1	2	640	53	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	25	2	.	255	.	.	.	.	.	.
678	542	43	750903	1	2	396	53	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	25	2	.	255	.	.	.	.	.	.
679	542	43	750903	1	2	2	95	651	.	.	.	1	0	2	.	25	2	.	255	.	.	.	.	.	.
680	543	26	750903	1	1	2	19	651	.	.	.	14	0	2	.	47	1	.	50	.	.	.	.	.	.
681	544	81	750904	1	1	666	16	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	90	.	.	.	.	.	.
682	545	81	750904	1	1	365	16	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	235	.	.	.	.	.	.
683	546	26	750904	1	3	651	51	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	145	.	.	.	.	.	.
684	547	26	750906	1	1	2	45	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	25	.	.	.	.	.	.
685	548	81	750906	1	1	2	45	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	25	.	.	.	.	.	.
686	549	94	750906	1	2	3	7	795	.	.	.	.	1	1	75026	25	2	.	70	.	.	.	.	.	.
687	549	95	750906	1	2	2	56	365	.	.	.	.	1	1	75026	25	2	.	70	.	.	.	.	.	.
688	550	2	750906	1	5	2	53	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	24	2	.	270	31	.	.	.	.	.
689	550	31	750906	1	5	2	63	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	24	2	.	270	18	.	.	.	.	.

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Obs ID	TIME	DATE	N	P	DIAC	SPAC	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDTR	SPIR	EPCT	ZONE	OSR	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EQP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
690	550	3	750306	1	5	365	.	53	2	.	.	.	0	2	.	24	2	.	2	270	31	.	.	.	.
691	551	26	750306	1	7	2	.	99	651	666	.	.	0	2	.	24	2	.	2	95	.	1	3	.	.
692	552	26	750307	1	5	2	.	52	651	666	.	.	0	2	.	260	2	.	2	300	18	1	3	.	.
693	552	82	750307	1	5	2	.	99	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	260	2	.	2	300	18	.	.	.	.
694	553	81	750308	1	2	640	15	46	2	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	2	.	3	20	.	.	.	.	.
695	554	81	750308	1	2	2	.	44	640	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	2	.	3	80	.	.	.	.	.
696	555	81	750309	1	3	2	.	42	670	.	.	.	0	2	.	37	1	.	3	25	.	.	.	.	.
697	556	26	750309	1	3	2	.	99	651	666	.	.	0	2	.	69001	3	1	1	115	.	3	.	.	.
698	557	47	750309	1	3	365	.	2	651	.	.	.	0	2	.	69001	3	1	.	70	18	.	.	.	.
699	558	81	750309	1	3	365	.	44	651	.	.	.	0	2	.	69001	3	1	.	150	.	.	.	.	.
700	558	82	750309	1	3	365	.	43	651	.	.	.	0	2	.	69001	3	1	.	150	.	.	.	.	.
701	558	83	750309	1	3	365	.	43	652	.	.	.	0	2	.	69001	3	1	.	150	.	.	.	.	.
702	559	26	750310	1	1	2	6	51	651	666	.	.	0	2	.	238	1	.	2	140	.	3	.	.	.
703	560	81	750311	1	1	2	6	19	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	213	1	.	3	30	.	.	.	.	.
704	561	61	750312	1	2	2	6	51	663	.	.	.	0	2	.	260	1	.	3	45	20	2	.	.	.
705	562	61	750312	1	2	2	.	22	350	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	4	40	.	4	10	.	.
706	563	31	750312	1	2	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	4	30	.	4	10	.	.
707	564	27	750313	1	1	2	.	99	651	666	.	.	0	2	.	260	1	.	4	65	.	1	3	.	.
708	564	67	750313	1	1	651	.	1	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	260	1	.	4	65	18	2	26	.	.
709	565	31	750313	1	1	2	13	35	651	666	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	3	60	18	3	.	.	.
710	566	72	750313	1	1	2	6	51	666	.	.	.	0	1	.	40	1	.	3	45	.	2	.	.	.
711	567	81	750313	1	2	2	.	44	640	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	5	.	3	65	.	2	.	.	.
712	568	31	750313	1	5	365	.	32	.	.	.	.	10	.	.	.	2	.	2	155	26	3	10	2	2
713	568	55	750313	1	5	365	.	56	396	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	2	.	3	155	10	2	.	.	.
714	569	41	750314	1	1	673	5	54	2	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	3	20	.	1	.	.	.
715	570	81	750314	1	1	2	.	52	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	66611	1	.	3	45	2	.	.	.	.
716	571	81	750314	1	2	2	6	44	640	.	.	.	0	1	.	37	1	.	3	60	.	.	.	.	.
717	572	81	750315	1	1	2	1	44	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	4	40	23	.	29	.	.
718	573	1	750315	1	2	365	.	53	2	.	.	.	0	2	.	260	1	.	4	70	9	.	.	.	.
719	573	33	750315	1	2	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	260	1	.	4	70	18	4	8	7	2
720	573	2	750315	1	2	365	.	53	2	.	.	.	0	2	.	260	1	.	3	30	23	.	.	.	.
721	574	81	750317	1	1	2	1	16	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	3	30	23	.	2	.	.
722	575	26	750317	1	1	2	1	16	651	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	3	20	.	3	.	.	.
723	576	81	750318	1	1	666	4	42	2	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	3	20	23	.	2	.	.
724	577	81	750318	1	1	2	.	49	663	2	.	.	0	2	.	232	1	.	3	55	20	.	.	.	.
725	578	94	750318	1	2	365	.	49	2	.	.	.	1	2	.	213	1	.	4	60	.	3	1	.	.
726	579	61	750319	1	1	666	4	19	2	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	3	25	.	.	.	.	.
727	580	81	750319	1	1	2	6	13	663	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	3	75	20	.	.	.	.
728	581	81	750320	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	3	35	23	.	.	.	.
729	582	94	750320	1	2	365	3	20	2	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	3	140	.	1	.	.	.
730	583	61	750320	1	2	396	.	22	335	.	.	.	0	1	.	36580	1	.	4	25	.	3	2	6	.
731	584	94	750320	1	2	365	.	49	2	.	.	.	1	1	.	213	5	.	4	70	.	3	1	.	.
732	584	95	750320	1	2	3	.	7	.	.	.	.	1	1	.	.	5	.	4	70	.	1	10	.	.
733	585	81	750321	1	1	2	4	17	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	2	100	23	1	2	.	.
734	586	48	750321	1	1	365	.	1	620	.	.	.	0	2	.	20001	1	.	3	90	30	.	.	.	.
735	586	81	750322	1	1	365	.	43	620	.	.	.	0	2	.	20001	1	.	3	90	20	.	10	28	.
736	587	81	750322	1	1	2	.	46	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	2	.	4	111	23	.	2	.	.
737	588	31	750322	1	2	255	.	56	2	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	2	.	4	210	10	.	11	14	4
738	589	81	750323	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	66614	1	.	3	70	4	.	.	.	.
739	590	81	750323	1	1	2	.	51	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	3	230	23	1	.	.	.
740	591	94	750324	1	2	365	3	59	2	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	2	160	.	1	.	.	.
741	592	26	750324	1	1	2	6	50	651	666	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	3	40	.	1	.	.	.
742	593	12	750325	1	1	690	7	18	365	.	.	.	0	2	.	69014	1	.	3	25	.	1	.	.	.

# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977

OBS ID	TIME	DATE	N	P	FACT	SPACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDTR	SPINT	EFCT	CONF	ORSR	ESOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EXP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
743	593		81	1	690	.	46	365					0	.	69014	40	1	.	3	25	.	.	.	.	.
744	594		26	1	2	6	51	666	651	.			0	2	.	47	1	.	3	45	.	1	3	.	.
745	595		81	2	2	.	51	666		.			0	1	.	40	1	.	3	30	23	.	.	.	.
746	596		81	2	2	.	44	640	.	.			0	2	.	47	1	.	4	90	.	.	.	.	.
747	597		94	2	2	6	6		.	.			0	2	.	39	1	.	4	70	20	1	4	.	.
748	598		81	1	2	1	40	651	.	.			0	3	.	38	1	1	2	60	.	1	3	.	.
749	599		26	1	2	6	55	666	666	.			0	2	.	47	1	.	3	60	.	.	.	.	.
750	600		82	1	2	5	55	666	495	2			0	2	.	47	1	.	3	130	19	.	.	.	.
751	601		81	2	3	6	48	235	666	.			0	2	.	40	1	.	4	65	.	1	3	.	.
752	602		26	2	2	6	51	651	666	.			0	2	.	47	2	.	4	75	.	.	.	.	.
753	603		94	2	2	8	8	.	.	.			0	2	.	24	1	.	2	110	.	.	.	.	.
754	604		94	2	2	6	56	396	.	2			1	2	.	47	1	.	2	60	.	4	.	.	.
755	605		94	2	394	.	44	651	.	.			0	2	.	38	6	5	1	117	18	.	19	.	.
756	606		81	1	365	.	52	666	.	670			10	1	65127	39	1	5	1	55	23	.	.	.	.
757	607		81	1	2	.	52	666	.	693			10	1	69029	39	1	1	1	335	23	.	2	.	.
758	608		81	1	2	.	17	666	.	.			0	3	287	39	1	.	1	335	23	.	.	.	.
759	609		62	1	2	13	17	666	.	.			10	1	.	39	5	4	4	105	23	.	.	.	.
760	610		81	5	2	6	17	666	.	.			0	1	66331	39	1	1	2	220	20	3	.	.	.
761	611		81	1	2	6	17	663	.	.			10	1	66327	37	1	1	1	290	20	.	.	.	.
762	612		81	5	2	6	46	678	.	.			0	3	213	49	1	.	2	130	.	.	.	.	.
763	613		81	6	2	13	53	666	651	.			0	2	231	39	1	.	3	50	.	.	.	.	.
764	614		1	12	365	.	36	666	.	.			0	1	230	39	1	5	3	75	5	.	.	.	.
765	615		82	5	2	4	44	666	.	.			0	3	230	39	1	5	3	75	2	.	.	.	.
766	616		26	11	2	1	95	666	651	.			0	2	227	49	1	1	2	180	20	1	3	.	.
767	617		81	10	2	6	17	663	.	2			10	1	260	38	1	.	2	160	20	.	.	.	.
768	618		26	1	2	.	97	666	651	.			0	2	213	40	1	.	3	40	.	1	3	.	.
769	619		47	5	678	13	6	365	.	.			0	3	213	40	1	.	2	80	.	.	.	.	.
770	620		81	12	2	6	55	666	.	.			0	1	287	38	1	.	.	45	.	.	.	.	.
771	621		81	5	2	6	51	666	.	.			0	1	287	38	1	.	.	45	.	.	.	.	.
772	622		82	12	2	6	51	666	.	.			0	2	287	38	1	.	.	45	.	.	.	.	.
773	623		24	12	2	6	51	666	.	.			0	2	287	38	1	.	.	45	.	.	.	.	.
774	624		11	13	2	6	18	651	.	.			0	3	.	42	1	.	2	100	17	1	.	.	.
775	625		82	13	2	1	11	651	.	.			0	3	.	49	1	5	2	100	17	1	.	.	.
776	626		94	13	2	1	97	651	.	.			0	1	227	49	1	.	2	160	20	1	4	.	.
777	627		26	5	2	.	97	651	.	.			0	2	227	39	1	.	2	195	.	.	.	.	.
778	628		26	13	2	.	32	651	.	.			0	1	64501	39	1	.	2	90	20	3	10	.	.
779	629		31	5	365	.	97	651	666	.			0	3	227	37	1	.	1	395	.	1	3	.	.
780	630		26	1	2	6	97	651	666	.			0	3	217	39	1	1	2	70	.	.	.	.	.
781	631		26	1	2	6	19	795	666	.			0	3	217	39	1	1	2	70	.	.	.	.	.
782	632		62	1	651	.	19	795	.	.			0	2	20001	39	1	1	2	150	.	.	.	.	.
783	633		41	2	2	6	51	795	.	.			0	2	213	.	2	.	2	150	.	.	.	.	.
784	634		12	2	3	3	18	795	.	.			0	2	214	.	2	.	3	150	.	.	.	.	.
785	635		41	2	2	3	19	795	.	.			0	2	214	.	2	.	2	150	.	.	.	.	.
786	636		41	2	2	3	18	795	.	.			0	2	214	.	2	.	2	150	.	.	.	.	.
787	637		81	6	365	.	43	652	.	.			0	2	214	38	1	.	2	215	2	.	.	.	.
788	638		81	1	2	.	51	651	.	.			0	3	202	40	1	.	2	135	29	.	.	.	.
789	639		82	1	2	13	42	651	.	.			0	3	214	40	1	.	2	135	18	.	.	.	.
790	640		83	1	2	.	51	651	.	.			0	2	214	40	1	.	2	135	18	.	.	.	.
791	641		26	1	2	6	51	651	666	.			0	2	214	37	1	.	2	110	.	1	3	.	.
792	642		81	8	365	.	25	651	.	.			0	3	66611	37	1	.	3	40	23	.	2	20	10
793	643		26	1	2	6	99	651	666	.			0	3	232	47	1	6	2	110	.	.	.	.	.
794	644		81	6	2	.	52	666	.	.			10	1	66629	47	1	.	3	180	.	.	.	.	.
795	645		82	1	365	.	25	651	652	620	666	3	10	.	66629	47	1	.	3	120	23	.	.	.	.



# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977

OBS ID	THRE	DATE	N	P	DIAC	SPACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDTR	SPINT	EPCT	TONR	OSFR	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EXP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
796	635	81	751005	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
797	635	42	751005	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
798	636	81	751004	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
799	636	42	751004	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
800	637	11	751004	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
801	638	41	751006	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
802	639	26	751007	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
803	640	26	751008	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
804	640	82	751008	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
805	641	81	751009	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
806	642	81	751009	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
807	643	26	751009	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
808	644	81	751009	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
809	645	26	751010	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
810	646	26	751011	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
811	647	26	751011	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
812	648	81	751011	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
813	649	81	751013	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
814	650	81	751014	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
815	651	41	751016	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
816	652	81	751017	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
817	653	61	751018	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
818	654	61	751019	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
819	655	81	751020	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
820	656	81	751023	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
821	656	82	751023	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
822	657	81	751023	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
823	657	82	751023	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
824	658	54	751024	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
825	658	95	751024	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
826	659	81	751025	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
827	659	82	751025	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
828	660	41	751025	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
829	661	81	751027	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
830	661	82	751027	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
831	662	81	751027	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
832	663	94	751027	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
833	664	41	751028	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
834	664	82	751028	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
835	665	81	751028	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
836	665	82	751028	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
837	666	81	751029	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
838	667	61	751029	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
839	668	81	751030	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
840	668	82	751030	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
841	669	94	751031	1	2	2	6	42	640	2	0	2	2	232	47	1	4	2	140	6	1	1	1	1	1
842	670	31	720509	1	1	1	13	32	816	2	0	2	2	213	47	1	4	2	135	22	2	10	4	1	1
843	671	91	720509	1	1	1	13	32	816	2	0	2	2	213	47	1	4	2	135	22	2	10	4	1	1
844	672	91	720509	1	1	1	13	32	816	2	0	2	2	213	47	1	4	2	135	22	2	10	4	1	1
845	673	91	720510	1	1	1	13	32	816	2	0	2	2	213	47	1	4	2	135	22	2	10	4	1	1
846	674	91	720510	1	1	1	13	32	816	2	0	2	2	213	47	1	4	2	135	22	2	10	4	1	1
847	675	91	720511	1	1	1	13	32	816	2	0	2	2	213	47	1	4	2	135	22	2	10	4	1	1
848	676	91	720511	1	1	1	13	32	816	2	0	2	2	213	47	1	4	2	135	22	2	10	4	1	1

# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977

OBS ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	DIACT	SPACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDTR	SPINT	EFCT	TOPE	OBSR	DSOUB	PRES	ORIG	DISP	STZ	EQP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	
849	677	91	720511	1	7	2	29	816	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	2	.	2	180	.	.	.	.	.	.
850	678	11	720512	1	1	365	18	652	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	40	1	.	3	20	.	.	1	.	.	.
851	679	91	720512	1	9	2	29	816	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	4	100	.	.	.	.	.	.
852	679	82	720512	1	9	2	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	4	100	.	.	.	.	.	.
853	680	11	720513	1	1	365	18	652	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	3	40	.	.	1	.	.	.
854	681	81	720513	1	1	2	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	41	1	.	3	85	29	.	30	.	.	.
855	681	27	720513	1	1	2	98	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	41	1	.	3	85	.	.	1	.	.	.
856	682	91	720513	1	7	2	29	816	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	4	95	.	.	1	.	.	.
857	683	11	720514	1	1	365	18	652	651	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	1	.	2	105	.	.	1	.	.	.
858	683	82	720514	1	1	365	19	652	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	2	105	.	.	1	.	.	.
859	684	94	720514	1	2	365	18	651	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	2	70	.	.	5	9	.	.
860	685	11	720515	1	1	365	18	651	652	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	2	165	17	1	1	.	.	.
861	686	41	720515	1	1	2	66	745	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	1	.	2	455	17	1	1	.	.	.
862	687	11	720516	1	1	365	18	651	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	1	.	2	455	14	1	1	.	.	.
863	687	12	720516	1	1	365	18	651	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	1	.	2	455	14	1	1	.	.	.
864	687	13	720516	1	1	365	19	651	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	1	.	2	185	.	.	1	.	.	.
865	688	41	720516	1	1	2	66	745	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	2	730	.	.	1	.	.	.
866	689	11	720517	1	1	365	19	651	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	1	.	2	205	.	.	1	.	.	.
867	690	11	720518	1	1	365	19	651	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	7	.	2	265	.	.	1	.	.	.
868	691	81	720519	1	1	365	18	651	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	8	.	3	40	.	.	1	.	.	.
869	692	11	720519	1	1	365	18	651	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	39	1	.	3	20	.	.	1	.	.	.
870	693	94	720519	1	2	3	67	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	4	100	2	.	3	2	6	.
871	694	81	720519	1	9	2	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	3	25	14	4	3	2	6	.
872	695	61	720520	1	1	365	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	25	1	.	2	135	.	.	1	.	.	.
873	696	94	720522	1	1	2	20	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	1	.	2	795	.	.	1	.	.	.
874	697	11	720523	1	1	2	18	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	1	165	.	.	2	.	.	.
875	698	94	720523	1	2	2	57	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	39	1	.	2	65	.	.	4	.	.	.
876	699	67	720523	1	2	350	1	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	2	.	2	670	.	.	1	.	.	.
877	700	94	720523	1	5	2	56	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	2	.	2	670	.	.	1	.	.	.
878	700	95	720523	1	5	2	56	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	2	.	2	670	.	.	1	.	.	.
879	700	95	720523	1	5	365	56	396	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	2	.	2	670	23	1	6	11	.	.
880	700	96	720523	1	5	394	56	396	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	2	.	2	670	10	1	9	.	.	.
881	700	96	720523	1	5	396	56	394	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	2	.	2	670	16	1	5	.	.	.
882	701	81	720524	1	1	2	20	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	37	1	.	2	80	.	.	1	.	.	.
883	702	94	720524	1	1	2	20	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	25	1	.	2	80	.	.	1	.	.	.
884	703	37	720525	1	1	2	68	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	25	1	.	2	205	.	.	1	.	.	.
885	704	94	720525	1	1	2	20	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	2	.	2	535	.	.	1	.	.	.
886	705	37	720525	1	1	2	68	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	2	.	2	60	.	.	1	.	.	.
887	706	94	720526	1	1	2	68	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	40	1	.	3	150	.	.	3	2	8	.
888	707	61	720526	1	1	396	22	215	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	40	1	.	3	150	.	.	3	2	8	.
889	707	95	720526	1	1	394	56	396	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	40	1	.	3	150	.	.	3	2	8	.
890	707	96	720526	1	1	2	7	215	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	38	1	.	3	80	.	.	6	1	1	.
891	708	31	720526	1	1	365	32	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	38	1	.	3	80	.	.	6	1	1	.
892	708	32	720526	1	1	365	35	2	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	38	1	.	3	80	.	.	6	1	1	.
893	708	32	720526	1	1	365	35	2	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	38	1	.	3	80	.	.	6	1	1	.
894	709	96	720527	1	1	365	68	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	25	1	.	2	190	.	.	1	6	11	.
895	710	94	720527	1	5	2	68	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	1	.	2	424	.	.	1	11	8	.
896	710	95	720527	1	5	2	56	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	1	.	2	424	.	.	1	11	8	.
897	711	94	720528	1	1	2	68	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	25	1	.	2	700	.	.	1	11	8	.
898	712	94	720530	1	1	2	68	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	25	1	.	2	110	.	.	1	11	8	.
899	713	11	720716	1	1	651	19	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	37	1	.	3	950	.	.	1	1	1	.
900	714	31	720717	1	1	2	35	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	37	1	.	3	950	.	.	1	1	1	.
901	714	32	720717	1	1	2	34	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	37	1	.	3	950	.	.	1	1	1	.



# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

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OBS ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	DIAC	SPACE	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDT	SPINT	EPC	TONE	ORSR	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZE	EXP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	
902	715	47	720719	1	1	651	1	2	365	.	.	.	0	.	65127	47	1	5	1	1430	.	.	.	.	.	
903	716	94	720719	1	2	2	.	68	365	.	.	.	0	1	71028	47	1	.	2	90	.	2	14	.	.	
904	717	47	720721	1	1	651	1	2	365	.	.	.	0	0	36541	25	1	.	1	495	.	.	.	.	.	
905	718	94	720722	1	2	651	.	68	365	.	.	.	0	2	229	40	1	3	3	30	.	3	1	.	.	
906	719	47	720724	1	1	651	.	2	365	.	.	.	0	0	36580	40	1	.	3	85	.	3	5	.	.	
907	720	94	720724	1	2	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	0	2	233	60	1	5	2	147	.	7	5	.	.	
908	721	81	720725	1	1	2	.	25	666	.	.	.	0	1	65127	.	1	5	2	135	.	.	.	.	.	
909	722	81	720725	1	3	2	.	43	666	.	.	.	10	1	65127	.	6	5	3	490	.	.	.	.	.	
910	723	81	720725	1	6	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	0	1	36581	41	6	5	1	65	.	.	.	.	.	
911	724	68	720727	1	1	666	.	48	666	.	.	.	0	2	36581	39	1	.	3	25	.	31	.	.	.	
912	724	68	720727	1	1	2	.	1	666	.	.	.	0	1	.	39	1	.	3	25	.	.	.	.	.	
913	725	81	720727	1	1	2	.	47	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	3	25	.	.	.	.	.	
914	726	47	720728	1	1	651	.	2	365	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	2	.	4	850	.	.	.	.	.	
915	726	48	720728	1	1	365	.	1	651	.	.	.	0	2	.	24	2	.	4	850	.	.	.	.	.	
916	727	94	720730	1	2	365	.	.	2	.	.	.	0	2	.	37	1	.	3	25	.	.	.	.	.	
917	728	37	720801	1	1	2	.	32	666	.	.	.	0	1	226	49	1	.	3	45	.	.	.	.	.	
918	729	81	720802	1	1	2	.	58	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	3	45	.	.	.	.	.	
919	729	82	720802	1	1	2	.	64	666	.	.	.	0	1	226	49	1	4	2	75	.	.	.	.	.	
920	730	37	720802	1	7	2	.	32	666	.	.	.	0	3	226	24	2	.	2	75	.	.	.	.	.	
921	731	61	720804	1	1	2	.	51	666	.	.	.	0	2	232	40	1	3	2	45	.	3	1	.	.	
922	732	47	720805	1	1	651	.	2	365	695	.	.	0	2	36580	40	1	.	2	55	.	.	.	.	.	
923	733	94	720805	1	2	2	.	51	365	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	3	40	.	.	.	.	.	
924	733	95	720805	1	2	2	.	67	365	.	.	.	0	3	235	25	1	.	3	65	.	.	.	.	.	
925	734	4	720806	1	2	2	.	61	695	.	.	.	0	3	235	25	1	.	3	65	.	.	.	.	.	
926	734	82	720806	1	2	2	.	17	666	.	.	.	0	3	230	39	1	.	2	95	.	1	9	.	.	
927	735	94	720808	1	1	2	.	11	335	.	.	.	1010	2	230	39	1	1	2	95	.	1	9	.	.	
928	735	95	720808	1	1	365	.	7	335	.	.	.	1100	1	232	39	1	1	2	30	.	.	.	.	.	
929	736	81	720810	1	1	2	.	40	666	.	.	.	10	2	.	39	1	.	3	25	.	.	.	.	.	
930	737	81	720809	1	1	2	.	42	640	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	3	25	.	.	.	.	.	
931	738	81	720809	1	7	2	.	40	666	.	.	.	0	1	.	37	1	.	4	80	.	.	.	.	.	
932	739	81	720812	1	1	2	.	47	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	3	25	.	.	.	.	.	
933	740	41	720814	1	1	2	.	5	350	.	.	.	0	2	232	39	1	3	2	85	.	.	.	.	.	
934	741	81	720815	1	1	2	.	16	666	.	.	.	0	3	232	39	1	1	3	40	.	.	.	.	.	
935	742	94	721001	1	1	2	.	68	365	.	.	.	0	3	.	39	1	.	3	35	.	.	.	.	.	
936	743	81	721004	1	1	2	.	52	690	.	.	.	0	2	261	40	1	.	3	40	.	2	.	.	.	
937	744	41	721006	1	2	2	.	1	325	.	.	.	0	2	213	39	1	.	3	30	.	1	2	.	.	
938	745	31	721007	1	2	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	39	1	.	2	80	.	4	2	.	.	
939	745	32	721007	1	2	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	0	2	214	60	1	.	2	80	.	4	2	.	.	
940	746	81	721010	1	1	2	.	40	666	.	.	.	0	1	232	38	1	6	3	45	.	.	.	.	.	
941	747	81	721011	1	5	2	.	59	666	.	.	.	0	2	232	38	1	.	4	125	.	.	.	.	.	
942	748	94	721012	1	2	2	.	59	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	39	1	.	4	100	.	.	.	.	.	
943	749	91	721013	1	9	2	.	28	816	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	5	.	4	130	.	.	.	.	.	
944	750	1	721014	1	1	3	.	53	365	.	.	.	0	2	233	38	1	.	3	40	.	.	.	.	.	
945	750	62	721014	1	1	2	.	35	335	.	.	.	0	2	233	38	1	.	3	40	.	.	.	.	.	
946	751	94	721014	1	2	2	.	18	365	.	.	.	0	2	36513	25	1	.	3	25	.	.	.	.	.	
947	752	11	721015	1	1	651	.	8	816	.	.	.	0	2	238	47	1	.	2	95	.	.	.	.	.	
948	753	91	721025	1	1	2	.	8	816	.	.	.	0	2	65128	.	1	.	2	35	.	.	.	.	.	
949	754	11	721026	1	1	651	.	19	365	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	3	770	.	.	.	.	.	
950	755	91	721026	1	1	2	.	8	816	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	3	45	.	.	.	.	.	
951	756	41	721026	1	2	365	.	1	771	.	.	.	0	2	25525	40	1	.	3	35	.	.	.	.	.	
952	757	91	721027	1	1	816	.	2	2	.	.	.	0	2	81611	47	1	.	2	250	.	.	.	.	.	
953	758	91	721027	1	1	816	.	2	2	.	.	.	0	2	81611	47	1	.	2	250	.	.	.	.	.	
954	759	91	721027	1	5	2	.	69	816	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	2	.	1	985	.	.	.	.	.	.

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955	760	31	721028	1	365	33	200	22	0	1	200	38	1	3	50	2	5	4	2
956	760	32	721028	1	365	35	200	22	0	1	200	38	1	3	50	2	5	4	2
957	761	91	721028	1	816	2	2	22	0	1	24	24	2	2	347	2	15	1	1
958	762	91	721029	1	816	2	2	22	0	1	24	24	2	2	985	2	15	1	1
959	763	81	730109	1	2	25	651	1	0	2	65127	60	3	2	125	2	1	1	1
960	764	41	730114	1	2	1	202	60	0	2	202	60	1	1	35	2	1	1	1
961	765	11	720806	1	2	18	219	60	0	2	219	60	1	1	85	2	1	1	1
962	765	12	720806	1	365	19	396	14	0	2	39614	38	1	2	50	1	1	1	1
963	766	94	730222	1	651	7	220	25	0	2	36501	25	1	2	305	2	9	1	1
964	767	11	730227	1	651	19	220	47	0	2	22040	47	1	2	85	4	3	2	7
965	768	11	730228	1	651	35	202	40	0	2	202	40	1	3	35	4	3	2	7
966	769	81	730228	1	2	42	202	40	0	2	202	40	1	3	80	4	3	2	7
967	770	61	731204	1	5	35	202	40	0	2	202	40	1	3	80	4	3	2	7
968	770	61	731204	1	5	35	202	40	0	2	202	40	1	3	80	4	3	2	7
969	771	1	731205	1	1	53	202	40	0	2	202	40	1	3	30	5	3	2	7
970	772	81	731205	1	2	63	220	20	0	2	220	39	1	3	95	20	3	10	1
971	773	31	731205	1	365	7	220	20	0	2	220	39	1	3	95	20	3	10	1
972	773	95	731205	1	2	63	220	20	0	2	220	39	1	3	95	20	3	10	1
973	774	94	731206	1	2	64	213	38	0	2	213	38	1	3	35	2	4	16	2
974	775	81	731227	1	1	68	213	38	0	2	213	38	1	3	265	2	2	16	2
975	776	91	731228	1	4	7	213	38	0	2	213	38	1	3	185	2	2	16	2
976	777	31	731230	1	3	56	651	4	0	2	65130	24	2	2	25	10	2	2	2
977	778	41	731022	1	2	59	69002	24	0	2	69002	24	2	2	25	10	2	2	2
978	778	72	731022	1	2	26	233	40	0	2	233	40	1	3	40	1	2	18	1
979	779	26	731022	1	2	51	233	40	0	2	233	40	1	3	40	1	2	18	1
980	779	62	731022	1	2	63	213	37	0	2	213	37	1	3	150	20	3	10	1
981	780	31	731023	1	365	26	213	38	0	2	213	38	1	3	35	2	2	10	1
982	781	71	731023	1	2	27	64013	38	0	2	64013	38	1	3	30	2	2	10	1
983	782	71	731023	1	2	25	36531	40											

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OBS	ID	THREMI	DATE	N	P	DIAC	SPACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDT	SPINT	EPCT	TOPE	OSR	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EUP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
1008	796	81	731026	1	2	2	.	27	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	.	7	80	10	.	.	.	.
1009	797	81	731026	1	1	2	.	48	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	.	.	220	10	.	25	.	.
1010	797	82	731026	1	1	2	1	64	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	.	.	220	5	.	.	.	.
1011	797	3	731026	1	1	2	.	53	651	652	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	.	.	220	5	.	.	.	.
1012	798	26	731027	1	1	365	4	98	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	1	106	.	3	.	.	.
1013	799	97	731027	1	1	365	2	8	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	2	115	.	.	.	.	.
1014	799	72	731027	1	1	365	2	26	693	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	2	115	.	.	.	.	.
1015	799	73	731027	1	1	365	2	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	.	72	.	3	.	.	.
1016	800	26	731027	1	1	365	2	98	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	2	115	.	.	.	.	.
1017	801	26	731027	1	1	255	2	13	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	2	10	.	3	.	.	.
1018	802	41	731027	1	2	255	1	13	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	3	30	.	3	12	.	.
1019	803	97	731028	1	2	2	1	62	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	.	1	128	.	.	.	.	.
1020	804	81	731028	1	2	2	.	27	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	.	2	130	10	.	8	.	.
1021	804	82	731028	1	2	2	.	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	.	2	130	.	.	.	.	.
1022	805	61	731028	1	2	2	.	22	255	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	3	25	.	1	21	8	.
1023	806	97	731028	1	2	2	.	62	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	.	2	133	.	.	.	.	.
1024	807	61	731028	1	2	345	2	22	345	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	.	3	20	.	1	21	8	.
1025	808	1	731028	1	1	2	.	53	651	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	.	4	68	5	.	.	.	.
1026	809	81	731028	1	5	2	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	.	4	110	.	.	.	.	.
1027	810	41	731028	1	5	215	2	13	2	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	.	2	342	.	3	1	.	.
1028	810	98	731028	1	5	2	.	62	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	.	2	356	.	.	.	.	.
1029	811	41	731028	1	5	215	2	13	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	3	35	.	.	.	.	.
1030	811	72	731028	1	5	2	.	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	3	35	.	.	.	.	.
1031	812	97	731029	1	1	2	6	62	215	335	10	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	2	356	.	.	.	.	.
1032	813	26	731029	1	2	2	6	17	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	3	35	.	.	.	.	.
1033	813	26	731029	1	2	2	.	15	666	652	2	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	2	90	31	1	.	.	.
1034	814	1	731029	1	2	365	.	55	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	2	30	.	4	.	.	.
1035	814	38	731029	1	2	365	.	20	394	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	3	105	.	.	.	.	.
1036	815	94	731029	1	2	396	.	2	215	255	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	3	170	.	.	.	.	.
1037	816	97	731029	1	3	2	.	62	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	3	126	.	.	.	.	.
1038	817	41	731029	1	3	255	2	13	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	2	310	20	3	4	.	.
1039	818	41	731029	1	3	200	2	13	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	2	310	20	3	4	.	.
1040	819	31	731029	1	3	365	.	63	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	2	310	20	3	4	.	.
1041	819	32	731029	1	3	365	.	63	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	2	310	20	3	4	.	.
1042	819	33	731029	1	3	365	.	63	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	2	310	20	3	4	.	.
1043	819	33	731029	1	3	365	.	63	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	2	310	20	3	4	.	.
1044	819	33	731029	1	3	3	.	63	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	2	310	20	3	4	.	.
1045	820	71	731030	1	1	2	.	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	2	110	25	.	.	.	.
1046	820	72	731030	1	1	365	.	26	651	652	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	2	110	25	.	.	.	.
1047	820	73	731030	1	1	365	.	27	651	652	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	2	110	25	.	.	.	.
1048	821	61	731030	1	2	365	.	35	735	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	3	30	12	4	3	1	6
1049	822	61	731030	1	2	365	.	35	735	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	3	30	12	4	3	1	6
1050	822	62	731030	1	2	2	.	35	795	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	3	15	10	4	3	1	7
1051	823	61	731031	1	2	2	.	35	795	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	3	85	.	.	.	.	.
1052	824	61	731031	1	2	365	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	3	30	12	4	3	1	6
1053	824	62	731031	1	2	365	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	3	30	12	4	3	1	6
1054	825	94	731031	1	2	396	1	20	394	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	.	3	70	.	.	.	.	.
1055	826	81	731201	1	1	2	6	8	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	.	3	30	.	2	.	.	.
1056	827	81	731202	1	1	2	6	8	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	.	3	30	.	2	.	.	.
1057	828	94	731202	1	2	2	.	7	795	.	.	.	.	1	2	.	.	.	.	2	110	.	3	9	.	.
1058	828	95	731202	1	2	365	.	7	795	.	.	.	.	1	2	.	.	.	.	2	85	.	2	9	.	.
1059	829	94	731202	1	2	2	.	7	795	.	.	.	.	1	2	.	.	.	.	2	85	.	2	9	.	.
1060	830	61	731203	1	1	2	.	55	795	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	.	2	85	.	4	4	.	7



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OBS	ID	THZME	DATE	N	P	DIAC	SPACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDR	SPINT	EPCT	TOPE	ORSR	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EUP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
1061	830	62	731203	1	1	671	3	17	2	.	.	.	.	0	1	67129	47	1	.	2	85	.	4	3	2	7
1062	831	61	731203	1	3	3	.	35	795	.	.	.	.	1	2	20021	.	2	.	2	140	.	4	3	2	7
1063	831	95	731203	1	3	3	.	7	795	.	.	.	.	1	2	20021	.	2	.	2	140	.	4	3	2	7
1064	832	31	731224	1	2	2	.	13	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	233	60	1	.	2	120	.	3	3	.	1
1065	833	81	730223	1	2	2	13	52	630	.	.	.	.	0	2	36501	37	1	.	3	45	.	1	9	.	.
1066	834	94	730224	1	2	2	.	10	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	37	1	.	3	45	.	1	9	.	.
1067	834	95	730224	1	2	2	.	12	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	66631	39	1	.	3	30	.	.	.	.	.
1068	835	81	730224	1	2	2	.	52	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	66631	49	1	.	3	80	.	.	.	.	.
1069	836	81	720715	1	1	2	.	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	66631	49	1	.	2	111	20	3	.	.	.
1070	837	31	720715	1	2	365	.	63	817	.	.	.	.	0	3	233	47	1	.	2	111	25	2	.	.	.
1071	837	32	720715	1	2	2	.	63	817	.	.	.	.	0	3	260	49	1	.	1	755	2	.	.	.	.
1072	838	81	720101	1	1	2	1	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	65114	39	1	.	2	45	2	.	.	.	.
1073	839	81	720101	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	214	39	1	.	2	69	2	.	.	.	.
1074	840	81	720102	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	214	24	1	.	2	100	2	.	.	.	.
1075	841	81	720102	1	9	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	10	1	66614	47	5	.	4	100	2	.	.	.	.
1076	842	81	720103	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	214	47	1	.	1	298	2	.	.	.	.
1077	843	41	731029	1	3	235	.	59	59	.	.	.	.	0	2	214	84	2	.	1	126	2	.	.	.	.
1078	843	42	731029	1	3	255	.	59	59	.	.	.	.	0	2	214	84	2	.	.	126	3	1	.	.	.
1079	843	43	731029	1	3	255	.	13	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	214	84	2	.	.	126	3	1	.	.	.
1080	844	41	731026	1	5	215	.	13	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	64013	60	2	.	2	300	6	1	.	.	.
1081	844	42	731026	1	5	640	.	59	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	214	60	2	.	2	300	6	1	.	.	.
1082	844	43	731026	1	5	215	.	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	214	60	2	.	2	132	2	.	.	.	.
1083	845	71	731026	1	5	2	.	27	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	227	47	1	.	1	132	2	.	.	.	.
1084	845	72	731026	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	10	1	227	47	1	.	1	405	2	.	.	.	.
1085	846	81	720104	1	1	2	1	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	3	100	2	.	.	.	.
1086	847	81	720104	1	1	2	4	52	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	2	50	3	12	4	.	.
1087	848	81	740105	1	1	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	66601	40	1	.	3	35	3	9	.	.	.
1088	849	31	740105	1	1	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	233	40	1	.	3	35	3	9	.	.	.
1089	850	94	740105	1	2	2	.	17	675	.	.	.	.	0	2	232	38	1	.	3	25	.	.	.	.	.
1090	851	81	740106	1	2	2	6	40	693	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	39	1	.	4	60	.	.	.	.	.
1091	852	51	740110	1	1	2	13	52	630	.	.	.	.	0	1	214	47	1	.	2	65	2	.	.	.	.
1092	853	51	740112	1	2	2	.	19	670	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	38	1	.	2	100	10	.	.	.	.
1093	854	81	741125	5	13	2	.	20	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	36541	47	1	.	2	95	.	.	.	.	.
1094	855	94	741125	5	13	2	13	35	691	.	.	.	.	0	1	65101	42	1	.	3	80	16	4	.	.	.
1095	856	81	741128	5	14	2	6	35	691	.	.	.	.	0	1	65101	42	1	.	3	80	16	4	.	.	.
1096	857	94	741128	5	14	2	.	20	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	288	38	1	.	2	70	10	.	.	.	.
1097	858	81	741128	5	14	2	.	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	288	38	1	.	2	60	2	.	.	.	.
1098	859	61	741128	5	14	2	.	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	288	38	1	.	2	60	2	.	.	.	.
1099	859	62	741128	5	14	2	.	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	288	38	1	.	2	60	2	.	.	.	.
1100	860	81	741126	5	12	2	.	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	288	38	1	.	2	60	2	.	.	.	.
1101	861	81	741126	5	12	2	.	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	288	38	1	.	2	60	2	.	.	.	.
1102	862	81	741129	5	12	2	.	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	65170	49	1	.	2	130	2	.	.	.	.
1103	863	81	741210	5	14	2	.	52	690	.	.	.	.	0	2	69030	39	1	.	2	130	2	.	.	.	.
1104	864	81	741210	5	14	2	.	51	690	.	.	.	.	0	2	69030	39	1	.	2	130	2	.	.	.	.
1105	865	11	741213	5	19	365	.	18	651	.	.	.	.	0	.	36541	39	1	.	3	25	12	1	.	.	.
1106	865	12	741213	5	19	365	.	18	651	.	.	.	.	0	.	36541	39	1	.	3	25	12	1	.	.	.
1107	866	81	741213	5	19	365	.	43	652	.	.	.	.	0	.	214	38	1	.	2	80	2	.	.	.	.
1108	867	81	741213	5	15	2	.	47	652	.	.	.	.	0	2	214	38	1	.	2	80	2	.	.	.	.
1109	868	4	741220	5	3	2	13	45	996	.	.	.	.	0	2	20001	37	1	.	2	150	.	.	.	.	.
1110	868	12	741220	5	3	2	.	18	691	.	.	.	.	0	1	20001	.	1	.	2	150	.	.	.	.	.
1111	868	13	741220	5	3	2	.	18	691	.	.	.	.	0	1	20001	.	1	.	2	150	.	.	.	.	.
1112	869	4	741220	5	22	2	.	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	65227	45	1	.	1	60	.	.	.	.	.
1113	870	81	720105	5	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	65113	49	1	.	.	195	2	.	.	.	.

# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977

OBS	ID	THRE	DATE	N	F	DIAC	SPACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDR	SPINT	EFFT	TOPE	ORSE	DSOUR	PHES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EQP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
1114	871	81	720104	5	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	10	2	227	49	1	1	2	170	2	.	.	.	.
1115	872	41	720104	5	1	365	.	1	651	.	.	200	14	0	1	237	49	1	1	2	20	2	.	3	.	.
1116	873	81	720104	5	1	2	1	42	666	.	.	.	.	10	1	24	49	5	1	4	180	2	.	.	.	.
1117	874	91	720508	5	11	2	.	51	816	.	.	.	.	0	2	49	49	1	1	2	125	.	.	.	.	.
1118	875	11	720508	5	12	365	4	18	652	.	.	.	.	0	2	49	49	1	1	2	100	.	.	1	.	.
1119	876	51	720509	5	11	2	.	51	816	.	.	.	.	0	2	49	49	1	1	2	170	.	.	.	.	.
1120	877	91	720509	5	11	2	.	28	816	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	49	1	1	2	55	.	.	.	.	.
1121	878	91	720510	5	1	2	.	29	816	.	.	.	.	0	2	24	49	1	1	2	96	.	.	.	.	.
1122	879	91	720510	5	9	2	1	29	816	.	.	.	.	0	2	227	49	1	5	4	209	.	.	.	.	.
1123	880	91	720510	5	11	2	4	29	816	.	.	.	.	0	2	39	39	1	1	3	470	.	.	1	.	.
1124	881	11	720510	5	12	365	4	18	652	651	.	.	.	0	2	39	39	1	1	2	40	.	.	1	.	.
1125	882	81	720510	5	12	365	1	25	652	.	.	.	.	0	2	39	39	1	1	2	10	20	10	9	2	.
1126	883	91	720511	5	11	2	1	29	816	.	.	.	.	0	2	49	49	1	1	2	510	.	.	1	.	.
1127	884	11	720511	5	12	365	4	19	652	.	.	.	.	0	2	25	25	1	1	2	225	.	.	1	.	.
1128	885	11	720512	5	1	365	4	18	652	.	.	.	.	0	2	36514	49	1	1	2	420	.	.	1	.	.
1129	886	81	720514	5	1	365	4	18	652	651	.	.	.	0	2	65114	49	1	1	2	180	.	.	1	.	.
1130	887	11	720515	5	1	365	4	29	816	.	.	660	8	0	1	49	49	1	1	3	230	.	.	1	.	.
1131	888	91	720514	5	9	2	.	29	816	.	.	.	.	0	1	49	49	1	1	3	30	.	.	1	.	.
1132	889	11	720516	5	1	365	4	18	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	65170	47	1	1	2	180	.	.	1	.	.
1133	890	11	720517	5	1	365	4	22	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	65170	47	1	1	2	42	14	1	1	.	.
1134	891	61	720517	5	1	365	4	22	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	65114	37	1	1	2	105	1	3	2	6	.
1135	892	81	720517	5	1	365	4	25	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	65114	37	1	1	2	28	2	.	9	.	.
1136	893	81	720518	5	1	365	4	18	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	65101	37	1	1	2	20	.	.	1	.	.
1137	894	11	720518	5	1	365	4	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	20013	39	1	1	2	60	1	1	1	.	.
1138	895	61	720520	5	11	365	4	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	20013	39	1	1	2	30	14	4	3	2	6
1139	895	62	720520	5	11	365	4	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	20013	39	1	1	2	30	12	4	3	2	6
1140	895	63	720520	5	11	365	4	20	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	60	47	1	1	2	50	9	4	3	2	6
1141	896	94	720525	5	15	2	1	66	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	47	47	1	1	2	200	.	.	11	1	10
1142	897	37	720525	5	15	2	1	66	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	25	25	1	1	2	30	.	.	9	.	.
1143	898	94	720526	5	11	2	5	68	365	.	.	.	.	0	3	49	49	1	1	2	295	.	.	5	6	11
1144	899	94	720527	5	11	2	1	68	365	.	.	.	.	0	3	49	49	1	1	2	570	.	.	7	6	1
1145	900	94	720528	5	11	2	1	56	365	.	.	.	.	0	3	40	40	1	1	2	50	.	.	6	7	.
1146	901	94	720528	5	11	2	.	66	365	.	.	.	.	0	3	49	49	1	1	2	110	24	.	6	7	.
1147	902	31	720807	5	1	651	.	2	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	65131	49	1	1	2	185	.	.	3	.	.
1148	903	47	721002	5	10	365	.	1	671	.	.	.	.	0	2	67129	.	1	1	2	85	.	.	3	.	.
1149	905	41	721002	5	10	365	.	52	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	237	39	1	1	2	120	.	.	3	.	.
1150	906	81	721004	5	11	365	1	67	2	.	.	.	.	0	3	65127	.	1	1	2	140	.	.	1	6	11
1151	907	94	721006	5	6	651	1	2	365	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	3	1	2	140	.	.	1	6	11
1152	908	47	721008	5	10	396	.	22	350	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	3	1	2	60	2	1	1	2	8
1153	909	61	721009	5	10	2	.	63	671	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	3	1	2	20	2	2	16	6	1
1154	910	31	721010	5	9	365	.	43	671	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	3	1	2	25	.	.	.	.	.
1155	911	81	721031	5	1	365	.	43	652	.	.	.	.	0	2	72	72	1	1	2	25	.	.	.	.	.
1156	912	51	721031	5	1	365	.	64	666	.	.	.	.	0	3	47	47	1	1	2	14	.	.	.	.	.
1157	913	81	751101	1	1	2	1	51	651	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	1	1	2	50	24	4	9	7	2
1158	914	81	751103	1	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	213	38	1	1	2	15	.	.	9	7	2
1159	915	31	751106	1	2	365	.	97	651	.	.	.	.	0	3	229	49	1	1	2	15	.	.	9	7	2
1160	916	26	751111	1	1	2	.	1	520	.	.	.	.	0	3	213	37	1	1	2	50	.	.	9	7	2
1161	917	51	751111	1	1	2	.	1	520	.	.	.	.	0	3	213	37	1	1	2	50	.	.	9	7	2
1162	918	41	751113	1	2	365	.	1	520	.	.	.	.	0	3	213	37	1	1	2	50	.	.	9	7	2
1163	918	42	751113	1	2	365	.	1	520	.	.	.	.	0	3	213	37	1	1	2	50	.	.	9	7	2
1164	918	43	751113	1	2	365	.	35	520	.	.	.	.	0	3	213	37	1	1	2	50	.	.	9	7	2
1165	918	43	751113	1	2	365	.	42	652	.	.	.	.	0	3	213	40	1	1	2	35	.	.	9	7	2
1166	919	81	751118	1	1	365	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	213	40	1	1	2	35	.	.	9	7	2



# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

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23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977

OBS	ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	DIAC	SPAC	ACTICN	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INTE	SPINT	EFCT	TOE	ORSR	DSOUR	PRES	CRIG	DISP	SIZE	EQ	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
1167	919	27	751118	1	1	365	.	99	652	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	40	1	.	35	.	2	.	.	.	.
1168	920	41	751101	1	2	2	.	19	640	.	.	.	.	0	2	64014	39	1	.	30	.	6	1	.	.	.
1169	921	94	751120	1	2	2	.	20	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	24	2	.	70	.	2	1	.	.	.
1170	922	81	751122	1	1	2	.	17	666	.	.	.	.	0	3	66001	42	1	.	35	.	23	.	.	.	.
1171	923	41	751125	1	2	2	.	19	640	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	55	.	6	1	.	.	.
1172	924	81	751126	1	2	365	.	43	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	229	47	1	5	55	.	.	.	.	.	.
1173	925	81	751126	1	2	2	.	42	640	.	.	.	.	0	2	35227	25	1	2	55	.	.	.	.	.	.
1174	926	81	751127	1	2	365	.	43	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	214	47	1	.	65	.	.	.	.	.	.
1175	927	81	751127	1	2	2	.	8	666	.	.	.	.	0	3	214	47	1	.	10	.	.	.	.	.	.
1176	928	81	751124	1	1	2	.	17	666	.	.	.	.	0	3	22040	49	1	.	155	.	2	.	.	.	.
1177	928	82	751124	1	1	2	.	51	666	.	.	.	.	0	3	22040	49	1	.	155	.	23	.	.	.	.
1178	929	81	751125	1	2	2	.	42	600	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	38	1	.	85	.	.	.	.	.	.
1179	930	81	751128	1	2	2	.	63	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	2	.	1670	.	20	3	.	.	.
1180	931	31	751124	1	3	365	.	54	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	49	1	.	50	.	.	.	.	.	.
1181	932	81	751203	1	2	2	.	48	491	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	49	1	.	50	.	.	.	.	.	.
1182	932	81	751203	1	2	2	.	17	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	38	1	.	60	.	18	.	.	.	.
1183	933	37	751205	1	2	2	.	52	630	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	70	.	2	.	.	.	.
1184	934	81	751207	1	2	2	.	51	350	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	15	.	2	.	.	.	.
1185	935	81	751210	1	2	2	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	640	.	1	.	35	.	2	.	.	.	.
1186	936	81	751210	1	2	2	.	7	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	15	.	2	.	.	.	.
1187	937	31	751210	1	2	2	.	43	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	125	.	2	.	.	.	.
1188	938	82	751213	1	2	2	.	12	396	.	.	.	.	0	2	261	47	1	.	125	.	2	.	.	.	.
1189	938	82	751213	1	2	2	.	20	394	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	1	.	95	.	1	.	.	.	.
1190	939	94	751212	1	2	2	.	19	640	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	60	.	1	.	.	.	.
1191	940	94	751212	1	2	396	.	12	215	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	1	.	45	.	2	.	.	.	.
1192	941	94	751213	1	2	396	.	64	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	100	.	6	.	.	.	.
1193	942	81	751212	1	2	2	.	19	640	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	1	.	105	.	1	.	.	.	.
1194	943	41	751216	1	2	2	.	66	652	.	.	.	.	0	2	2084	49	1	.	105	.	6	.	.	.	.
1195	944	77	720807	5	9	365	.	51	630	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	40	1	.	1170	.	9	4	.	.	.
1196	944	81	751217	1	1	365	.	63	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	85	.	2	.	.	.	.
1197	945	31	751216	1	5	365	.	17	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	20006	47	1	.	195	.	3	.	.	.	.
1198	946	31	751218	1	1	2	.	16	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	214	.	1	.	25	.	1	.	.	.	.
1199	947	81	751219	1	2	365	.	26	666	.	.	.	.	1	2	227	40	1	.	55	.	1	.	.	.	.
1200	948	81	751220	1	1	2	.	20	394	.	.	.	.	1	2	36541	38	1	.	70	.	1	.	.	.	.
1201	949	71	751220	1	1	396	.	43	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	229	47	1	.	105	.	2	.	.	.	.
1202	950	94	751220	1	2	365	.	43	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	49534	37	1	.	105	.	3	.	.	.	.
1203	951	81	751221	2	2	365	.	16	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	150	.	2	.	.	.	.
1204	952	81	751223	1	2	365	.	48	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	20	.	2	.	.	.	.
1205	952	27	751223	1	2	365	.	51	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	20	.	2	.	.	.	.
1206	952	83	751223	1	2	2	.	48	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	25	.	16	4	.	.	.
1207	953	81	751225	1	2	365	.	48	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	115	.	3	.	.	.	.
1208	954	81	751225	1	2	2	.	35	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	35	.	5	.	.	.	.
1209	954	82	751225	1	2	2	.	48	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	288	.	5	.	.	.	.
1210	955	61	751225	1	2	2	.	48	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	240	.	5	.	.	.	.
1211	956	81	751226	1	2	2	.	48	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	172	.	5	.	.	.	.
1212	957	81	751226	1	2	2	.	43	560	.	.	.	.	0	3	36541	24	2	.	172	.	5	.	.	.	.
1213	958	37	751225	1	5	2	.	65	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	201	49	1	.	240	.	5	.	.	.	.
1214	959	26	751228	1	2	365	.	16	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	36580	37	1	.	240	.	5	.	.	.	.
1215	960	81	751227	1	2	365	.	17	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	232	37	1	.	240	.	5	.	.	.	.
1216	961	81	751228	1	2	2	.	43	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	232	37	1	.	240	.	5	.	.	.	.
1217	961	82	751228	1	2	365	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	240	.	5	.	.	.	.
1218	962	61	751229	1	2	365	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	240	.	5	.	.	.	.
1219	962	62	751229	1	2	365	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	240	.	5	.	.	.	.

# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977

OBS	ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	DIAGN	SPACI	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDT	SPINT	PRCT	TONE	ORSR	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	LUP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
1220	963	81	751231	1	1	2	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	232	38	1	3	2	55	10	.	21	8	.
1221	964	31	751231	1	1	2	.	8	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	232	38	1	3	2	50	10	.	3	11	.
1222	965	81	751230	1	2	2	.	43	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	.	15	.	.	.	.	.
1223	966	81	751230	1	2	365	.	46	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	49514	47	1	.	.	10	2	.	10	.	
1224	967	31	740107	1	3	2	.	32	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	47	2	.	1	532	5	2	17	3	.
1225	968	81	740115	1	1	2	.	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	66601	40	1	2	3	40	23	.	.	.	
1226	969	81	740115	1	1	365	.	52	693	651	.	666	4	0	2	66630	37	1	.	2	42	.	.	.	.	
1227	970	91	740205	1	1	2	.	7	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	66631	47	1	.	3	35	.	8	4	.	
1228	971	94	740205	1	2	2	.	42	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	47	1	.	3	25	26	.	.	.	
1229	972	81	740211	1	2	2	.	63	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	261	39	1	.	3	10	26	.	10	.	
1230	973	31	740211	1	2	365	.	42	651	.	.	22	.	0	2	261	39	1	.	3	30	26	.	.	.	
1231	974	81	740212	1	2	2	.	42	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	37	1	.	3	30	26	.	.	.	
1232	974	82	740212	1	2	2	.	26	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	37	1	.	2	60	.	.	.	.	
1233	975	94	740219	1	2	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	.	20	.	.	1	.	
1234	976	31	740219	1	2	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	.	15	.	.	6	7	
1235	977	94	740219	1	2	2	.	64	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	.	30	.	.	4	7	
1236	978	31	740222	1	2	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	47	1	.	.	15	.	.	6	7	
1237	979	31	740228	1	2	2	.	64	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	214	38	1	.	.	70	2	2	16	.	
1238	980	81	740301	1	1	2	.	6	666	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	38	1	.	.	20	.	.	3	6	
1239	981	94	740718	1	2	396	.	20	394	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	.	15	.	.	.	.	
1240	982	81	740718	1	2	2	.	45	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	.	35	.	.	.	.	
1241	983	11	740719	1	1	620	.	18	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	25	1	.	.	25	.	.	1	.	
1242	984	41	740719	1	3	651	.	66	2	.	.	.	.	1	2	.	25	2	.	1	1123	.	.	1	.	
1243	984	42	740719	1	3	651	.	18	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	1	1123	.	.	1	.	
1244	985	97	740721	1	1	365	.	62	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	.	1	.	.	20	.	.	.	.	
1245	986	97	740721	1	1	396	.	62	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	.	15	.	.	.	.	
1246	987	61	740721	1	1	2	.	35	352	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	.	1	.	.	15	16	.	3	1	
1247	987	62	740721	1	1	2	.	35	352	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	.	1	.	.	15	12	.	4	3	
1248	988	94	740722	1	1	365	.	12	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	36527	47	1	.	.	73	.	1	1	5	
1249	989	81	740725	1	1	2	.	64	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	229	40	1	3	3	40	.	.	3	11	
1250	990	94	740727	1	1	2	.	66	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	229	38	1	.	2	60	.	.	5	1	
1251	991	41	740727	1	1	2	.	1	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	227	38	1	.	.	20	.	.	1	.	
1252	992	61	740727	1	2	666	.	19	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	25	1	.	.	40	.	.	.	.	
1253	993	11	740729	1	1	2	.	16	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	.	15	.	.	1	.	
1254	994	81	740729	1	1	2	.	48	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	.	10	3	.	.	.	
1255	995	94	740729	1	1	365	.	7	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	36533	47	1	.	3	15	14	.	.	.	
1256	996	81	740729	1	1	365	.	48	651	.	.	.	.	0	3	36533	47	1	.	3	15	14	.	.	.	
1257	997	81	741123	1	2	2	.	52	396	630	.	.	.	0	3	213	40	1	.	3	45	2	.	.	.	
1258	998	94	741124	1	1	2	.	20	365	.	.	.	.	0	3	36541	47	1	.	.	135	.	.	.	.	
1259	999	94	741125	1	1	2	.	68	365	.	.	.	.	0	3	261	47	1	7	.	85	.	.	1	6	
1260	1000	81	730915	5	12	220	.	56	620	.	.	.	.	0	2	261	49	1	.	2	100	20	.	2	2	
1261	1001	31	730915	5	12	220	.	56	620	.	.	.	.	0	2	261	49	1	.	2	50	20	.	10	2	
1262	1002	81	730926	5	1	2	.	51	660	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	60	1	.	2	90	2	.	.	.	
1263	1002	82	730926	5	1	2	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	60	1	.	2	90	2	.	.	.	
1264	1003	51	730928	5	9	2	.	51	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	260	64	2	.	2	800	.	.	.	.	
1265	1004	81	730929	5	1	2	.	58	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	3	25	.	.	.	.	
1266	1005	81	731002	5	10	365	.	43	645	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	38	1	.	2	108	2	.	.	.	
1267	1006	81	731003	5	12	365	.	43	645	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	38	1	.	2	50	2	.	.	.	
1268	1007	11	731004	5	12	816	.	16	652	.	.	.	.	0	2	65214	.	1	.	3	84	.	.	1	.	
1269	1008	26	731004	5	12	816	.	97	652	.	.	.	.	0	2	65214	.	1	.	3	55	.	.	4	.	
1270	1009	26	731007	5	10	365	.	35	651	652	.	.	.	0	2	66611	24	1	.	3	44	.	.	3	1	
1271	1010	61	731008	5	12	2	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	50	1	.	2	152	9	.	3	1	
1272	1011	81	731010	5	1	365	.	43	651	652	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	2	45	19	.	.	6	.

S T A T I S T I C A L     A N A L Y S I S     S Y S T E M

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977 25

OBS	ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	DIAC	SPAC	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDR	SPINT	EPCT	TOPE	ORSE	DSOUR	PRES	CRIG	DISP	SIZ	EQP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
1273	1012	71	731011	5	1	365	.	26	651	652	.	.	.	0	.	214	49	1	.	2	50	20	.	.	.	.
1274	1013	61	731011	5	1	365	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	.	64014	49	1	.	2	50	.	4	3	1	6
1275	1014	61	731011	5	1	365	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	69314	.	1	.	2	50	9	4	3	1	6
1276	1015	71	731012	5	1	365	.	43	651	652	.	.	.	0	1	214	47	1	.	2	52	20	.	.	.	.
1277	1016	81	731012	5	1	365	.	51	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	217	47	1	.	2	52	2	.	.	.	.
1278	1017	61	731012	5	1	365	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	47	1	.	2	50	16	4	3	1	6
1279	1018	71	731013	5	1	365	.	43	651	652	.	.	.	0	.	229	47	1	.	.	55	.	.	.	.	.
1280	1019	81	731013	5	1	365	.	46	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	229	47	1	.	.	60	.	.	.	.	.
1281	1020	81	731014	5	1	365	.	46	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	214	49	1	.	.	40	2	.	10	.	.
1282	1021	4	731016	5	1	365	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	10	1	213	24	1	.	1	390	.	.	.	.	.
1283	1022	81	731016	5	1	365	.	16	693	.	.	.	.	0	.	227	24	1	.	2	290	2	.	.	.	.
1284	1023	81	731017	5	1	365	.	54	693	.	.	.	.	0	3	36541	47	1	7	2	390	.	.	.	.	.
1285	1024	4	731017	5	1	365	.	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	229	25	1	.	2	103	.	.	.	.	.
1286	1025	71	731017	5	1	365	.	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	25	1	.	2	74	10	.	.	.	.
1287	1025	72	731017	5	1	365	.	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	.	1	.	2	74	10	.	.	.	.
1288	1025	73	731017	5	1	365	.	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	.	1	.	2	74	10	.	.	.	.
1289	1026	81	731018	5	1	365	.	43	651	652	.	.	.	0	.	36517	41	1	.	.	15	.	.	.	.	.
1290	1027	71	731018	5	1	365	.	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	66234	.	1	.	2	12	.	.	.	.	.
1291	1028	81	731018	5	1	365	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	66234	.	1	.	2	780	2	.	22	10	11
1292	1028	82	731018	5	1	365	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	66234	.	1	.	2	780	21	.	25	27	20
1293	1029	81	731020	5	1	365	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	10	1	227	.	1	.	1	256	2	.	23	21	11
1294	1029	82	731020	5	1	365	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	10	1	227	.	1	.	1	256	2	.	23	21	11
1295	1030	26	731020	5	14	672	.	98	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	.	1	.	2	42	.	.	.	.	.
1296	1031	41	731021	5	9	672	.	2	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	67229	39	1	.	2	126	.	.	.	.	.
1297	1032	4	731022	5	7	672	.	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	214	25	1	.	2	110	.	.	.	.	.
1298	1033	31	731022	5	9	365	.	56	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	214	25	1	.	3	25	11	3	12	1	.
1299	1034	71	731023	5	11	365	.	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	38	1	.	3	40	.	.	.	.	.
1300	1035	81	731024	5	11	365	.	44	666	.	.	.	.	0	3	213	25	1	.	2	110	.	.	.	.	.
1301	1036	26	731025	5	1	365	.	57	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	25	1	.	2	308	.	.	.	.	.
1302	1037	71	731025	5	12	365	.	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	25	1	.	1	20	.	.	.	.	.
1303	1038	71	731025	5	12	365	.	8	651	652	.	.	.	0	.	213	25	1	.	1	10	.	.	.	.	.
1304	1039	97	731026	5	1	365	.	62	695	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	.	1	.	1	300	.	.	.	.	.
1305	1040	26	731026	5	1	365	.	51	695	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	.	1	.	1	300	.	.	.	.	.
1306	1041	81	731026	5	10	365	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	229	25	1	.	2	285	21	.	23	25	26
1307	1042	97	731026	5	11	365	.	62	651	.	.	.	.	0	1	229	49	1	2	2	205	.	.	.	.	.
1308	1043	97	731026	5	11	365	.	62	651	.	.	.	.	0	1	229	49	1	2	2	180	.	.	.	.	.
1309	1044	26	731028	5	8	365	.	98	651	.	.	.	.	0	.	36527	49	1	5	1	86	.	.	.	.	.
1310	1045	81	731029	5	8	365	.	51	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	1	.	.	58	2	.	.	.	.
1311	1045	82	731029	5	8	365	.	52	690	670	.	.	.	0	3	.	24	1	.	.	10	2	.	.	.	.
1312	1046	81	731029	5	8	365	.	51	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	1	.	.	88	20	.	.	.	.
1313	1047	81	731029	5	8	365	.	51	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	1	.	.	36	10	.	26	11	.
1314	1048	41	731029	5	10	396	.	13	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	24	1	.	.	120	.	.	.	.	.
1315	1049	41	731029	5	10	396	.	13	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	24	1	.	.	20	.	.	.	.	.
1316	1050	51	731030	5	11	365	.	49	666	695	.	.	.	1000	.	288	39	1	.	2	98	.	.	.	.	.
1317	1051	41	731030	5	11	365	.	13	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	287	39	1	.	.	52	.	.	.	.	.
1318	1051	42	731030	5	11	365	.	13	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	287	39	1	.	.	52	.	.	.	.	.
1319	1051	73	731030	5	11	365	.	16	365	.	.	.	.	0	.	287	39	1	.	.	52	.	.	.	.	.
1320	1051	73	731030	5	11	365	.	16	365	.	.	.	.	0	.	287	39	1	.	.	52	.	.	.	.	.
1321	1052	41	731030	5	11	396	.	13	394	.	.	.	.	0	1	287	39	1	.	.	20	.	.	.	.	.
1322	1053	94	731030	5	11	396	.	13	394	.	.	.	.	0	1	287	39	1	.	.	102	.	.	.	.	.
1323	1054	31	731031	5	8	365	.	32	.	.	.	.	.	0	.	213	49	1	.	1	45	20	3	10	2	2
1324	1055	41	731031	5	10	365	.	13	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	229	49	1	.	1	40	.	.	.	.	.
1325	1056	81	730224	5	11	2	.	43	630	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	38	1	.	2	168	2	.	21	10	4



# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

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OBS	DATE	TIME	TH	DA	MP	DI	SC	TA	TR	IN	IS	FE	TO	OR	DS	PR	OR	DI	SI	EP
1326	1057	61	731202	5	10	671	17	2	670	67129	49	1	1	67129	49	1	1	130	9	4
1327	1058	81	740105	5	10	2	46	670	262	262	40	1	1	262	40	1	1	75	2	3
1328	1059	51	740107	5	9	2	49	996	230	230	39	1	1	230	39	1	1	125	2	2
1329	1060	94	740107	5	9	365	7	7	230	230	39	1	1	230	39	1	1	25	2	4
1330	1060	22	740107	5	9	365	7	7	230	230	39	1	1	230	39	1	1	25	2	1
1331	1060	23	740107	5	9	2	8	996	230	230	39	1	1	230	39	1	1	95	2	1
1332	1061	51	740109	5	11	2	49	996	652	652	37	1	1	652	37	1	1	85	2	4
1333	1062	26	740109	5	11	365	98	652	20014	20014	37	1	1	20014	37	1	1	45	2	4
1334	1063	81	740109	5	11	365	26	652	20014	20014	37	1	1	20014	37	1	1	45	2	4
1335	1063	82	740109	5	11	365	66	651	20014	20014	37	1	1	20014	37	1	1	45	2	4
1336	1064	94	740109	5	9	365	56	2	264	264	40	1	1	264	40	1	1	280	7	9
1337	1065	51	740110	5	1	2	49	996	690	690	40	1	1	690	40	1	1	155	2	2
1338	1065	52	740110	5	1	2	49	996	670	670	40	1	1	670	40	1	1	155	2	2
1339	1066	81	740111	5	9	365	25	652	233	233	39	1	1	233	39	1	1	67	23	3
1340	1067	81	740111	5	9	2	25	663	214	214	39	1	1	214	39	1	1	20	2	3
1341	1068	81	740115	5	10	690	46	365	69014	69014	40	1	1	69014	40	1	1	25	2	3
1342	1068	12	740115	5	10	2	18	666	213	213	49	1	1	213	49	1	1	145	2	3
1343	1069	81	711201	5	12	2	46	666	75028	75028	38	1	1	75028	38	1	1	500	2	3
1344	1070	81	711201	5	12	2	46	666	213	213	49	1	1	213	49	1	1	275	2	3
1345	1071	81	711203	5	1	2	42	666	213	213	49	1	1	213	49	1	1	120	2	3
1346	1072	81	711203	5	11	2	44	666	213	213	49	1	1	213	49	1	1	150	2	3
1347	1073	81	711203	5	11	2	44	666	213	213	49	1	1	213	49	1	1	95	2	3
1348	1074	51	740207	5	10	2	15	996	65165	65165	38	1	1	65165	38	1	1	100	7	3
1349	1075	67	740208	5	11	365	32	651	36541	36541	38	1	1	36541	38	1	1	60	4	2
1350	1076	31	740219	5	11	2	17	666	214	214	39	1	1	214	39	1	1	20	4	2
1351	1077	81	740223	5	1	365	17	666	214	214	39	1	1	214	39	1	1	310	4	2
1352	1078	31	740223	5	1	365	56	2	227	227	37	6	2	227	37	6	2	10	4	2
1353	1079	51	740227	5	1	2	15	996	65101	65101	38	1	1	65101	38	1	1	45	2	1
1354	1080	81	740301	5	1	365	44	652	213	213	49	1	1	213	49	1	1	75	4	4
1355	1081	67	740303	5	10	2	51	651	65101	65101	38	1	1	65101	38	1	1	36	4	4
1356	1082	11	740718	5	12	2	17	651	213	213	49	1	1	213	49	1	1	25	4	4
1357	1083	61	740721	5	14	2	35	335	213	213	49	1	1	213	49	1	1	825	3	4
1358	1084	97	740721	5	14	365	62	335	213	213	49	1	1	213	49	1	1	115	4	4
1359	1085	61	740724	5	8	2	18	660	65170	65170	24	1	1	65170	24	1	1	735	4	4
1360	1086	61	740726	5	5	2	40	396	20026	20026	47	1	1	20026	47	1	1	210	4	4
1361	1087	51	740729	5	13	365	40	396	20026	20026	47	1	1	20026	47	1	1	95	30	2
1362	1088	11	720715	5	10	651	46	365	65170	65170	24	1	1	65170	24	1	1	245	30	2
1363	1089	67	720716	5	10	365	16	651	65170	65170	24	1	1	65170	24	1	1	185	20	2
1364	1090	81	720717	5	10	365	16	651	65170	65170	24	1	1	65170	24	1	1	35	20	10
1365	1091	47	720719	5	1	651	2	365	65170	65170	24	1	1	65170	24	1	1	75	6	3
1366	1092	81	720719	5	1	365	44	651	65170	65170	24	1	1	65170	24	1	1	20	6	4
1367	1093	47	720719	5	12	365	66	651	65170	65170	24	1	1	65170	24	1	1	27	30	2
1368	1094	81	720719	5	12	365	66	651	65170	65170	24	1	1	65170	24	1	1	768	20	2
1369	1095	47	720720	5	11	651	25	651	65170	65170	24	1	1	65170	24	1	1	185	20	10
1370	1096	81	720720	5	11	365	44	651	65170	65170	24	1	1	65170	24	1	1	35	20	8
1371	1097	81	720721	5	1	365	44	651	65170	65170	24	1	1	65170	24	1	1	75	6	3
1372	1098	41	720722	5	10	365	66	651	65170	65170	24	1	1	65170	24	1	1	20	6	4
1373	1099	26	720722	5	10	365	35	651	65170	65170	24	1	1	65170	24	1	1	20	6	4



# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

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OBS	IL	THRE	DATE	N	P	DICT	SPACT	ACIION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDR	SPINT	EFCT	TONE	ORSH	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EXP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
1374	1100	41	720722	5	10	365	.	66	651	.	.	.	.	0	.	214	38	1	.	.	55	5	6	3	.	.
1375	1101	61	741125	26	1	2	.	35	691	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	47	1	.	3	50	16	4	3	2	7
1376	1101	62	741125	26	1	2	.	35	691	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	47	1	.	3	50	12	4	3	2	7
1377	1102	94	741125	26	2	2	.	59	.	.	.	399	8	0	2	213	25	1	.	3	30	16	4	4	2	7
1378	1103	61	741127	1	1	2	.	35	691	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	39	1	.	3	35	16	4	3	2	7
1379	1103	62	741127	1	1	2	.	35	691	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	39	1	.	4	92	16	4	3	2	7
1380	1104	61	741127	1	1	2	.	35	691	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	4	92	12	4	3	2	7
1381	1104	62	741127	1	1	2	.	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	287	25	5	.	4	92	12	4	3	2	7
1382	1105	51	741127	1	1	2	4	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	37	1	.	3	35	1	2	15	3	2
1383	1106	61	741128	1	1	2	.	47	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	20006	47	1	.	3	30	35	1	2	15	3
1384	1107	31	741128	1	1	2	6	51	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	232	47	1	.	4	28	.	.	.	.	.
1385	1108	61	741128	1	1	2	1	51	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	232	39	1	.	2	100	.	.	.	.	.
1386	1109	94	741128	1	1	2	6	51	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	287	38	1	.	3	25	.	.	.	.	.
1387	1110	81	741129	1	1	2	13	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	230	40	1	.	2	15	.	.	.	.	.
1388	1110	4	741210	1	1	2	.	66	215	.	.	.	.	0	1	36541	47	1	.	.	397	.	.	.	.	.
1389	1112	81	741210	1	1	2	.	18	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	24	2	.	2	100	2	.	.	.	.
1390	1113	94	741210	1	1	2	.	33	950	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	3	15	.	.	.	.	.
1391	1114	31	741212	1	1	2	.	66	215	.	.	.	.	0	2	20001	40	1	.	3	35	.	.	.	.	.
1392	1115	11	741213	1	1	2	.	18	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	40	1	.	3	50	.	.	.	.	.
1393	1116	11	741213	1	2	2	7	69	352	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	40	1	.	3	10	.	.	.	.	.
1394	1117	4	741214	1	3	2	.	51	2	220	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	.	397	.	.	.	.	.
1395	1118	81	741214	1	2	396	.	53	950	.	.	.	.	0	2	20001	40	1	.	2	15	.	.	.	.	.
1396	1119	31	741215	1	1	2	13	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	2	20026	37	1	.	3	15	.	.	.	.	.
1397	1120	4	741215	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	40	1	.	3	50	.	.	.	.	.
1398	1121	81	741215	1	1	2	.	68	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	227	47	1	.	3	70	.	.	.	.	.
1399	1122	94	741217	1	1	2	1	68	365	.	.	.	.	0	3	213	40	1	.	2	10	.	.	.	.	.
1400	1123	94	741216	1	1	2	1	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	40	1	.	3	10	.	.	.	.	.
1401	1124	81	741217	1	1	2	.	8	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	3	10	.	.	.	.	.
1402	1125	31	741217	1	1	2	.	49	996	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	3	50	.	.	.	.	.
1403	1126	4	741217	1	5	2	13	8	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	36531	47	1	.	2	45	.	.	.	.	.
1404	1127	94	741219	1	2	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	20026	37	1	.	2	45	.	.	.	.	.
1405	1128	94	710331	1	1	365	.	56	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	20026	37	1	.	3	15	.	.	.	.	.
1406	1129	94	710331	1	1	2	.	59	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	36527	47	1	.	3	15	.	.	.	.	.
1407	1130	94	710331	1	1	396	.	59	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	36527	47	1	.	3	15	.	.	.	.	.
1408	1131	94	710307	1	1	2	.	59	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	36528	25	1	.	2	36	.	.	.	.	.
1409	1132	94	710307	1	1	365	.	52	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	1	244	.	.	.	.	.
1410	1133	81	711201	1	1	2	.	52	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	2	.	2	275	.	.	.	.	.
1411	1134	81	711201	1	7	2	.	52	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	25	1	.	2	45	.	.	.	.	.
1412	1135	81	711202	1	1	2	1	52	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	47	1	.	2	90	.	.	.	.	.
1413	1136	37	711202	1	1	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	226	47	1	.	2	90	.	.	.	.	.
1414	1136	38	711202	1	1	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	39	1	.	3	20	.	.	.	.	.
1415	1137	81	711202	1	1	2	.	44	750	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	47	1	.	3	75	.	.	.	.	.
1416	1138	81	711202	1	1	666	.	46	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	36526	37	1	.	2	31	.	.	.	.	.
1417	1139	37	711202	1	1	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	66628	37	1	.	2	265	.	.	.	.	.
1418	1140	81	711204	1	1	666	.	46	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	24	2	.	2	212	.	.	.	.	.
1419	1141	94	711204	1	5	666	.	20	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	37	1	.	2	65	.	.	.	.	.
1420	1142	81	711205	1	1	2	2	46	2	.	.	.	.	0	1	214	37	1	.	3	40	.	.	.	.	.
1421	1143	81	711205	1	1	2	1	40	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	231	47	1	.	2	165	.	.	.	.	.
1422	1144	81	711206	1	1	2	.	40	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	3	23	.	.	.	.	.
1423	1145	81	711206	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	66601	40	1	.	3	35	.	.	.	.	.
1424	1146	81	711207	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	202	40	1	.	3	15	.	.	.	.	.
1425	1147	81	711207	1	1	2	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	40	1	.	3	2	.	.	.	.	.



# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977

OBS	ID	THRE	DATE	N	P	DIAGN	SPACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDTR	SPINT	EXCT	TONR	ORSR	DSOUR	PRBS	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EXP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
1480	1193	81	700325	1	1	365	.	25	651	.	.	2	3	10	.	229	47	1	2	.	25	20	.	30	.	.
1481	1194	81	700325	1	1	2	.	38	666	.	.	.	.	10	1	.	47	1	.	1	516	2	.	.	.	.
1482	1195	81	700325	1	1	2	.	38	666	.	651	.	.	10	1	.	47	1	.	1	516	2	.	.	.	.
1483	1196	61	700325	1	2	365	.	28	812	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	3	35	2	.	.	.	.
1484	1196	61	700325	1	2	365	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	38	1	.	3	25	13	4	3	2	6
1485	1196	62	700325	1	2	365	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	38	1	.	3	25	12	4	3	2	6
1486	1197	81	700325	1	5	2	1	38	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	229	24	5	4	96	2	.	.	.	.
1487	1198	81	700325	1	5	2	1	38	666	.	.	.	.	10	1	.	229	24	2	2	368	2	.	.	.	.
1488	1199	81	700328	1	1	2	.	44	666	.	.	.	.	10	1	.	69331	24	1	1	398	2	.	.	.	.
1489	1200	81	700328	1	1	2	.	43	666	.	693	.	.	10	1	.	69331	24	1	2	18	2	.	.	.	.
1490	1201	4	700329	1	1	2	.	69	660	.	660	.	.	0	1	.	66031	25	1	2	33	2	.	.	.	.
1491	1202	81	700330	1	1	2	.	44	666	.	365	.	.	0	1	.	36580	41	1	3	25	2	.	.	.	.
1492	1203	81	700331	1	1	2	13	44	666	.	662	.	33	0	1	.	66233	47	1	2	25	2	.	.	.	.
1493	1204	81	700331	1	5	2	.	69	816	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	5	3	55	2	.	.	.	.
1494	1205	91	700331	1	5	2	.	2	2	812	811	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	5	3	20	.	.	.	.	.
1495	1206	41	700611	1	5	820	.	2	2	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	5	3	90	.	1	1	.	.
1496	1207	41	700612	1	1	620	.	15	666	.	.	.	.	10	1	.	62033	24	5	3	150	.	1	1	.	.
1497	1208	81	700612	1	1	2	.	38	666	.	.	.	.	10	1	.	229	24	5	3	1303	2	.	.	.	.
1498	1208	82	700612	1	1	2	1	25	2	.	651	.	.	0	1	.	65127	40	6	2	35	2	.	1	1	.
1499	1209	41	700612	1	9	620	.	2	666	.	399	.	.	0	1	.	39927	47	1	2	56	2	.	1	1	.
1500	1210	81	700613	1	1	2	.	52	2	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	66631	49	1	2	15	2	.	1	1	.
1501	1211	41	700613	1	2	620	.	65	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	213	25	1	3	61	.	.	.	.	.
1502	1212	81	700613	1	2	620	.	65	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	213	25	1	3	45	2	.	.	.	.
1503	1213	41	700614	1	1	620	.	51	666	.	.	.	.	10	2	.	66628	47	1	3	118	5	.	.	.	.
1504	1214	4	700614	1	1	2	.	65	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	214	37	1	3	60	5	.	.	.	.
1505	1215	81	700615	1	1	2	1	53	651	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	214	37	1	3	60	5	.	.	.	.
1506	1216	81	700831	1	1	2	.	53	651	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	202	37	1	3	536	.	.	.	.	.
1507	1217	1	700831	1	1	2	.	53	651	.	652	.	.	0	1	.	287	38	1	3	536	.	.	.	.	.
1508	1218	1	700901	1	1	2	.	53	651	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	62027	.	2	3	536	.	.	.	.	.
1509	1218	2	700901	1	1	365	.	43	620	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	4	5	30	.	.	.	.	.
1510	1219	81	700901	1	1	620	.	2	200	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	4	5	30	.	.	.	.	.
1511	1220	41	700901	1	7	620	.	2	200	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	4	5	30	.	.	.	.	.
1512	1220	42	700901	1	7	620	.	2	200	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	4	5	30	.	.	.	.	.
1513	1221	81	700902	1	1	2	.	15	666	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	.	4	5	30	.	.	.	.	.
1514	1222	1	700902	1	2	2	.	53	365	.	710	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	4	5	30	.	.	.	.	.
1515	1223	31	700902	1	2	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	.	4	5	30	.	.	.	.	.
1516	1224	81	700903	1	1	2	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	230	47	1	2	60	2	.	.	.	.
1517	1225	1	700904	1	1	2	.	53	651	.	.	.	.	10	1	.	214	47	1	2	76	5	.	.	.	.
1518	1225	2	700904	1	1	2	.	53	651	.	.	.	.	10	1	.	214	47	1	2	76	5	.	.	.	.
1519	1226	94	700904	1	2	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20026	47	2	2	84	7	2	6	.	.
1520	1226	95	700904	1	2	2	.	56	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20026	47	2	2	84	8	2	.	.	.
1521	1226	96	700904	1	2	365	.	57	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20026	47	2	2	84	8	2	.	.	.
1522	1226	96	700904	1	2	394	.	396	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20026	47	2	2	84	8	2	.	.	.
1523	1227	31	700904	1	2	2	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20026	47	2	2	30	.	.	.	.	.
1524	1227	32	700904	1	2	2	.	13	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20026	47	2	2	30	.	.	.	.	.
1525	1227	33	700904	1	2	365	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20026	47	2	2	30	.	.	.	.	.
1526	1227	33	700904	1	2	365	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20026	47	2	2	30	.	.	.	.	.
1527	1227	33	700904	1	2	365	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20026	47	2	2	30	.	.	.	.	.
1528	1228	81	700905	1	1	2	.	16	666	.	.	.	.	10	1	.	219	38	1	2	20	2	.	.	.	.
1529	1228	81	700906	1	1	2	.	16	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	1	2	25	21	.	.	.	.
1530	1230	81	700906	1	1	2	.	16	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	.	1	2	25	21	.	.	.	.
1531	1231	81	700908	1	1	2	.	48	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	288	38	1	2	30	2	.	.	.	.
1532	1232	81	700908	1	1	2	.	52	666	.	.	.	.	10	2	.	66601	47	1	3	50	29	.	.	.	.



# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977

OBS	ID	THRE	DATE	N	P	DIAC	SPAC	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDR	SPIN	EPCT	TON	ORSR	DSOU	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EXP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
1533	1233	81	700910	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	10	1	261	47	1	.	1	347	2	.	.	.	.
1534	1234	81	700910	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	65114	.	2	.	3	105	2	.	.	.	.
1535	1235	81	700910	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	232	47	1	.	3	105	2	.	.	.	.
1536	1236	81	700911	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	66614	47	1	.	3	30	2	.	.	.	.
1537	1237	81	700911	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	66614	47	1	.	2	191	2	.	.	.	.
1538	1238	81	700911	1	9	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	2	.	2	377	18	.	.	.	.
1539	1239	81	700912	1	9	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	232	37	1	.	4	80	2	.	.	.	.
1540	1240	4	700912	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	39	39	1	.	1	363	2	.	4	10	27
1541	1241	61	700912	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	2	81	2	.	.	.	.
1542	1242	81	700912	1	7	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	10	2	.	.	5	.	4	95	27	.	2	2	6
1543	1243	81	700913	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	10	1	201	25	1	.	2	213	10	.	2	20	21
1544	1243	82	700913	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	201	25	1	.	3	213	27	.	19	.	.
1545	1244	81	700913	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	36580	41	1	.	2	20	2	.	.	.	.
1546	1245	94	700914	1	1	365	.	.	.	.	.	.	1	2	233	49	1	.	2	79	14	2	.	.	.
1547	1246	81	700915	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	229	60	1	.	1	503	2	.	.	.	.
1548	1247	81	700915	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	10	1	.	60	1	.	2	70	18	.	.	.	.
1549	1248	81	700915	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	10	1	.	60	1	.	2	70	18	.	.	.	.
1550	1249	81	700915	1	1	365	.	.	.	.	.	.	10	1	213	60	1	.	2	70	11	.	27	21	.
1551	1250	81	700915	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	65129	49	1	.	2	275	2	.	.	.	.
1552	1251	81	700916	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	66614	49	1	.	1	180	2	.	.	.	.
1553	1252	81	700916	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	66614	49	1	.	1	130	2	.	.	.	.
1554	1253	31	700916	1	1	365	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	287	38	1	.	3	40	2	2	16	.	1
1555	1254	81	700916	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	10	1	65129	.	5	.	2	93	.	.	.	.	.
1556	1255	81	700916	1	5	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	4	105	.	.	.	.	.
1557	1256	4	700917	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	201	39	1	.	2	86	.	.	.	.	.
1558	1257	61	700917	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	201	39	1	.	2	10	.	.	.	.	.
1559	1258	81	700917	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	10	2	66614	47	1	.	.	2021	3	.	3	1	6
1560	1259	26	700917	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	201	41	1	.	3	35	30	2	1	.	.
1561	1260	61	700917	1	5	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	4	110	.	.	3	1	6
1562	1261	4	700918	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	47	1	.	3	105	.	.	.	.	.
1563	1262	61	700918	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	214	25	1	.	2	25	13	4	.	3	1
1564	1263	81	700919	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	25	1	.	2	36	2	.	.	18	27
1565	1264	81	700919	1	1	666	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	25	1	.	2	88	2	.	.	.	.
1566	1264	82	700919	1	1	666	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	25	1	.	2	88	21	.	.	.	.
1567	1265	61	700919	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	47	1	.	2	149	17	4	.	3	1
1568	1265	62	700919	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	47	1	.	2	149	16	4	.	3	1
1569	1265	63	700919	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	47	1	.	2	149	16	4	.	3	1
1570	1266	4	700919	1	3	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	69331	.	1	.	2	167	.	.	.	.	.
1571	1267	4	700919	1	3	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	36580	.	1	.	.	50	.	.	.	.	.
1572	1268	4	700919	1	7	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	4	85	.	.	.	.	.
1573	1269	4	700920	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	65131	.	1	.	2	80	.	.	.	.	.
1574	1270	61	700920	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	2	141	16	4	.	3	1
1575	1270	62	700920	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	2	141	17	4	.	3	1
1576	1270	63	700920	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	2	141	17	4	.	3	1
1577	1271	4	700920	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	62527	47	1	.	3	30	.	.	.	.	.
1578	1272	81	700920	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	214	25	1	.	2	130	2	.	.	.	.
1579	1273	4	700920	1	3	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	36580	.	1	.	2	77	.	.	.	.	.
1580	1274	81	700921	1	2	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	25	1	.	2	50	2	.	.	.	.
1581	1275	4	700921	1	7	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	4	95	.	.	.	.	.
1582	1276	4	700922	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	214	.	1	.	1	141	.	.	.	.	.
1583	1277	97	700922	1	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	.	1	.	1	27	.	.	.	.	.
1584	1278	4	700922	1	3	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	36581	41	1	.	1	100	.	.	.	.	.
1585	1279	4	700922	1	7	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	5	.	4	105	.	.	.	.	.



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OBS	ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	DIACF	SPACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDTR	SPIINT	EFCT	ZONE	CHSR	DSOUR	PRES	CRIG	DISP	SIZ	EQP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
1586	1280	4	700923	1	4	2	.	49	663	.	.	365	.	0	1	36546	24	1	.	2	2	64	.	.	.	.
1587	1281	4	700923	1	7	2	.	49	663	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	3	2	4	196	.	.	.	.	
1588	1282	4	700923	1	7	2	.	49	663	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	5	.	4	112	.	.	.	.	
1589	1283	4	700924	1	1	2	1	51	663	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	2	2	144	.	.	.	.	
1590	1284	97	700924	1	1	2	.	62	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	47	1	1	2	45	.	.	.	.	
1591	1285	4	700924	1	1	2	.	49	663	.	.	365	13	0	1	36513	37	1	3	75	.	.	.	.		
1592	1286	94	700924	1	2	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	1	2	213	38	1	2	2	76	.	2	14	9	
1593	1287	4	700924	1	7	2	.	51	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	24	2	2	2	320	.	.	.	.	
1594	1288	97	700925	1	1	2	.	62	335	.	.	.	.	0	1	36513	38	1	1	2	54	.	.	.	.	
1595	1289	4	700925	1	3	2	.	49	663	.	.	365	13	0	1	62011	38	1	2	69	.	.	.	.		
1596	1290	4	700925	1	3	2	.	51	663	.	.	620	13	0	1	.	47	1	4	2	15	.	.	.	.	
1597	1291	4	700925	1	9	2	.	51	663	.	.	.	.	0	1	231	38	5	4	85	.	.	.	.		
1598	1292	94	700926	1	2	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	100	2	231	38	1	2	79	.	8	1	.		
1599	1293	41	700926	1	2	365	.	8	40	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	37	1	3	25	.	2	3	.		
1600	1294	21	700926	1	2	2	.	59	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	47	1	3	25	.	.	04	6		
1601	1295	94	700926	1	2	2	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	3	50	.	4	31	6		
1602	1296	61	700926	1	2	3	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	20026	24	2	2	440	.	1	.	.		
1603	1297	37	700926	1	9	365	.	33	335	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	37	1	2	56	.	.	.	.		
1604	1298	57	700927	1	1	2	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	37	1	2	56	.	4	31	6		
1605	1299	61	700927	1	1	2	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	1	227	38	1	2	116	.	.	.	.		
1606	1300	81	700927	1	1	2	.	42	663	.	.	.	.	20	1	213	47	1	2	126	.	2	32	.		
1607	1301	41	700927	1	7	365	.	1	40	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	24	5	4	92	.	.	.	.		
1608	1302	81	700927	1	2	2	.	42	663	.	.	.	.	0	1	214	37	1	3	40	.	.	.	.		
1609	1303	97	700928	1	2	2	.	62	255	.	.	.	.	0	1	237	37	1	3	90	.	21	.	.		
1610	1304	81	690101	1	1	2	.	51	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	3	30	.	4	31	6		
1611	1305	61	690101	1	1	2	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	2	60	.	.	.	.		
1612	1306	97	690102	1	1	2	.	62	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	42	1	3	35	.	2	.	.		
1613	1307	81	690102	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	660	6	0	1	66032	47	1	3	155	.	1	12	8		
1614	1308	61	690102	1	1	2	.	22	255	.	.	.	.	0	2	215	42	1	2	30	.	2	.	.		
1615	1309	81	690102	1	3	2	.	32	666	.	.	.	15	0	3	.	24	2	2	540	.	20	3	.		
1616	1310	31	690102	1	6	2	.	32	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	24	2	2	20	.	11	3	.		
1617	1310	32	690102	1	6	2	.	18	671	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	42	1	3	20	.	12	1	.		
1618	1311	11	690103	1	2	365	.	18	671	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	42	1	3	754	.	2	.	.		
1619	1311	12	690103	1	2	365	.	18	671	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	42	1	3	20	.	13	2	.		
1620	1312	81	690103	1	5	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	24	2	1	76	.	2	.	.		
1621	1313	81	690104	1	1	2	.	35	335	.	.	365	5	0	1	36531	41	1	1	118	.	4	32	6		
1622	1314	61	690104	1	1	365	.	35	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	231	38	1	2	103	.	2	1	8		
1623	1315	61	690105	1	2	2	.	22	255	.	.	.	.	0	2	66629	88	1	1	20	.	2	1	12	8	
1624	1317	81	690107	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	66631	37	1	1	25	.	.	.	.		
1625	1318	81	690107	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	2	3	779	.	2	.	.		
1626	1319	37	690107	1	3	3	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	5	4	117	.	2	.	.		
1627	1320	81	690108	1	5	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	4	100	.	2	.	.		
1628	1321	81	690108	1	5	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	10	1	36541	47	1	2	85	.	1	.	.		
1629	1322	37	690111	1	1	365	.	33	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	220	47	1	3	25	.	4	.	.		
1630	1323	11	690113	1	1	2	.	18	616	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	3	15	.	12	1	.		
1631	1324	31	690114	1	1	365	.	32	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	67214	.	1	2	70	.	2	.	.		
1632	1325	11	711209	5	1	365	.	25	652	.	.	.	.	0	.	36541	47	1	3	15	.	4	.	.		
1633	1326	81	711209	5	1	365	.	25	652	.	.	.	.	0	2	36541	47	1	3	30	.	2	.	.		
1634	1327	41	711209	5	12	672	.	54	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	36541	47	1	3	75	.	13	1	.		
1635	1328	11	711211	5	1	365	.	18	652	.	.	.	.	0	.	36541	47	1	3	75	.	14	1	.		
1636	1328	12	711211	5	1	365	.	18	652	.	.	.	.	0	.	36541	47	1	2	75	.	14	1	.		
1637	1328	13	711211	5	1	365	.	18	652	.	.	.	.	0	.	65127	49	1	2	110	.	2	.	.		
1638	1329	41	711214	5	1	651	.	40	365	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	.	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	

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OBS	ID	THRE	DATE	N	P	DI	SP	ACT	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	IND	SP	INT	EF	CT	TON	OR	DS	OR	PR	CR	DIS	SIZE	EQ	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
1639	1330	47	711214	5	1	651	2	66	365	.	.	.	.	.	0	.	65127	49	49	1	1	2	35	.	.	.	.	.	.
1640	1331	81	711214	5	1	666	4	46	2	.	.	.	.	.	10	2	66628	49	49	1	1	2	130	2	.	.	.	.	.
1641	1332	11	711214	5	1	365	4	18	645	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	201	47	47	1	1	2	75	3	.	.	.	.	.
1642	1333	81	711214	5	9	2	1	16	666	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	201	47	47	1	1	2	884	2	.	.	.	.	.
1643	1334	11	711215	5	10	365	4	18	645	652	651	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	49	1	1	2	65	3	.	.	.	.	.
1644	1335	61	711218	5	13	365	.	35	795	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	49	1	1	2	15	16	4	3	1	7	7
1645	1336	61	711218	5	13	365	.	35	795	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	49	1	1	2	15	14	4	3	1	7	7
1646	1336	62	711218	5	13	365	.	35	740	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	36541	38	49	1	1	2	50	12	4	3	1	5	5
1647	1337	37	711220	5	11	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	264	38	49	1	1	2	243	3	1	.	.	.	.
1648	1338	47	711221	5	9	365	.	59	651	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	264	.	49	1	1	2	110	2	.	.	.	.	.
1649	1339	41	711221	5	9	651	.	25	365	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	264	.	49	1	1	2	110	11	2	.	.	.	.
1650	1340	81	711221	5	9	365	.	25	651	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	264	.	49	1	1	2	110	11	2	.	.	.	.
1651	1340	82	711221	5	9	365	.	25	651	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	264	.	49	1	1	2	110	11	2	.	.	.	.
1652	1341	81	711222	5	9	2	.	16	666	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	69307	.	49	1	1	2	150	1	.	.	.	.	.
1653	1342	91	711228	5	13	2	.	30	816	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	49	1	1	2	95	2	.	.	.	.	.
1654	1343	81	711229	5	12	365	.	48	651	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	40	49	1	1	2	65	2	.	.	.	.	.
1655	1344	47	711229	5	12	365	.	66	651	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	40	49	1	1	2	10	2	.	.	.	.	.
1656	1345	91	711229	5	13	2	.	30	816	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	49	49	1	1	2	335	2	.	.	.	.	.
1657	1346	91	711230	5	11	2	.	30	816	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	49	1	1	2	110	2	.	.	.	.	.
1658	1347	81	700323	5	1	365	.	56	651	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	66030	49	49	1	1	2	458	20	3	10	4	.	.
1659	1348	31	700323	5	1	365	.	56	651	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	229	49	49	1	1	2	565	2	.	.	.	.	.
1660	1349	81	700324	5	1	2	.	44	666	.	.	.	.	.	10	1	229	49	49	1	1	2	20	2	.	.	.	.	.
1661	1350	81	700324	5	1	2	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	69301	49	49	1	1	2	620	2	.	.	.	.	.
1662	1351	81	700325	5	6	2	.	44	666	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	69301	49	49	1	1	2	410	2	.	.	.	.	.
1663	1352	81	700326	5	7	2	.	44	666	.	.	.	.	.	10	1	69301	49	49	1	1	2	165	2	.	.	.	.	.
1664	1353	11	700328	5	7	365	.	18	615	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	39	39	1	1	2	30	3	.	.	.	.	.
1665	1354	41	700328	5	7	615	.	18	652	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	40	40	1	1	2	35	2	.	.	.	.	.
1666	1355	11	700328	5	7	365	.	18	652	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	65170	.	40	1	1	2	35	2	.	.	.	.	.
1667	1356	81	700328	5	10	2	.	25	666	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	65129	.	40	1	1	2	35	2	.	.	.	.	.
1668	1357	81	690115	1	1	365	.	25	666	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	65129	.	40	1	1	2	35	2	.	.	.	.	.
1669	1358	37	690115	1	1	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	36517	.	40	1	1	2	35	2	.	.	.	.	.
1670	1359	37	690116	1	1	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	36517	.	40	1	1	2	35	2	.	.	.	.	.
1671	1360	37	690116	1	1	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	36517	.	40	1	1	2	35	2	.	.	.	.	.
1672	1361	37	690117	1	1	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	36541	47	47	1	1	2	822	1	.	.	.	.	.
1673	1362	94	690117	1	2	365	.	1	335	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	47	1	1	2	81	1	.	.	.	.	.
1674	1363	37	690118	1	1	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	227	37	37	1	1	2	375	1	.	.	.	.	.
1675	1364	37	690118	1	1	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	227	37	37	1	1	2	35	1	.	.	.	.	.
1676	1365	37	690118	1	1	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	20026	47	47	1	1	2	35	1	.	.	.	.	.
1677	1366	61	690118	1	2	2	.	22	255	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	38	1	1	2	25	1	.	.	.	.	.
1678	1367	37	690118	1	3	365	.	32	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	24	24	1	1	2	540	1	.	.	.	.	.
1679	1368	37	690118	1	3	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	36541	.	24	1	1	2	222	1	.	.	.	.	.
1680	1369	37	690118	1	3	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	36541	.	24	1	1	2	408	1	.	.	.	.	.
1681	1370	37	690119	1	1	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	230	37	37	1	1	2	269	1	.	.	.	.	.
1682	1371	51	690120	1	2	2	.	49	365	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	233	49	49	1	1	2	55	1	.	.	.	.	.
1683	1372	94	690123	1	1	2	.	57	365	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	233	49	49	1	1	2	30	1	.	.	.	.	.
1684	1373	91	711229	5	9	2	.	30	816	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	24	1	1	2	198	1	.	.	.	.	.
1685	1374	37	690715	1	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	25	25	1	1	2	513	1	.	.	.	.	.
1686	1375	37	690715	1	1	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	47	47	1	1	2	213	1	.	.	.	.	.
1687	1376	31	690715	1	2	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	60	60	1	1	2	91	1	.	.	.	.	.
1688	1377	11	690715	1	2	365	.	18	40	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	213	47	47	1	1	2	50	1	.	.	.	.	.
1689	1378	37	690715	1	3	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	226	47	47	1	1	2	873	1	.	.	.	.	.
1690	1379	37	690715	1	3	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	213	25	25	1	1	2	110	1	.	.	.	.	.
1691	1380	37	690715	1	3	3	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	24	24	1	1	2	153	1	.	.	.	.	.

# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

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OBS	ID	THRE	DATE	N	P	DICT	SPACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDTR	SPINT	EPCT	TOPE	OSR	DSOUR	PHES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EQP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
1692	1361	81	690802	1	1	2	.	43	663	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	37	1	.	3	20	2	.	.	.	.
1693	1382	21	690803	1	2	2	.	12	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	60	1	.	2	40	2	.	.	.	.
1694	1383	11	690804	1	2	3	.	18	345	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	3	20	1	.	.	.	.
1695	1384	31	690807	1	1	2	6	16	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	2	74	2	3	10	.	1
1696	1385	81	690808	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	10	1	.	60	1	.	1	407	2	.	29	.	.
1697	1386	81	690808	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	38	1	.	3	119	2	.	.	2	8
1698	1387	61	690808	1	2	365	6	12	315	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	24	2	.	1	1400	2	.	10	.	.
1699	1388	31	690809	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	60	1	.	2	53	2	.	.	.	.
1700	1389	81	690809	1	1	2	.	46	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	60	1	.	2	73	2	.	.	.	.
1701	1390	61	690809	1	1	2	.	56	666	.	.	.	.	1	2	.	60	1	.	4	98	2	.	7	.	.
1702	1391	94	690809	1	5	365	1	56	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	214	5	.	3	81	2	.	.	.	.
1703	1392	81	690810	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	214	1	.	3	30	2	.	.	.	.
1704	1393	81	690810	1	1	2	.	52	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	214	1	.	3	20	2	.	.	.	.
1705	1394	81	690810	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	20032	1	.	3	85	2	.	.	.	.
1706	1395	81	690811	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	2	.	4	1687	2	.	.	3	2
1707	1396	81	690815	1	1	2	1	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	25	1	.	3	15	4	.	3	2	6
1708	1397	61	690716	1	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	47	1	.	1	804	.	.	.	.	.
1709	1398	37	690716	1	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	24	2	.	2	903	.	.	.	.	.
1710	1399	37	690716	1	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	24	1	.	2	248	.	.	.	.	.
1711	1400	37	720723	5	1	365	.	66	651	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	5131	1	.	.	35	.	3	4	.	.
1712	1401	26	720723	5	1	365	.	66	651	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	65131	1	.	.	55	.	.	.	.	.
1713	1402	41	720723	5	1	365	.	66	651	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	24	1	.	1	1000	.	.	.	.	.
1714	1403	47	720726	5	1	651	.	6	365	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	214	1	.	2	145	14	7	.	5	10
1715	1404	94	720727	5	1	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20002	1	.	2	145	9	2	.	10	.
1716	1404	95	720727	5	1	365	.	56	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	20002	1	.	2	145	16	2	.	9	10
1717	1404	96	720727	5	1	2	.	56	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	213	1	.	2	125	12	2	.	9	1
1718	1405	94	720727	5	11	2	.	44	750	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	213	1	.	2	10	.	.	.	.	.
1719	1406	81	711207	5	1	2	.	44	750	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	214	1	.	3	25	.	.	.	.	.
1720	1407	81	711207	5	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	38	1	.	2	68	2	.	.	.	.
1721	1408	81	711208	5	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	38	1	.	2	95	.	.	.	.	.
1722	1409	37	711208	5	1	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	40	1	.	2	72	2	.	.	2	.
1723	1410	47	720728	5	1	365	.	2	651	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	49	1	.	2	156	.	.	.	.	.
1724	1411	41	720804	5	10	365	.	66	651	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	49	1	.	2	375	.	.	.	.	.
1725	1412	81	720806	5	10	365	.	16	651	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	46	1	.	2	135	.	.	.	.	.
1726	1413	41	720815	5	1	365	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	260	1	.	2	279	.	.	.	.	.
1727	1414	81	720101	5	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	227	1	.	2	150	.	.	.	.	.
1728	1415	81	720104	5	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	10	1	.	38	1	.	2	40	.	.	.	.	.
1729	1416	41	720104	5	1	365	.	1	651	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	229	1	.	.	35	2	.	.	.	.
1730	1417	81	700612	5	2	2	3	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	214	1	.	2	74	2	.	.	.	.
1731	1418	81	700612	5	9	2	.	2	666	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	42	1	.	2	110	.	.	.	.	.
1732	1419	41	700612	5	9	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	42	1	.	2	516	.	.	.	.	.
1733	1420	97	700613	5	1	2	.	35	663	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	38	1	.	1	90	10	.	.	.	.
1734	1421	81	700901	5	6	365	.	43	620	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	287	1	.	3	25	2	.	.	.	.
1735	1422	81	700902	5	10	2	.	55	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	37	1	.	.	35	7	2	.	6	.
1736	1423	94	700904	5	7	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	.	35	24	2	.	7	8
1737	1424	94	700904	5	7	2	.	56	365	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	40	1	.	.	50	2	.	.	.	.
1738	1425	94	700905	5	7	394	.	56	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	2	50	2	.	.	.	.
1739	1426	94	700905	5	7	2	.	56	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	2	50	2	.	.	.	.
1740	1427	4	700910	5	1	2	.	42	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	1	151	.	.	.	.	.
1741	1428	81	700910	5	1	2	.	42	663	.	.	.	.	10	1	.	49	1	.	2	170	.	.	.	.	.
1742	1429	61	700911	5	1	2	.	51	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	114	6	4	.	5	1
1743	1431	1	700917	5	1	2	.	54	663	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	40	1	.	2	90	.	.	.	.	.
1744	1432	4	700918	5	1	2	.	45	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	234	.	.	.	.	.



# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

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OBS	ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	DIAGN	SPACE	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDTR	SPINT	EFCT	TOPE	ORSR	DSOUR	PHES	CRIG	DISP	SIZ	EXP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		
1745	1433	61	700918	5	6	2	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	3	30	.	4	3	1	9	.	
1746	1434	4	700919	5	1	2	.	51	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	92	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1747	1435	61	700919	5	1	2	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	195	.	4	5	1	9	.	
1748	1436	81	700919	5	1	2	1	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	49	1	.	2	120	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1749	1437	91	700921	5	1	652	.	69	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	92	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1750	1438	97	700922	5	1	2	.	49	663	.	.	.	13	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	150	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1751	1439	61	700922	5	1	2	.	35	663	335	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	30	.	4	7	1	9	.	
1752	1440	4	700923	5	1	2	.	35	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	128	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1753	1441	97	700923	5	1	2	.	49	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	75	.	2	.	.	.	.	
1754	1442	97	700925	5	6	2	.	35	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	122	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1755	1443	61	700925	5	6	2	.	35	663	335	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	92	16	4	3	1	9	.	
1756	1443	62	700925	5	6	2	.	35	663	335	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	92	17	4	3	1	9	.	
1757	1444	51	700924	5	10	365	1	61	663	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	49	1	.	2	160	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1758	1445	51	700926	5	7	365	.	61	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	100	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1759	1446	37	700926	5	9	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	280	.	1	.	.	.	.	
1760	1447	41	700926	5	10	365	.	1	40	.	.	.	13	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	45	.	2	3	2	.	.	
1761	1448	81	700927	5	1	2	.	42	663	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	49	1	.	2	140	.	2	3	2	.	.	
1762	1449	61	700927	5	11	2	.	35	335	652	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	90	.	4	3	1	9	.	
1763	1450	61	700928	5	8	2	.	35	335	663	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	42	.	4	3	1	9	.	
1764	1451	61	700929	5	7	365	.	7	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	25	.	2	4	1	1	6	.
1765	1452	37	700929	5	7	365	.	32	663	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	49	1	.	2	15	.	2	2	17	.	.	
1766	1453	81	700929	5	7	365	.	17	663	.	.	.	22	0	1	.	49	1	.	2	34	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1767	1454	81	700929	5	7	2	.	42	663	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	49	1	.	2	24	2	.	10	.	.	.	
1768	1455	81	690101	5	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	49	1	.	2	15	.	2	4	3	1	9	.
1769	1456	61	690101	5	1	2	.	35	335	660	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	25	.	4	3	1	9	.	
1770	1457	11	690104	5	2	2	.	51	660	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	90	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1771	1457	12	690104	5	2	365	.	51	660	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	90	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1772	1458	94	690110	5	8	365	.	7	795	335	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	117	.	2	.	.	.	.	
1773	1459	37	690117	5	1	365	.	33	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	703	.	1	.	.	.	.	
1774	1459	38	690117	5	1	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	25	.	1	.	.	.	.	
1775	1460	94	690117	5	5	396	.	1	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	90	.	7	9	.	.	.	
1776	1461	37	690119	5	8	365	.	33	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	185	.	1	.	.	.	.	
1777	1461	38	690119	5	8	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	30	.	1	.	.	.	.	
1778	1462	37	690112	5	5	2	.	33	2	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	2	400	.	1	.	.	.	.	
1779	1463	94	690121	5	5	365	.	20	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	133	.	1	1	10	.	.	
1780	1463	95	690121	5	5	365	.	17	396	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	100	.	2	9	.	.	.	
1781	1464	31	690122	5	5	2	.	33	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	50	.	2	8	.	.	.	
1782	1465	97	690123	5	5	2	.	57	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	100	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1783	1466	37	690803	5	5	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	99	.	1	.	.	.	.	
1784	1467	31	690808	5	5	2	6	8	817	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	4	2	245	.	3	10	.	.	.	
1785	1468	97	690808	5	5	2	.	52	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	15	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1786	1469	81	690809	5	7	365	.	33	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	49	1	.	2	108	.	2	.	.	.	.	
1787	1470	37	690809	5	7	365	.	33	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	126	.	1	.	.	.	.	
1788	1471	87	690009	5	7	2	.	56	312	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	20	.	1	.	.	.	.	
1789	1472	61	690009	5	7	394	.	22	312	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	49	1	.	2	55	.	1	4	2	8	.	
1790	1472	81	690810	5	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	49	1	.	2	118	.	2	.	.	.	.	
1791	1473	11	690811	5	5	365	.	22	355	360	.	.	.	0	1	.	49	1	.	2	80	.	1	1	.	.	.	
1792	1474	81	690812	5	4	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	49	1	2	2	122	.	2	.	.	.	.	
1793	1475	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
1794	1476	81	681201	5	6	365	.	43	651	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	.	1	.	3	60	.	2	.	.	.	.	
1795	1477	61	681203	5	7	396	.	7	335	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	.	1	.	2	80	.	4	3	2	6	.	
1796	1478	94	681205	5	7	365	.	56	335	396	.	.	.	0	.	.	.	1	.	2	65	.	7	9	.	.	.	
1797	1479	61	681208	5	8	2	.	35	336	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	108	.	12	4	3	2	6	.



# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

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OBS	ID	THRE	DATE	N	P	DIAC	SPAC	ACTI	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDR	SPIN	EPCT	TOE	ORSR	DSOR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EQP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
1798	1479	62	681208	5	8	2	.	22	215	.	.	.	.	0	2	214	49	1	.	.	30	.	1	1	2	8
1799	1480	61	681209	5	7	2	.	35	336	.	.	.	.	0	2	49	49	1	.	.	360	12	4	3	2	6
1800	1481	94	681011	5	7	365	.	7	.	.	.	.	.	0	.	36532	47	1	.	.	330	.	5	4	.	.
1801	1482	61	681011	5	7	365	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	.	39633	49	1	.	.	106	.	4	3	2	6
1802	1483	11	681011	5	7	2	.	16	336	.	.	.	.	0	2	36001	49	1	.	.	42	.	1	.	.	.
1803	1484	11	681212	5	7	2	.	53	336	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	49	1	.	.	30	12	1	.	.	.
1804	1485	1	681212	5	7	365	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	36001	49	1	.	.	281	12	.	.	2	6
1805	1486	61	681213	5	7	365	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	49	1	.	.	63	.	4	3	2	6
1806	1487	37	681213	5	7	365	.	33	335	.	.	.	.	0	3	213	49	1	.	.	90	.	1	3	2	6
1807	1488	61	681214	5	1	365	.	8	335	.	.	.	.	0	.	39614	39	1	.	.	45	.	4	3	2	6
1808	1489	61	681215	5	1	365	.	53	336	.	.	.	.	0	.	64014	39	1	.	.	15	.	4	3	2	6
1809	1490	61	681215	5	1	365	.	35	336	.	.	.	.	0	2	233	49	1	.	.	35	.	4	3	2	6
1810	1491	81	681215	5	1	365	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	39633	38	1	.	.	65	.	2	.	2	6
1811	1492	61	681220	5	1	2	.	33	333	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	779	14	4	3	2	6
1812	1493	37	681222	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	592	.	1	.	.	.
1813	1494	37	681222	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	24	1	.	.	1450	.	1	.	.	.
1814	1495	37	681222	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	635	.	1	.	.	.
1815	1496	37	681224	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	713	.	1	.	.	.
1816	1497	37	681224	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	285	.	2	.	.	.
1817	1498	26	681224	5	12	731	.	58	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	.	800	.	1	.	.	.
1818	1499	37	681225	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	420	.	1	.	.	.
1819	1500	37	681225	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	90	.	2	.	.	.
1820	1501	26	681225	5	8	731	.	98	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	.	1360	.	1	.	.	.
1821	1502	37	681226	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	667	.	1	.	.	.
1822	1503	37	681228	5	1	2	.	33	2	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	118	2	.	2	1	.
1823	1504	81	681228	5	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	213	49	1	.	.	84	.	2	1	.	.
1824	1505	37	681228	5	9	710	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	294	.	1	.	.	.
1825	1506	37	681228	5	10	2	.	33	365	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	136	.	1	.	.	.
1826	1507	37	681229	5	10	710	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	110	.	2	1	.	.
1827	1508	37	681229	5	10	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	230	.	1	.	.	.
1828	1509	37	681231	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	515	.	1	.	.	.
1829	1510	37	690715	5	5	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	245	.	1	.	.	.
1830	1511	37	690715	5	5	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	204	.	1	.	.	.
1831	1512	37	690716	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	170	.	1	.	.	.
1832	1513	37	690716	5	1	2	.	33	365	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	170	.	1	.	.	.
1833	1514	38	690717	5	1	365	.	56	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	2007	6	0	1	.	.
1834	1515	37	690717	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	1178	.	1	.	.	.
1835	1516	37	690717	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	744	.	1	.	.	.
1836	1517	37	690718	5	1	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	148	.	1	.	.	.
1837	1518	37	690718	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	850	.	1	.	.	.
1838	1519	37	690718	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	850	.	1	.	.	.
1839	1520	37	690718	5	5	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	450	.	1	.	.	.
1840	1521	37	690719	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	1180	.	1	.	.	.
1841	1522	37	690719	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	1008	.	1	.	.	.
1842	1523	37	690720	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	207	.	1	.	.	.
1843	1524	37	690720	5	1	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	600	.	1	.	.	.
1844	1525	37	690720	5	6	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	35	9	4	3	2	6
1845	1526	61	690720	5	6	365	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	39	1	.	.	182	.	1	.	.	.
1846	1527	37	690720	5	7	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	148	.	1	.	.	.
1847	1528	37	690720	5	7	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	.	4000	.	1	.	.	.
1848	1529	37	690720	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	24	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1849	1530	37	690720	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

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OBS	ID	THRE	DATE	N	P	DIAC	SPAC	ACTION	TAB1	TAB2	TAB3	INDR	SPINT	EPCT	TOPE	ORSR	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EQP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
1851	1530	37	690721	5	1	2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	24	1	.	1	954	.	1	.	.	.
1852	1531	37	690721	5	5	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	2	600	.	1	.	.	.
1853	1532	37	690722	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	1	2000	.	1	.	.	.
1854	1533	37	690722	5	6	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	2	875	.	1	.	.	.
1855	1534	37	690722	5	7	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	2	808	.	1	.	.	.
1856	1535	37	690722	5	9	2	.	56	365	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	24	1	.	2	480	.	1	.	.	.
1857	1536	37	690723	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	1	780	.	1	.	.	.
1858	1537	37	690723	5	6	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	1	890	.	1	.	.	.
1859	1538	37	690723	5	7	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	1	670	.	1	.	.	.
1860	1539	37	690723	5	8	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	2	550	.	1	.	.	.
1861	1540	37	690724	5	7	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	1	875	.	1	.	.	.
1862	1541	37	690725	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	1	2475	.	1	.	.	.
1863	1542	37	690726	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	2	495	.	1	.	.	.
1864	1543	41	690726	5	6	365	.	66	615	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	49	1	.	2	170	.	2	1	3	.
1865	1544	37	690726	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	5	3000	.	1	.	.	.
1866	1545	37	690729	5	7	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	2	680	.	1	.	.	.
1867	1546	37	690730	5	1	2	.	42	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	2	495	.	1	.	.	.
1868	1547	81	690730	5	4	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	49	1	.	3	35	.	2	1	.	.
1869	1548	37	690731	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	2	340	.	1	.	.	.
1870	1549	37	690731	5	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	2	160	.	1	.	.	.
1871	1550	91	680124	1	1	731	.	31	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	110	.	9	.	.	.
1872	1551	51	680125	1	1	2	.	49	731	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	1	400	.	.	.	.	.
1873	1552	91	680125	1	1	731	.	31	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	1	200	.	9	.	.	.
1874	1553	61	680125	1	1	2	.	35	950	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	1	380	.	4	5	1	5
1875	1554	37	680125	1	2	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	36	.	1	.	.	.
1876	1555	97	680126	1	1	2	.	62	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	204	.	2	.	.	.
1877	1556	51	680126	1	1	2	.	49	731	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	104	.	2	.	.	.
1878	1557	61	680127	1	9	2	.	35	950	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	75	.	2	4	5	1
1879	1558	61	680130	1	2	2	.	35	950	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	117	.	16	4	5	1
1880	1559	94	680130	1	2	2	.	64	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	158	.	5	4	5	1
1881	1560	61	680201	1	2	365	.	7	335	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	49	1	.	3	25	.	4	3	2	6
1882	1561	94	680202	1	2	365	.	7	.	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	49	1	.	3	15	.	7	2	1	.
1883	1562	94	680202	1	2	2	.	56	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	3	15	.	2	2	1	.
1884	1563	94	680203	1	2	365	.	56	396	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	118	.	2	2	9	.
1885	1564	94	680203	1	2	365	.	63	335	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	49	1	.	2	45	.	6	1	5	.
1886	1565	31	680204	1	2	365	.	32	.	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	49	1	.	2	45	.	6	1	5	.
1887	1566	94	680204	1	2	2	.	11	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	75	.	6	1	5	.
1888	1567	94	680205	1	2	2	.	32	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	3	90	.	5	1	1	.
1889	1568	31	680205	1	2	2	.	32	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	3	70	.	3	6	2	.
1890	1569	31	680205	1	2	365	.	32	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	3	30	.	3	6	5	.
1891	1570	61	680206	1	2	365	.	35	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	3	35	.	4	3	2	.
1892	1571	61	680208	1	1	2	.	35	950	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	3	35	.	4	3	2	.
1893	1572	31	680208	1	1	365	.	35	731	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	3	20	.	16	4	3	4
1894	1573	37	680208	1	2	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	3	15	.	24	4	8	2
1895	1574	61	680209	1	1	365	.	35	950	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	3	30	.	30	3	1	5
1896	1575	31	680211	1	2	365	.	32	731	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	3	30	.	31	1	3	.
1897	1576	11	680212	1	1	365	.	18	651	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	49	1	.	3	18	.	3	1	3	.
1898	1577	61	802112	1	1	365	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	3	48	.	17	4	3	2
1899	1578	81	802115	1	1	2	.	42	663	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	49	1	.	3	36	.	18	7	5	9
1900	1579	94	802115	1	1	365	.	62	.	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	49	1	.	3	36	.	7	3	7	2
1901	1580	31	680218	1	1	365	.	32	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	3	48	.	2	2	2	.
1902	1581	26	680219	1	1	2	.	99	817	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	3	25	.	14	2	9	.
1903	1582	94	680220	1	2	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	3	25	.	14	2	9	.

## STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

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OBS	ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	EFFECT	SPACE	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDR	SPIRT	EFFECT	TOPE	ORSE	DSOUR	PRES	OEIG	PISP	SZ	EJP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
1904	1583	94	680220	1	2	2		56	365					0	2	288	39	1			15	14	2	5		
1905	1584	81	680220	1	2	2		42	663					0	3	22001	37	1		3	35					
1906	1585	94	680221	1	2	2	4	64						0	2		38	1		3	20		5	11		
1907	1586	94	680222	1	2	2		5						0	2	231	49	1	3	2	65		5	11		
1908	1587	31	680222	1	2	2		35						0	2	231	49	1		2	13	14	4	5	1	
1909	1588	81	690907	5	1	2		45	666					0	1	213	49	1		3	92	2	4	3	2	
1910	1589	61	690913	5	1	2		35	335					0	1		38	1		2	130		4	3	2	
1911	1590	81	690913	5	4	2		43	666					0		232	39	1		2	80	2				
1912	1591	61	690914	5	5	2		7	335					0		39633	39	1			70		4	3	2	
1913	1592	61	690914	5	5	2		22	365					0		39633	39	1			60		4	3	2	
1914	1593	94	691025	5	7	2		20	335					0	3	213	49	1	2		80		5	1		
1915	1594	4	691027	5	4	2		49	660					0	2		24	1		2	54					
1916	1595	61	691027	5	5	2		22	335					0		36577	49	1		3	65		5	1		
1917	1596	4	691029	5	5	2		49	660					0	2		42	1		3	35		1	1		
1918	1597	4	691101	5	1	2		49	660					0	2	213	49	1	2	1	132		1	1		
1919	1598	41	691101	5	1	2		13	2					0	2	64028	49	1		1	20		1	1		
1920	1599	41	691102	5	6	2		4	620					0	2	213		1		3	65		1	1		
1921	1600	37	690717	1	1	2		33						0	3			1		1	1242		1	10		
1922	1601	37	690717	1	3	2		33						0	3		24	2		1	1307		1			
1923	1602	37	690717	1	5	2		33						0	3			5		4	90		1			
1924	1603	37	690717	1	7	2		33						0	3			2		1	374		1			
1925	1604	37	690718	1	1	2		33						0	3		25	1		1	905		1			
1926	1605	37	690718	1	1	2		33						0	3		47	1		2	225		1			
1927	1606	37	690718	1	6	2		33						0	3		26	2		1	195		1	10		



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OBS	ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	EFACT	SPACT	ACTION	TAB1	TAB2	TAB3	INDTR	SPINT	EPT	TONZ	ORSE	DSOUR	PREB	OBIG	DISP	SLZ	LUP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
1957	1635	61	690907	1	1	2	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	231	37	1	.	2	117	2	.	29	.	.
1958	1636	81	690907	1	1	2	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	36541	.	1	.	3	75	2	.	.	.	.
1959	1637	81	690907	1	5	2	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	10	1	.	.	5	.	4	81	2	.	.	.	.
1960	1638	81	690908	1	1	2	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	231	.	1	.	3	95	2	.	.	.	.
1961	1639	81	690908	1	1	2	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	49	1	.	2	103	2	.	.	.	.
1962	1640	81	690508	1	1	2	.	52	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	49	1	.	4	24	2	.	.	.	.
1963	1641	81	690908	1	5	2	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	5	.	3	50	2	.	.	.	.
1964	1642	61	690909	1	2	365	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	-	.	39	1	.	3	15	9	4	3	2	6
1965	1643	81	690010	1	1	2	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	66328	42	1	.	3	55	2	.	.	.	.
1966	1644	61	690010	1	1	2	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	66028	42	1	.	.	5	2	.	.	.	.
1967	1645	81	690010	1	1	2	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	34501	42	1	.	.	20	2	.	.	.	.
1968	1646	94	690012	1	2	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	20026	47	1	.	3	50	7	7	1	10	4
1969	1647	94	690912	1	2	2	.	56	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	20026	47	1	.	2	10	2	.	8	10	6
1970	1648	94	690912	1	2	2	.	2C	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	20001	47	1	.	2	84	.	.	1	10	.
1971	1649	81	690914	1	2	2	.	42	640	.	.	.	.	0	2	64014	60	1	.	3	15	12	.	7	11	10
1972	1650	94	691026	1	2	2	.	2C	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	47	1	.	3	35	.	.	11	10	.
1973	1651	94	691027	1	2	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	130	.	.	6	7	11
1974	1652	94	691028	1	2	2	.	56	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	60	1	.	2	80	.	.	1	.	.
1975	1653	94	691028	1	2	2	.	20	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	60	1	.	2	40	.	.	1	.	.
1976	1654	94	691028	1	2	2	.	7	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	60	1	.	2	40	.	.	1	.	.
1977	1654	94	691028	1	2	2	.	8	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	25	1	.	3	45	.	.	1	.	.
1978	1655	41	691029	1	1	620	.	6	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	230	47	1	.	3	70	.	.	4	.	.
1979	1656	94	691029	1	2	2	.	7	660	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	24	5	.	4	117	.	.	6	6	2
1980	1657	4	691030	1	5	2	.	49	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	214	60	1	.	3	50	.	.	6	6	2
1981	1658	31	691031	1	2	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	-	214	60	1	.	3	50	.	.	15	6	2
1982	1658	32	691031	1	2	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	-	214	60	1	.	3	50	.	.	4	2	2
1983	1658	33	691031	1	2	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	1	231	37	1	.	2	65	.	.	1	1	.
1984	1659	51	691101	1	1	620	.	49	695	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	47	1	.	3	60	.	.	1	1	.
1985	1660	41	691101	1	1	2	.	6	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	231	47	1	.	2	65	.	.	1	1	.
1986	1661	31	691102	1	2	2	.	34	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	60	1	.	5	19	3	.	.	2	2
1987	1662	94	691102	1	2	2	.	40	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	230	40	1	.	2	131	.	.	1	.	.
1988	1663	51	691106	1	1	2	.	49	695	.	.	.	.	0	1	65131	49	1	.	3	25	.	.	.	.	.
1985	1664	94	691108	1	1	2	.	59	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	3	24	.	.	.	.	.
1990	1665	11	680401	1	1	365	.	18	651	.	.	.	.	0	-	.	.	1	.	2	132	.	.	1	.	.
1991	1666	11	680402	1	1	365	.	18	651	.	.	.	.	0	-	.	.	1	.	3	20	.	.	.	.	.
1992	1667	81	680402	1	1	2	.	4C	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	37	1	.	3	30	.	.	.	.	.
1993	1668	91	680403	1	1	731	.	31	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	73118	47	1	.	3	18	.	.	.	.	.
1994	1669	37	680404	1	1	365	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	260	38	1	.	3	30	.	.	.	.	.
1995	1670	11	680404	1	1	365	.	18	651	.	.	.	.	0	0	.	.	1	.	2	143	.	.	1	.	.
1996	1671	94	680404	1	1	394	.	56	396	.	.	.	.	0	0	39633	38	1	.	2	128	.	.	1	.	.
1997	1672	94	680404	1	1	2	.	64	215	.	.	.	.	0	2	39633	38	1	.	3	10	.	.	4	.	.
1998	1673	37	680405	1	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	233	36	1	.	3	30	.	.	10	.	.
1999	1674	31	680405	1	2	2	.	51	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	1	.	3	2	6	2	10	.	2
2000	1675	11	680407	1	1	365	.	18	652	.	.	.	.	0	0	.	.	1	.	3	15	.	.	.	.	.
2001	1676	11	680408	1	1	365	.	18	651	.	.	.	.	0	0	65131	.	1	.	3	18	.	.	.	.	.
2002	1677	67	680411	1	1	666	.	34	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	226	38	1	.	3	26	.	.	31	.	.
2003	1678	26	680413	1	1	365	.	9E	625	.	.	.	.	0	-	.	.	1	.	3	15	.	.	3	2	6
2004	1679	61	680413	1	1	365	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	0	-	.	.	1	.	3	15	.	.	3	2	6
2005	1680	11	680414	1	2	365	.	1E	652	.	.	.	.	0	0	.	.	1	.	3	18	.	.	18	.	.
2006	1681	81	680701	1	1	2	.	43	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	56001	40	1	.	3	18	.	.	18	.	.
2007	1682	81	680701	1	1	2	.	43	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	56001	39	1	.	3	42	.	.	17	3	2
2008	1683	31	680701	1	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	36528	47	1	.	2	205	.	.	.	.	.
2009	1684	94	680702	1	1	2	.	68	365	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	1	.	2	205	.	.	.	.	.



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OBS	ID	THENE	DATE	N	P	DIACT	SPACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDTR	SPINT	EPCT	TONB	OSBR	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EXP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
2010	1684	95	680702	1	1	365	2	40	365	.	.	.	.	0	3	36528	47	1	.	2	205	.	1	1	10	.
2011	1684	96	680702	1	1	2	.	20	365	.	.	.	.	0	0	227	40	1	.	3	205	.	1	1	11	.
2012	1685	37	680702	1	1	365	.	32	365	.	.	.	.	0	0	287	47	1	.	3	18	.	1	1	5	2
2013	1686	81	680704	1	1	2	6	51	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	64014	39	1	.	3	30	2	.	.	.	.
2014	1637	11	680704	1	1	365	.	16	651	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	38	1	.	3	36	9	1	.	.	.
2015	1688	11	680705	1	1	651	1	18	365	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	25	1	.	1	400	.	1	.	.	.
2016	1689	11	680705	1	1	651	1	21	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	214	38	1	.	1	741	.	1	.	.	.
2017	1690	41	680705	1	2	2	.	51	795	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	38	1	.	2	65	2	.	.	.	.
2018	1691	11	680706	1	1	651	1	21	365	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	25	1	.	1	1477	.	.	.	.	.
2019	1692	11	680707	1	1	651	1	21	365	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	25	1	.	1	817	.	.	.	.	.
2020	1693	81	680707	1	1	394	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	213	37	1	.	3	70	20	.	.	.	.
2021	1694	61	680707	1	1	365	.	22	10	.	.	.	.	0	2	233	38	1	.	3	130	1	3	2	4	.
2022	1695	94	680707	1	1	651	1	21	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	25	1	.	1	530	2	1	.	.	.
2023	1696	11	680708	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	37	1	.	2	40	20	.	.	.	.
2024	1697	81	680708	1	1	2	.	52	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	37	1	.	2	40	20	.	.	.	.
2025	1698	81	680708	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	25	5	.	4	160	20	.	.	.	.
2026	1699	81	680709	1	1	651	1	21	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	25	1	.	1	324	20	.	.	.	.
2027	1700	11	680709	1	1	2	1	21	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	40	1	.	1	160	20	.	.	.	.
2028	1701	81	680709	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	36514	40	1	.	3	15	20	.	.	.	.
2029	1702	81	680709	1	2	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	69029	38	1	.	4	108	20	.	.	.	.
2030	1703	81	680709	1	5	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	10	1	.	25	1	.	1	116	.	.	.	.	.
2031	1704	11	680710	1	1	651	7	19	365	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	25	1	.	1	240	.	.	.	.	.
2032	1705	11	680710	1	1	650	12	1	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	214	38	1	.	1	110	2	.	.	.	.
2033	1706	81	680710	1	1	2	.	51	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	36580	41	1	.	2	30	20	.	.	.	.
2034	1707	81	680710	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	232	37	1	.	3	36	2	.	.	.	.
2035	1708	94	680710	1	1	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	37	1	.	3	20	10	.	.	.	.
2036	1709	31	680710	1	2	365	.	1	625	.	.	.	.	0	.	36531	47	1	.	1	40	20	.	.	.	.
2037	1710	81	680710	1	2	365	.	42	651	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	25	1	.	2	32	.	.	.	.	.
2038	1711	81	680711	1	1	365	.	16	651	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	25	1	.	1	62	.	.	.	.	.
2039	1712	11	680711	1	1	651	7	19	651	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	38	1	.	3	24	.	.	.	.	.
2040	1713	81	680711	1	1	365	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	20001	47	1	.	3	40	20	.	.	.	.
2041	1714	81	680711	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	260	38	1	.	3	36	2	.	.	.	.
2042	1715	81	680711	1	1	2	.	52	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	64035	47	1	.	3	25	.	.	.	.	.
2043	1716	41	680711	1	2	640	9	6	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	3	24	.	.	.	.	.
2044	1717	61	680711	1	2	396	.	22	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	3	25	.	.	.	.	.
2045	1718	11	680712	1	1	651	7	19	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	2	24	.	.	.	.	.
2046	1719	94	680712	1	2	2	2	16	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	228	49	1	.	3	30	.	.	.	.	.
2047	1720	81	680712	1	2	2	.	12	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	65131	38	1	.	3	18	.	.	.	.	.
2048	1721	11	680713	1	1	651	7	19	365	.	.	.	.	0	1	39413	47	1	.	2	80	.	.	.	.	.
2049	1722	61	680713	1	2	394	.	22	315	.	.	.	.	0	.	36580	39	1	.	2	25	.	.	.	.	.
2050	1723	61	680713	1	2	394	.	22	10	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	38	1	.	3	20	.	.	.	.	.
2051	1724	61	680716	1	2	394	.	22	265	.	.	.	.	0	.	36533	41	1	.	3	42	1	2	2	8	.
2052	1725	31	680717	1	1	365	.	35	.	.	.	.	.	0	.	31018	40	1	.	3	18	.	.	.	.	.
2053	1726	61	680717	1	1	365	.	22	310	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	3	25	24	4	1	2	8
2054	1727	31	680817	1	1	2	13	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	3	25	7	2	9	1	2
2055	1727	32	680817	1	1	2	13	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	3	25	7	2	9	1	2
2056	1728	41	680817	1	1	2	13	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	2	232	38	1	.	3	25	7	2	9	1	2
2057	1729	81	680820	1	2	2	6	16	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	235	25	1	.	3	20	2	.	.	.	.
2058	1730	81	680821	1	1	2	9	16	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	64014	37	1	.	3	20	2	.	.	.	.
2059	1731	11	680821	1	1	640	.	17	625	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	42	1	.	3	20	2	.	.	.	.
2060	1732	81	680827	1	7	365	.	43	625	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	47	1	.	3	20	2	.	.	.	.
2061	1733	81	680828	1	1	2	9	16	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	37	1	.	3	60	2	.	.	.	.
2062	1734	81	680830	1	1	2	9	16	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	37	1	.	3	35	2	.	.	.	.

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OBS	ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	DIAC	SPACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDTR	SPINT	EPCT	TOHE	OBSE	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EXP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
2063	1735	91	680830	1	1	394	.	69	315	.	.	.	.	0	.	.	24	2	.	.	2039	.	.	.	.	.
2064	1736	11	680830	1	2	640	9	17	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	.	25	.	.	.	.	.
2065	1737	81	680831	1	1	365	.	42	671	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	.	30	.	.	.	.	.
2066	1738	94	681206	1	2	365	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	.	30	.	.	.	.	.
2067	1739	61	681207	1	2	365	.	35	336	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	41	1	.	.	60	.	.	.	.	.
2068	1740	82	681207	1	5	365	.	25	693	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	.	5	.	.	104	.	.	.	.	.
2069	1741	61	681208	1	2	396	.	22	255	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	.	118	.	.	.	.	.
2070	1742	61	681208	1	2	396	.	35	336	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	.	118	.	.	.	.	.
2071	1743	81	681207	1	5	2	.	25	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	.	5	.	.	104	.	.	.	.	.
2072	1743	61	681209	1	1	2	.	35	336	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	.	65	.	.	.	.	.
2073	1743	62	681209	1	1	2	.	35	336	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	.	65	.	.	.	.	.
2074	1744	61	681210	1	1	2	.	35	336	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	.	30	.	.	.	.	.
2075	1745	94	681211	1	2	365	.	59	336	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	.	75	.	.	.	.	.
2076	1746	61	681211	1	2	365	.	7	335	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	49	1	.	.	20	.	.	.	.	.
2077	1747	81	681211	1	2	365	1	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	49	1	.	.	25	.	.	.	.	.
2078	1748	61	681212	1	1	365	.	35	336	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	.	24	.	.	.	.	.
2079	1748	62	681212	1	1	365	.	35	336	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	.	24	.	.	.	.	.
2080	1748	63	681212	1	1	365	.	35	336	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	.	24	.	.	.	.	.
2081	1749	94	681212	1	2	365	.	59	336	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	.	35	.	.	.	.	.
2082	1750	61	681213	1	1	365	.	8	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	37	1	.	.	48	.	.	.	.	.
2083	1750	62	681213	1	1	365	.	8	335	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	37	1	.	.	48	.	.	.	.	.
2084	1751	61	681213	1	2	365	.	35	336	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	.	20	.	.	.	.	.
2085	1752	94	681213	1	4	3	.	66	335	.	.	.	.	1	2	.	24	2	.	.	1605	.	.	.	.	.
2086	1752	62	681213	1	4	3	.	35	335	.	.	.	.	1	2	.	24	2	.	.	1605	.	.	.	.	.
2087	1753	81	681216	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	.	30	.	.	.	.	.
2088	1754	81	681217	1	1	2	.	46	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	.	18	.	.	.	.	.
2089	1755	26	681220	1	1	731	.	95	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	24	1	.	.	20	.	.	.	.	.
2090	1756	81	681220	1	2	2	6	16	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	47	1	.	.	343	.	.	.	.	.
2091	1757	37	681220	1	1	2	.	35	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	24	2	.	.	981	.	.	.	.	.
2092	1758	37	681220	1	3	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	47	1	.	.	800	.	.	.	.	.
2093	1759	37	681222	1	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	47	1	.	.	900	.	.	.	.	.
2094	1760	37	681223	1	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	39	1	.	.	80	.	.	.	.	.
2095	1761	26	681223	1	1	731	.	99	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	24	1	.	.	820	.	.	.	.	.
2096	1762	31	681223	1	6	200	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	24	2	.	.	21	.	.	.	.	.
2097	1762	32	681223	1	6	220	.	56	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	24	2	.	.	21	.	.	.	.	.
2098	1763	37	681224	1	1	2	.	98	2	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	47	1	.	.	835	.	.	.	.	.
2099	1764	26	681224	1	1	731	.	98	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	.	234	.	.	.	.	.
2100	1765	37	681224	1	3	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	24	2	.	.	883	.	.	.	.	.
2101	1766	37	681225	1	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	5	.	.	100	.	.	.	.	.
2102	1767	37	681225	1	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	5	.	.	904	.	.	.	.	.
2103	1768	26	681225	1	2	731	.	98	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	47	1	.	.	167	.	.	.	.	.
2104	1769	37	681225	1	3	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	24	1	.	.	798	.	.	.	.	.
2105	1770	37	681226	1	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	47	1	.	.	30	.	.	.	.	.
2106	1771	81	681226	1	1	365	3	40	663	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	24	2	.	.	1075	.	.	.	.	.
2107	1772	37	681226	1	3	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	5	.	.	492	.	.	.	.	.
2108	1773	37	681227	1	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	5	.	.	100	.	.	.	.	.
2109	1774	37	681227	1	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	5	.	.	1686	.	.	.	.	.
2110	1775	37	681227	1	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	.	5	.	.	104	.	.	.	.	.
2111	1776	81	681227	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	10	1	.	38	1	.	.	206	.	.	.	.	.
2112	1777	81	681229	1	1	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	24	1	.	.	120	.	.	.	.	.
2113	1778	81	681229	1	5	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	37	1	.	.	24	.	.	.	.	.
2114	1779	81	681230	1	1	365	.	51	651	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	47	1	.	.	243	.	.	.	.	.
2115	1780	37	681231	1	1	2	.	33	.	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	47	1	.	.	243	.	.	.	.	.

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Obs	ID	THRE	DATE	N	P	DIACT	SPACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDTR	SPINT	EFTCT	TOPE	ORSR	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZE	EQP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
2116	1761	81	670101	1	1	2		42	663					10	2	201	38	1		3	25					
2117	1762	11	670102	1	5	645		18	2					0	2	64530	39	1		3	15					
2118	1763	37	670108	1	4	3		66	200					0	2		39	1		2	61					
2119	1764	81	650301	1	4	2	5	46	666					10	2	66614	39	1		1	355					
2120	1765	81	650301	1	4	2		52	663	670				0	2	214	39	1		3	20					
2121	1766	31	650301	1	5	2		33						0	2		49	1		3	25					
2122	1767	81	650301	1	1	2		46	666					0	2	66611	39	1		2	164					
2123	1768	81	650301	1	4	2		51	663	670				0	2	260		1		3	35					
2124	1769	81	650302	1	8	2	5	46	666					0	1			5		4	105					
2125	1790	81	650303	1	1	2	5	46	666					10	1	66614		1		4	438					
2126	1791	81	650304	1	1	2		46	666					10	1	66601		1		2	1625					
2127	1792	81	650305	1	9	2	5	46	666					10	1		24	1		1	1625					
2128	1792	82	650305	1	9	2		52	670					0	1		24	2		1	1625					
2129	1793	94	650305	1	10	3		45						1	2	230		2		3	165					
2130	1794	81	650307	1	1	666		49						10	1		25	2		3	90					
2131	1795	26	650308	1	4	2		96	817					0	2	213	24	5		2	187					
2132	1796	91	650309	1	4	2		30	816					0	2		25	1		4	80					
2133	1797	26	650309	1	4	2		96	817					0	2		47	1		3	77					
2134	1798	11	650311	1	1	365		18	651					0	2			1		3	20					
2135	1799	11	650312	1	1	365		18						0	2			1		3	25					
2136	1800	94	631108	5	7	2	6	59						0	2	232	39	1		2	54					
2137	1801	41	631109	5	6	620	1	6	2					0	2		38	1		3	20					
2138	1803	94	670515	1	4	2		20	365					0	3			1		1	180					
2139	1804	11	670516	1	1	2		51	660					0	1		42	1		3	15					



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[illegible]

DBS	ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	DICT	SPACE	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDR	SPINT	EPCT	TOE	ORSR	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SLZ	EXP	Q1	Q2	Q3
1169	1833	94	670505	1	10	2		2C	365	215				0	2										
1170	1834	61	670606	1	1	2		35	335					0	1										
1171	1835	4	670606	1	1	365		45	666					0											
1172	1836	91	670607	1	1			30	693					0	1										
1173	1836	92	670607	1	1	2		3C	693					0	1										
1174	1837	91	670607	1	1	2		30	651					0	1										
1175	1838	61	670607	1	1	2		35	335					0	1										
1176	1839	91	670607	1	1	2		30	651	663				0	1										
1177	1840	91	670607	1	4	2		30	651	663				0	1										
1178	1850	26	670607	1	4	2		98	666					0	1										
1179	1851	1	670607	1	4	2		53	651	663				0	1										
1180	1852	61	670607	1	4	2		35	620					0	1										
1181	1853	91	670608	1	1	2		35	651	663				0	1										
1182	1854	81	670608	1	1	2		45	666					0	1										
1183	1855	97	670608	1	2	2		62						0	1										
1184	1856	61	670608	1	2	2		35	335					0	1										
1185	1857	91	670609	1	1	2		30	651	663				0	1										
1186	1858	91	670609	1	1	2		30	651	663				0	1										
1187	1859	61	670609	1	1	666		35	335					0	1										
1188	1860	81	670609	1	1	2		45	666					0	1										
1189	1861	61	670609	1	2	2		35	335					0	1										
1190	1862	61	670609	1	2	365		35	335					0	1										
1191	1863	41	670609	1	4	2		30	666	620				0	1										
1192	1864	91	670610	1	2	666		30	666					0	1										
1193	1865	91	670613	1	1	666		53	651	666				0	1										
1194	1866	1	670613	1	1	2		32						0	1										
1195	1867	31	670615	1	1	365		4	620					0	2				</						



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OBS	ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	DIAC	SPAC	ACTICN	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDTB	SPIWT	EPCT	TOBE	CHSR	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	KOP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
C	2222	1694	1	680125	5	5	2	53	731					0	2	73118	38	1		4	170	9				
	2223	1695	91	680126	5	1	731	31	2					0	2		49	1		2	455	9				
	2224	1696	97	680126	5	1	2	62						0	2		49	1		2	36	2				
	2225	1697	91	680126	5	1	2	51	710					0	2			5		4	180					
	2226	1698	92	680126	5	1	731	31	2					0	2			5		4	180					
	2227	1698	11	680126	5	4	365	18	651					0	2		42	1		3	15	1				
	2228	1699	97	680126	5	5	2	62						0	2		49	1		2	294	2				
	2229	1900	61	680126	5	5	2	35	950					0	2		49	1		2	117	16	4	5	1	5
	2230	1901	1	680128	5	1	365	53	2	950				0	2		213	1		2	88	9				
	2231	1902	91	680128	5	1	731	31	2					0	2		213	1		2	15	9				
	2232	1902	92	680128	5	1	365	31	2					0	2		38	1		2	25	3				
	2233	1903	81	680128	5	7	625	46	365					0	2		38	1		3	180					
	2234	1904	51	680129	5	1	2	49	731					0	2		39	5		4	80	2				
	2235	1905	81	680129	5	4	2	16	666					0	1			7		2	162					
	2236	1906	97	680130	5	1	2	35	950					0	2			1		2	237	10	4	3	1	5
	2237	1907	61	680130	5	1	2	35	950					0	2		287	1		2	326	9	4	3	1	5
	2238	1907	62	680130	5	1	2	35	950					0	2			1		2	326	9	4	3	1	5
	2239	1908	94	680130	5	5	2	64						0	2		49	1		2	326	9	4	3	1	5
	2240	1909	81	680201	5	1	365	66	625					0	0		39	1		3	40					
	2241	1910	61	680201	5	8	365	66	335					0	0		49	1		3	50					
	2242	1911	81	680203	5	4	365	45	671					0	0		49	1		2	119					
	2243	1912	81	680204	5	6	671	19	365					101	3		39	1		3	35					
	2244	1913	94	680204	5	5	2	56	335					100	3		24	2		5	568					
	2245	1914	61	680204	5	5	3	66	335					1000	2		24	2		5	568					
	2246	1915	61	680204	5	5	365	7	335					0	0		39	1		3	30					
	2247	1916	81	680208	5	8	365	19	671					0	0		42	1		2	25					
	2248	1917	11	680213	5	1	365	16	651					0	0		38	1		3	15					
	2249	1918	81	680214	5	4	365	19	671					0	0		49	1		3	40					
	2250	1919	26	680214	5	5	2	99	817					0	2		49	1		1	108					
	2251	1920	81	680215	5	1	365	42	625					10	3		49	1		2	360	2		19	18	
	2252	1921	82	680215	5	4	365	46	625					0	0		49	1		2	78					
	2253	1922	11	680408	5	6	365	18	651					0	0		42	1		3	25					
	2254	1923	11	680410	5	8	365	18	652	652				0	0		38	1		2	114	1				
	2255	1924	11	680412	5	4	365	18	652					0	0			1		7	182	1		1		
	2257	1925	11	680412	5	4	365	35	335					0	0		39	1		3	20					
	2258	1926	61	680412	5	4	365	35	335					0	0		40	1		3	40					
	2259	1927	81	680413	5	4	365	48	625					0	0		39	1		3	30					
	2260	1928	61	680413	5	4	365	35	335					0	0		40	1		3	30					
	2261	1929	81	680414	5	6	365	43	615					10	0		37	1		3	45					
	2262	1930	11	680701	5	1	365	43	615					0	0		38	1		3	50					
	2263	1931	81	680701	5	4	2	43	663					0	2		40	1		3	35					
	2264	1932	81	680701	5	4	2	43	666					0	2		40	1		3	15					
	2265	1933	94	680702	5	5	2	68	365	200				0	3		49	1		7	247					
	2266	1934	94	680702	5	5	2	66	365	200				0	3		49	1		2	213					
	2267	1935	94	680702	5	5	2	40	365					0	3		49	1		2	122					
	2268	1936	94	680702	5	5	365	40						0	3		49	1		2	60					
	2269	1937	11	680703	5	1	651	18	365					0	0		37	1		2	310					
	2270	1937	82	680703	5	1	365	18	651					10	0		37	1		2	310					
	2271	1938	11	680703	5	1	365	18	651					0	0		37	1		2	75					
	2272	1939	81	680703	5	1	365	48	651	652	645	666	14	0	1		37	1		3	45					
	2273	1940	81	680703	5	1	2	25	666				27	0	1		39	1		3	45					
	2274	1941	31	680704	5	5	2	17						0	2			1		3	40					

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OBS	ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	DIRECT	SPACE	ACTION	TAK1	TAK2	TAK3	INDE	SPINT	EPCT	TOPE	ORSE	DSOUR	PRES	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EXP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
2275	1942	11	680705	5	1	651	1	16	365					0												
2276	1942	82	680705	5	1	365		41	651					0		36514	49	1			2095	5				
2277	1943	11	680706	5	1	651	1	21	365					0				1			50					
2278	1944	11	680706	5	4	651	1	21	365					0		36541	49	1			768					
2279	1945	11	680707	5	1	651	1	21	365					0				1			972					
2280	1946	81	680707	5	1	651	1	42	666					0	1	213	49	1			200					
2281	1947	11	680708	5	4	651	1	21	365					0		65127	39	1			157	20				
2282	1948	81	680708	5	8	651	1	42	666					10	1	214	49	1			221					
2283	1949	81	680708	5	8	651	1	42	666					0	1	69029	50	1			178	20				
2284	1950	11	680709	5	1	651	1	21	365					0				1			35	20				
2285	1951	81	680710	5	4	651	1	42	625					0		36531	39	1			60					
2286	1952	11	680710	5	8	651	1	21	365					0				1			40	10				
2287	1953	11	680711	5	1	651	1	21	365					0		22040	49	8			365					
2288	1954	81	680711	5	4	651	1	16	651					0		22040	49	1			685					
2289	1955	81	680711	5	4	651	1	42	666					0	1	65131	49	1			50					
2290	1956	61	680713	5	5	394	2	22	315					0		36541	49	1			100	20				
2291	1957	61	680713	5	5	394	2	22	10					0		36541	49	1			96					
2292	1958	31	680717	5	10	2		33						0	3			1			75					
2293	1958	32	680717	5	10	2		33						0	3			1			117					
2294	1959	11	680718	5	8	625		18	365					0				1			117					
2295	1959	82	680718	5	4	625		15	365					0				1			25					
2296	1960	1	680719	5	4	365	6	53	2					0	2	232	49	1			80					
2297	1961	81	680719	5	4	365		16	666					1010	1	232	49	1			10	2				
2298	1962	47	680719	5	4	365		66	651					1000	2	232	49	1			20					
2299	1963	94	680720	5	5	2		56	365					0	2	219	49	1			110					
2300	1964	91	680722	5	1	365		30	315					0				5			270					
2301	1965	91	680722	5	1	365		30	315					0		66013		1			353					
2302	1965	92	680822	5	1	365		30	315					0		66035		1			90					
2303	1966	91	680822	5	1	365		30	315					0	1		24	5			76					
2304	1967	91	680822	5	1	365		30	315					0	1		24	5			76					
2305	1968	91	680822	5	1	365		30	315					0			24	5			76					
2306	1969	61	680822	5	4	394		22						0		36582	47	5			50					
2307	1970	91	680823	5	1	365		30	315					0			24	5			76					
2308	1971	91	680823	5	1	365		30	315					0			24	5			76					
2309	1972	91	680823	5	1	365		30	315					0	1		24	5			90					
2310	1973	91	680823	5	2	365		30	315					0		66013		1			115					
2311	1974	51	680823	5	4	365		30	315					0		64501	49	1			60					
2312	1975	91	680824	5	1	365		30	315					0				5			180					
2313	1976	91	680824	5	8	365		30	315					0		64527	49	1			102					
2314	1977	91	680824	5	8	365		30	315					0		66301	49	1			48					
2315	1978	91	680824	5	8	365		30	315					0	1		49	1			18					
2316	1979	91	680825	5	1	365		30	315					0	1		24	5			90					
2317	1980	91	680825	5	1	365		30	315					0			24	5			90					
2318	1981	91	680826	5	8	365		30	315					0		67111	49	1			35					
2319	1982	67	750822	5	13	666		32	666					0	2	202	49	1			75					
2320	1983	81	750822	5	1	2		40						0	2	229	49	1			30	23				
2321	1984	26	750827	5	11	396		17	651					0	2	35014	38	1			50					
2322	1985	61	750828	5	11	396		22						0	2	214	38	1			150					
2323	1986	26	750829	5	13	2		97	651					0	2	66628	38	1			125					
2324	1987	26	750830	5	12	2		97	651					0	2	232	37	1			70					
2325	1988	81	751004	5	5	2		51	666					0	2	232	49	1			110					
2326	1989	26	751004	5	5	2		95	651					0	2			1			80					
2327	1990	81	751004	5	5	2		25	666					0	1	67029	50	1								

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OBS	ID	THRM	DATE	N	P	DIAC	SPACT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDR	SPINT	EFT	TONE	ORSR	DSOUR	PREB	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	LUP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
2328	1991	81	751004	5	5	2	6	42	640	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	37	1	.	3	60	.	.	.	.	.
2329	1992	81	751008	5	5	2	.	51	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	.	25	.	.	.	.	.
2330	1993	11	751010	5	5	165	20	118	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	120	.	.	.	.	.
2331	1994	26	751010	5	5	2	6	99	651	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	100	.	.	.	.	.
2332	1995	81	751010	5	5	2	.	46	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	42	1	.	3	60	3	.	.	.	.
2333	1996	11	751012	5	5	652	1	18	365	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	7	185	.	.	.	.	.
2334	1997	81	751014	5	5	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	3	35	23	.	.	.	.
2335	1998	11	751014	5	5	365	.	18	652	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	3	35	.	.	.	.	.
2336	1999	26	751014	5	5	2	1	68	651	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	37	1	.	3	30	.	.	.	.	.
2337	2000	81	751023	5	7	2	3	44	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	35	.	.	.	.	.
2338	2001	81	751023	5	7	2	.	44	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	25	.	.	.	.	.
2339	2002	81	751027	5	1	2	.	52	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	245	.	.	.	.	.
2340	2003	81	751027	5	5	365	.	43	652	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	2	55	2	.	.	.	.
2341	2004	47	751027	5	5	651	1	66	652	.	.	.	.	0	3	.	40	1	.	2	15	.	.	.	.	.
2342	2005	81	751028	5	8	2	.	21	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	25	1	.	2	60	.	.	.	.	.
2343	2006	81	751107	5	7	365	.	44	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	3	40	.	.	.	.	.
2344	2007	81	751127	5	7	2	.	42	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	3	80	.	.	.	.	.
2345	2008	81	751128	5	7	2	13	42	630	600	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	30	26	.	.	.	.
2346	2009	81	751202	5	7	365	.	48	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	70	.	.	.	.	.
2347	2010	26	751202	5	7	2	.	98	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	36580	1	.	2	40	.	.	.	.	.
2348	2011	81	751207	5	7	2	.	42	630	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	37	1	.	7	90	2	.	.	.	.
2349	2012	81	751211	5	8	2	.	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	49	1	.	3	35	2	.	.	.	.
2350	2013	81	751214	5	5	365	.	43	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2006	5	.	.	.	.	.
2351	2014	81	751217	5	8	2	6	48	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	2	45	.	.	.	.	.
2352	2015	81	751217	5	8	2	.	48	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	65	.	.	.	.	.
2353	2016	81	751218	5	5	365	.	43	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	80	.	.	.	.	.
2354	2017	81	751220	5	5	666	4	46	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	227	1	.	3	120	2	.	.	.	.
2355	2018	71	751220	5	5	2	.	26	666	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	40	1	.	2	45	.	.	.	.	.
2356	2019	81	751220	5	6	2	.	48	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	2	40	.	.	.	.	.
2357	2020	81	751220	5	6	2	6	17	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	260	1	.	2	80	.	.	.	.	.
2358	2021	26	751221	5	5	365	.	98	652	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	213	1	.	2	40	.	.	.	.	.
2359	2022	81	751221	5	5	2	13	42	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	60	2	.	.	.	.
2360	2023	81	751221	5	5	2	6	17	495	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	287	1	.	2	245	.	.	.	.	.
2361	2024	26	750901	5	10	2	6	51	651	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	3	160	31	.	.	.	.
2362	2025	1	750901	5	11	365	.	53	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	2	120	.	.	.	.	.
2363	2026	26	750902	5	1	2	.	97	651	666	.	.	.	0	3	.	25	1	.	2	450	.	.	.	.	.
2364	2027	81	750902	5	10	2	6	17	663	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	38	1	.	2	124	20	.	.	.	.
2365	2028	81	750902	5	10	365	.	43	620	.	.	.	.	0	1	.	49	1	.	2	60	.	.	.	.	.
2366	2029	26	750903	5	9	2	6	51	651	666	.	.	.	0	22	.	49	5	.	2	400	2	.	.	.	.
2367	2030	26	750903	5	10	2	3	68	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	42	1	.	2	130	.	.	.	.	.
2368	2031	81	750905	5	1	2	2	64	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	25	1	.	3	60	.	.	.	.	.
2369	2032	81	750905	5	12	2	.	52	651	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	40	1	.	26	18	.	.	.	.	.
2370	2033	26	750906	5	1	2	3	40	651	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	3	125	.	.	.	.	.
2371	2034	26	750907	5	1	2	6	51	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	25	1	.	3	175	.	.	.	.	.
2372	2035	26	750909	5	12	2	3	40	651	666	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	3	140	.	.	.	.	.
2373	2036	81	750909	5	12	2	.	41	651	663	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	2	100	.	.	.	.	.
2374	2037	81	750910	5	10	2	.	46	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	213	39	.	3	300	2	.	.	.	.
2375	2038	81	750910	5	10	2	.	45	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	229	39	.	3	55	.	.	.	.	.
2376	2039	81	750912	5	12	2	6	15	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	3	85	20	.	.	.	.
2377	2040	81	750913	5	11	2	6	17	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	3	60	20	.	.	.	.
2378	2041	81	750914	5	10	2	6	51	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	39	1	.	3	145	20	.	.	.	.
2379	2042	81	750916	5	10	2	6	51	663	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	38	1	.	3	20	2	.	.	.	.
2380	2043	81	750917	5	1	2	1	40	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	.	49	1	.	2	130	.	.	.	.	.

# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SYSTEM

23:14 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977<sup>46</sup>

OBS	ID	THEME	DATE	N	P	DIAGN	SPECT	ACTION	TAR1	TAR2	TAR3	INDB	SPINT	EPCT	TOUR	ORSH	DSOUR	PKRS	ORIG	DISP	SIZ	EXP	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
2381	2044	81	750917	5	9	666	4	46	2	.	.	.	.	0	2	66630	49	1	.	.	30	2	.	23	25	.
2382	2045	81	750917	5	9	2	.	68	666	.	.	.	.	0	2	261	49	1	.	2	150	2	.	23	.	.
2383	2046	81	750922	5	7	2	.	42	663	.	.	663	22	0	2	66301	39	1	.	2	75	20	.	.	.	.
2384	2047	81	750924	5	5	2	.	43	666	.	.	2	5	0	1	214	39	1	.	2	90	4	.	.	.	.
2385	2048	81	750926	5	7	2	.	51	651	.	.	.	.	0	3	227	40	1	1	3	22	.	.	.	.	.
2386	2049	81	750926	5	7	3	.	48	235	495	.	.	.	0	2	260	40	1	.	3	80	.	.	.	.	.
2387	2050	81	750928	5	5	2	.	51	666	.	.	693	3	0	1	69927	42	1	.	2	100	2	.	23	.	.
2388	2051	81	750930	5	7	2	.	17	666	.	.	.	.	0	3	69029	41	.	2	0	1252	3	.	.	.	.

PRINT REPEATED BY OPERATOR



APPENDIX 5

CODEBOOK

AAI SR 0006-76

The Assessment  
of the  
Impact of Military Force:  
Codebook for the Force Assessment Content/  
Events Data Systems (FACES)

Edward E. Azar  
Suhaïla Haddad  
R. D. McLaurin

Abbott Associates, Inc.  
300 N. Washington St.  
Alexandria, VA 22314

January 1976

## Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION

This codebook discusses a computerized content and events data analysis system which is an outgrowth of two research efforts. Its objective is to assist in the analysis of the impact of specific types of events and developments--as stimuli--on diverse audiences (targets) as witnessed by the audience response. The two research efforts that have led to the development of this system are (1) a broad-gauged, data-based analysis of events and their impact on international cooperation and conflict and (2) a more narrowly defined effort arrived at identifying the political impact of U.S. military force developments in the Middle East.

The first of these two research programs is based at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and is an activity of the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB).<sup>1</sup> In the COPDAB approach to the study of impact, events are the unit of analysis. For each event, the date, the actor, the target, the source, the act, and the issue area are coded. On the basis of events data research performed over the past several years using COPDAB, the research team at Chapel Hill is planning the development of events data-based, computer-assisted analyses of the effects of political, economic, social, and other activities of various actors toward diverse targets.

The second research concept on which this codebook is based is systematic content analysis. Based on the PSYOP Automated Management Information System (PAMIS) Foreign Media Analysis (FMA) File, developed for the U.S.

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<sup>1</sup>For a discussion of COPDAB, its origins, development, objectives, and activities, see Edward E. Azar and Thomas J. Sloan, *A Codebook of the Conflict and Peace Data Bank* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1973), mimeo.

Department of Defense by Mr. Phillip P. Katz of the American Institutes for Research (A.I.R.), Abbott Associates, Inc., under subcontract to A.I.R. modified PAMIS/FMA programs and coding regulations to attempt the content analysis of foreign language media to measure impact.

After several attempts to use both types of data independently, it was concluded that a marriage of content analysis data and events data was the most appropriate approach and would constitute the most sensitive indicator of effect.

This coding manual is divided into two sections. The first (Chapter 2) is description and narrative constituting a set of instructions on the use of the codebook and the system. The second (Chapter 3) is in handbook form. Chapter 3 is the codebook itself and is designed for the use of the coders.



## Chapter 2. INSTRUCTIONS

Each coder works with a standard 88-column computer coding sheet and abstracting sheets. The coding instructions that follow are for the coding sheet, since the abstracting sheet requires only a free test abstract, the unique ID, and some source ID data.

### COLUMNS 1-4

Columns 1-4 are for the unique ID assigned to each article or article segment. The coding supervisor provides blocks of numbers to coders. No two articles or article segments may have the same unique ID. However, some articles or segments may be double-coded, as succeeding sections will show.

### COLUMNS 5-6

The theme of the article is coded in columns 5 and 6. The themes may be varied depending upon the purposes of the research subject. Codes terminating -1, -4, and -7 are for the first coding of an article. If an article is double-coded (see below), the theme codes end in -2, -5, or -8. Similarly, if an article is triple-coded more than three times, the theme codes will terminate in -3, -6, or -9.

### Segmenting

In many cases, articles will deal with two or more themes, two or more direct actors, four or more direct targets, or the like, in a significant manner. If possible, the coder should segment such articles, that is, divide the article into discrete elements and code each separately. (Note that segmenting will require special treatment in columns 54 and 55-58.)

- 01-02-03    Intelligence  
            Data pertaining to military intelligence collection technology/  
            action.
- 04-05-06    Military Intervention  
            Data pertaining to domestic superpower discussions of actual  
            or potential overseas military intervention.
- 11-12-13    Visits  
            Data pertaining to visits of military/naval units, personnel, etc.
- 21-22-23    Manpower  
            Data pertaining to superpower military manpower. E.g.: quality,  
            quantity, etc.
- 26-27-28    Sending of Civilian/Military Personnel  
            Data pertaining to the use of superpower civilian or military  
            personnel in quasi- or semi-military roles. E.g., UNDOF  
            civilian technicians, peacekeeping forces.
- 31-32-33    Weapons Development/Performance  
            Data pertaining to weapons systems originating outside the  
            region. Includes RDT&E, deployment, performance characteristics,  
            etc.
- 37-38-39    Technological Breakthrough  
            Data pertaining to science and technology developments relevant  
            to military affairs.
- 41-42-43    Bases  
            Data pertaining to military bases within or near the Middle East.
- 47-48-49    Military Missions  
            Data pertaining to military assistance advisory groups, other  
            superpower military missions, and the like.
- 51-52-53    Threats  
            Data pertaining to explicitly threatened superpower military  
            action.
- 61-62-63    Maneuvers, Games, Movements, Deployments  
            Data pertaining to superpower military maneuvers, games, move-  
            ments, and deployments.
- 67-68-69    Assistance (Non-military assistance)  
            Data pertaining to the provision or proffer of assistance of a  
            quasi-military nature by a superpower.

## 71-72-73    Airlift/Sealift

Data pertaining to superpower airlift/sealift capabilities, operations, etc.

## 81-82-83    Military Assistance and Sales

Data pertaining to the sale or other transfer of weapons systems to regional Middle Eastern states and data pertaining to the provision of security assistance to regional Middle Eastern states.

## 91-92-93    Military Operations

Data pertaining to superpower military operations with relevance to the Middle East.

## 94-95-96    U.S.-Soviet Strategic Balance

Data pertaining to the local or global military balance between the superpowers, including human and material resources, interactions, will, capabilities, force structure, etc.

## 97-98-99    Recalls, Alerts, etc.

Data pertaining to certain actions involving superpower military readiness status.

COLUMNS 7-12

The date of the source (newspaper or other media) is coded in columns 7-12, with the year occupying columns 7 and 8, the month columns 9 and 10, and the day columns 11 and 12. If only some of the date is known, other elements should be left blank.

COLUMNS 13-14

Source identification is effected in the next two columns.

COLUMNS 15-16

Similarly, columns 15-16 are for the page in the source document.

COLUMNS 17-19

Columns 17, 18, and 19 hold the Direct Actor identification. The direct actor/theme country codes are presented in the list of "Sovereign States and Territories" appended to the codebook. One of these codes must be selected as the Direct Actor (or theme country). If more than one Direct Actor are needed, the coder should double-code.

COLUMNS 20-21

The Specific Direct Actor in columns 20-21 is the individual personally identified with the action of the Direct Actor. Clearly, only some types of action are appropriate for Specific Direct Actors. Although rare, double-coding may be used here.

COLUMNS 22-25

Columns 22 to 25 are for the action. Normally, columns 22 and 23 are used for (grammatically or substantively) auxiliary words and phrases, columns 24 and 25 for the basic actions. In some analyses, only two columns will be necessary.



Actions should be sufficiently detailed and precise to allow coders to readily choose the most appropriate descriptors. In this system, it is the analyst's job to determine the aggregation of actions most appropriate to the specific analysis.

COLUMNS 26-28, 29-31, 32-34

The Direct Target in Columns 26 to 28 uses the same country codes as the Direct Actor (Theme Country). The system provides for up to three Direct Targets. If more are needed, double-coding is permitted.

Some actions are worded in such a manner (through use of the passive voice) that the "actor" can be viewed as the Direct Target. This technique is to be used only to the extent it facilitates analysis. For that reason, it is project-specific and will be discussed in more detail by the coding supervisor.

COLUMNS 35-37

In many cases, a media "event" is in fact a comment on, description of or reaction to a previous action. In these instances the country reacting is the Indirect Actor. The Indirect Actor field uses the same country codes as the Direct Actor and Direct Targets, and may be double-coded if necessary. While the Indirect Actor is usually different from the Actor or Targets, this situation does not always apply. Sometimes an element within the Actor or Target may "oppose" or "support" the action. In such a case, clearly the Indirect Actor would be the same as the Actor or Target.

COLUMNS 38-39

The Specific Indirect Actor in columns 38 and 39 enjoys the same relationship to the Indirect Actor as the Specific Direct Actor has with respect to

the Direct Actor. Coders will indicate in this column who in the Indirect Actor country carried out the response. As with columns 20 and 21 (Specific Direct Actor), it is not necessary that there be a Specific Indirect Actor each time there is an Indirect Actor. Whether coders should enter a Specific Direct Actor depends largely upon the nature of the "indirect action."

#### COLUMNS 40-43

Columns 40, 41, 42, and 43 gauge explicit effect, i.e., effects described in the source. These columns may be scaled using a thesaurus of words and phrases assessed as relevant (similar to the General Inquirer) or they may be dichotomous. Alternatively they may be "trichotomous." Specific "effects" depend upon the focus of the system. Please refer to the insert page following.

For FACES, effects are to be coded as follows: "1" (yes) if the article or article segment being coded explicitly indicates that the action will have an effect specified in the question; "2" (no) if the article or article segment explicitly indicates that the action will not have the specified effect; "0" (no mention) if the article explicitly states neither.

Column 40 investigates the action's impact on the local superpower military balance, i.e., the balance of Soviet and U.S. forces in the Mediterranean and Middle East area. Will the action have an effect on that regional balance?

The effect on local superpower military capabilities is addressed in column 41. By this question it is meant to determine whether the article explicitly identifies an impact of the action on the regional military capabilities of the United States or the Soviet Union. The action could enhance one superpower's military capabilities, for example, without having any impact on the superpower balance.

Column 42 is concerned with the military balance of regional states. This is not necessarily limited to the Arab-Israeli conflict. A given action may affect the Iran-Iraq military balance. If the article or article segment coded so states, column 42 would be coded "1."

The final "effect," dealt with in column 43, is the question of the action's impact on the global military balance. Here, for the purposes of FACES, we are in fact concerned with the global superpower balance, not other global balance issues (such as U.S.S.R.--Western Europe or U.S.S.R.--China).

COLUMN 44

The tone of the article or segment analyzed is coded in column 44. The coder is to make a judgment on the tone of the article toward the event in terms of "critical," "neutral," or "favorable." The determination of tone must take into account what the writer expected his audience's attitudes to be and how he tried to influence them. Thus, most wire service stories are neutral, most editorials critical or favorable. It is important not to code the explicit content: an article in a Soviet newspaper describing U.S. Congressional denunciation of oil prices increased by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) would probably not be coded "critical," depending upon the action. (It may be critical of Congress, but is certainly not critical of OPEC.)

COLUMNS 45-49

Columns 45-49 are for the Original Source of the story carried by a specific source. The Original Source must be distinguished both from the Specific Direct (or Indirect) Actor, on the one hand, and from the Immediate Source, on the other. We have already explained the Specific Actors, and the Immediate Source is described below (columns 50-51). The Original Source is the reporting medium that transmitted news of the event from the scene of the event to the Immediate Source. Whether general "newspaper," radio, or "news service") or specific (*Los Angeles Times*, BBC, or AP), the Original Source is the Immediate Source's source, and, as such, is frequently revealed in the story. The Original Source can also be a person, of course.

Columns 45 to 47 are the country of the Original Source. The "Sovereign States and Territories" list is used for the Original Source country. Columns 48 and 49 are for the source itself.



COLUMNS 50-51

The Immediate Source uses the same source codes as in columns 48 and 49. "Immediate Source" refers to the channel by which the article was transmitted to the publisher (newspaper, magazine). Thus, most Immediate Sources for newspapers are either foreign correspondents or news services.

COLUMN 52

By "Presentation" (column 52) is meant the nature of the material being coded: is it a news article, an analytical article, an editorial, a verbatim letter to the editor, excerpts from or a verbatim communique? Note that Presentation refers to the article itself, i.e., unless an article is a verbatim speech (or verbatim excerpts from a speech) it is not coded as a speech. If an article in a newspaper should concern a speech but is not solely the text or excerpts from the text, it is a news or analytical article.

COLUMN 53

Origin (column 53) addresses the presentation of the material in the article. Thus, a news article on a speech given by the U.S. Secretary of the Interior would have been coded as "news article" in Presentation but is coded as "speech" in Origin.

COLUMN 54

Column 54 is a measure of intensity. In column 54, Display, the coder determines and codes by the headline size. In segmented articles, Display refers only to that segment to which the headline is relevant (if any). Thus, not all articles will have entries in the Display field.

COLUMNS 55-58

The size of the material coded is indicated in columns 55 to 58. Size is to be measured in square centimeters. Coders will use a template for this purpose. If an article or article segment should exceed 9,999 cm<sup>2</sup>, the article might be coded as 8,000 cm<sup>2</sup>, the second as 7,000 cm<sup>2</sup>. In fact, however, newspapers rarely carry articles of such a length. (9,999 cm<sup>2</sup> is equal to almost six full pages of *The New York Times*.)

COLUMNS 59-80

Columns 59-80 are available for specific questions related to the subject for which the system is being used. Note that different themes, Direct Actors, Actions, or other fields can employ different types of questions applicable uniquely to certain entries within those fields. The use of columns 59-80 for this research is described on the following pages.

COLUMNS 59-60

For FACES, many articles segments will deal with specific types of weapons systems or training. When such obtains, columns 59 to 60 are to be used to identify the type of materiel or training more specifically. The specific type of equipment (e.g., M60 Tank, F-16 aircraft) should, of course, be noted in the abstract of the article. Columns 59 and 60 identify categories of equipment (e.g., air-to-surface missile, aircraft carrier, helicopter, and the like), training (CONUS, in-country), and related activities (e.g., civil action). Note that in the case of theme series 81-82-83 (military sales and security assistance), columns 63-64, 65-66, and 67-68 use the same codes as columns 59-60 in the event the equipment/training is of more than one type. If more codes are needed than can be used, double-coding in columns 59-60 (and, in themes 81-82-83, columns 63-64, 65-66, and 67-68) is possible.

COLUMNS 61-68

Columns 61-68 in FACES are reserved for questions unique to each theme. They are explained by theme below.

Themes 01-02-03-04-05-06

No specific questions are to be used in these theme series.

Theme 11-12-13

All questions under this theme series address the nature of the visit. Naval visits are coded under columns 61-62, military under columns 63-64, other ceremonial acts in connections with visits in columns 65-66, and political visits in columns 67-68. The latter is designed to deal with non-military visits relevant to military force issues.

Theme 21-22-23

The questions in this theme series merely seek to ascertain whether the event relates to qualitative or quantitative manpower matters.

Theme 26-27-28

Under this theme, columns 61-62 identify whether the personnel sent are civilian or military, and columns 63-64 give the purpose of the personnel.

Themes 31-32-33-37-38-39

For both theme series, columns 61-62 are for the type of system or technology (ground, air, naval, space), and columns 63-64 the type of military forces to which the development is applicable. In columns 65 and 66, the coder enters the development or improvement area (firepower, speed, etc.); in columns 67 and 68, whether there is a lag explicitly mentioned between the breakthrough or development, on the one hand, and the actual deployment of the system as developed or modified.

Theme 41-42-43

For theme series 41-42-43, columns 61-62 and 63-64 give some attributes of the base. Columns 65-66 should be used in the event the entry has an Indirect Actor that supports or opposes the action. Similarly, in columns 67-68, Direct Target agreement, approval, acceptance, or denial are coded.

Theme 51-52-53

No questions are coded under this theme series.

Theme 61-62-63

As in the theme series 41-42-43, the first two sets of columns (61-62 and 63-64) are attributes of the action. If the event took place during a crisis to which the event may have had some relevance, the coder should place an 01 in columns 65-66. If there was no relevant crisis during the time the event took place, the coder should place an 02 in these columns. Every entry must be either 01 or 02. It should also be noted that the crisis-relevance is not expected to be explicit: the coder must be provided with crisis dates so that he will be able to determine whether the event coincided with a crisis. Columns 67-68 are to be used to indicate the region in which the coded event took place.

Theme 67-68-69

Columns 61 and 62 in this theme series identify the assistance source, columns 63 and 64 the type of assistance. For these purposes, the type of assistance is sufficiently well described by themes. For example, if aid in the construction of equipping of a base were to be provided, columns 63-64 would be coded 41 (base).



Theme 71-72-73

The airlift/sealift theme, only columns 61 and 62 may be used for theme specific questions. In those columns, the coder should indicate whether the Indirect Actor supports (01) or opposes (02) the action. If there is no Indirect Actor, or if the Indirect Actor's support or opposition is not clear in or pertinent to the article, columns 61 and 62 should be left blank.

Theme 81-82-83

As we have indicated, columns 63-64, 65-66, and 67-68 in this theme series should be used to identify types of equipment or training in addition to any noted in columns 59 and 60. In columns 61 and 62, the coder should indicate whether the event involved or was related to a debate within the executive branch (01) of the supplier government, between the executive and legislative branches (02) of the supplier, or within the legislative branch (03) of the supplier government. If the event does not involve or is unrelated to any known debates of this nature, the coder should not enter anything in columns 61 or 62.

Theme 91-92-93

No questions are to be used in this theme series.

Theme 94-95-96

In this theme series, columns 61 and 62 should be used by the coder to describe the nature of the statement responding to a force development. That is, many entries under this theme series will consist of announcements, press conference statements, Congressional testimony and the like. These should be categorized as recommendations (01), observations (02), projections (03), reflections (04), or some combination of the foregoing (05, 06, 07, and 08). Recommendations are self-explanatory. Observations are statements assessing current situations or developments or trends. Projections are forecasts, usually based on trend analysis or intelligence. Reflections are observations about past developments.

Columns 63-64, 65-66, and 67-68 are used to describe the types of forces involved in the event coded. Thus, up to three discrete types may be coded without resorting to double-coding.

Theme 97-98-99

No questions are coded under this theme series.

### Chapter 3. CODEBOOK

MILITARY PERCEPTIONS PROJECTCODING MANUAL

<u>COLUMNS</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
1 - 4	I.D. unique to each article 0001 ... 9999
5 - 6	Theme 01 ... 99
7 - 12	Date YY up to 76 MM 01 to 12 DD 01 to 31
13 - 14	Source 01 ... 99
15 - 16	Page in Source 01 ... 99
17 - 19	Direct Actor 001 ... 999
20 - 21	Specific Direct Actor 01 ... 99
22 - 25	Action (Cols. 22 - 23 will have 01 ... 99 and 24 - 25 blank)
26 - 28	Direct Target 1 coded 001 ... 999
29 - 31	Direct Target 2 001 ... 999
32 - 34	Direct Target 3 001 ... 999
35 - 37	Indirect Actor 001 ... 999
38 - 39	Specific Indirect Actor 01 ... 99
40	Effect 1 ( 1, 2, or 0)
41	Effect 2 ( 1, 2, or 0)
42	Effect 3 ( 1, 2, or 0)
43	Effect 4 ( 1, 2, or 0)
44	Tone ( 1 critical; 2 neutral; 3 favorable)
45 - 49	Original Source of Story where 45 - 47 are country ref. 001 ... 999 and 48 - 49 initiator reference of 00 means none and others range from 01 to 99
50 - 51	Immediate source of story 01 to 99
52	Presentation 1 ... 9
53	Origin of statement in presentation 1 ... 9
54	Display 1 ... 9
55 - 58	Size of article in square cms. 0001 ... 9999
59 - 60	Type of Equipment 01 ... 99
61 - 62	Question 1 ( 01 ... 99 )
63 - 64	Question 2 ( 01 ... 99 )
65 - 66	Question 3 ( 01 ... 99 )
67 - 68	Question 4 ( 01 ... 99 )
69 - 80	Blank

<u>THEME</u>	THEME COLS. 5-6
<u>CODES</u>	
Intelligence	01 - 02 - 03
Subject of Military Intervention	04 - 05 - 06
Visits	11 - 12 - 13
Manpower	21 - 22 - 23
Sending of Civilian/Military Personnel	26 - 27 - 28
Weapons Development/Performance	31 - 32 - 33
Technological Breakthrough	37 - 38 - 39
Bases	41 - 42 - 43
Military Mission	47 - 48 - 49
Threats	51 - 52 - 53
Maneuvers, Games, Force Movements, Deployments	61 - 62 - 63
Provision of Some Assistance	67 - 68 - 69
Airlift/Sealift	71 - 72 - 73
Military Assistance and Sales	81 - 82 - 83
Military Operations	91 - 92 - 93
US-Soviet Strategic Balance and Defense Budget Appropriations	94 - 95 - 96
Recalls, Alerts, etc.	97 - 98 - 99

Note: When double listing an article, use the same ID No. and the second Theme code. For a third listing of the same article, use the third Theme code.



DATE  
COLS. 7 - 12

Columns 7 - 8

YY up to 76

Columns 9 - 10

MM 01 to 12

Columns 11 - 12

DD 01 to 31

NEWSPAPER SOURCE  
COLS. 13 - 14NEWSPAPER TITLECODE

Al-Ahram

01

Al-Hayat

03

Al-Nahar

05

Al-Sharq

07

SPECIFIC DIRECT ACTOR  
COLS. 20 - 21

<u>SPECIFIC DIRECT ACTOR</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Head of State	01
Head of Government	02
Foreign Minister	03
Defense Minister	04
Other Senior Member of Government	05
Member of the Legislature	06
High-ranking Political/Military Leader	07
Political Organization or Committee	08
Member of Legal Opposition Political Party or Group	09
Other Members of Illegal Opposition Groups	11
Member of Minority Group	12
Named Government Agency or Official Source at National/Provincial Level	13
Anonymous Government Agency or Official Source at National/Provincial Level	14
Worker, Soldier, Farmer, or other Citizen	15
Significant Public Personality	16
Distinguished Private Citizen	17
Artist or Writer	18
Distinguished Foreign Personality	19
Other	20
Insurgent Leader	21

ACTION  
COLS. 22 - 25ACTIONCODE

Establishes	01
Disestablishes/Terminates	02
Is Asked to Establish/Reestablish by	03
Is Asked to Disestablish by	04
Requests to Establish	05
Requests to Disestablish/Terminate	06
Increases	07
Decreases	08
Is Asked to Increase by	09
Is Asked to Decrease	10
Requests to Increase	11
Requests to Decrease	12
Changes/Modifies/Limits Use of	13
Is Asked to Change/Modify by	14
Requests to Change/Modify	15
Supports	16
Opposes	17
Visits	18
Engages in Talks with	19
Engages in Arms Control Talks with	20
Engages in High-Level Meeting with	21
Maneuvers (Military)	22
Plays Games (Military)	23
Exercises (Military)	24



ACTION (Cont.)  
COLS. 22 - 25

<u>ACTION</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Supply/Resupply (non.Spec.)	25
Supply/Resupply: Airlift	26
Supply/Resupply: Sealift	27
Bombs	28
Mines (Harbors, Ports, Rivers, etc.)	29
Raids/Attacks	30
Seizes (Vessel, Vehicle, A/C, Persons)	31
Plans to Develop/Develops	32
Tests	33
Enters into Production	34
Deploys/Considers Deployment	35
Establishes Alliance with	36
Disestablishes Alliance with	37
Guarantees	38
Is Asked to Guarantee	39
Announces/Maintains/Defends Policy	40
May be Asked for by	41
Decides to Transfer Arms to	42
Delivers Arms to	43
Suspends Arms to/Delays	44
Is Asked for MA by	45
Is Negotiating ____ for	46
Approves MA Budget for	47
Offers MA to	48
May Use Military Measure	49
Can Supply	50

ACTION (Cont.)  
COLS. 22 - 25

<u>ACTION</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Studying/Reviewing/Considering	51
Target Decides to Purchase/Request Arms	52
Observes (Intelligence Purposes)	53
Denies (Declare not to be True)	54
Considers Security Agreement with	55
More Than	56
Less Than	57
Extends/Prolongs	58
Authorizes/Appropriates	59
Supports Military Intervention	60
Opposes Military Intervention	61
Alerts, etc.	62
Operates Effectively (Weapons Performance in General)	63
Requests Appropriation/Authorization	64
Recruits	65
Maintains, i.e., bases	66
Ratifies, i.e., treaties	67
Signs, i.e., agreements/bills	68
Intervenes	69
Is Asked/Expected to Send	97
Sends	98
Will Send	99

SPECIFIC INDIRECT ACTOR  
COLS. 38 - 39

<u>SPECIFIC INDIRECT ACTOR</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Head of State	01
Head of Government	02
Foreign Minister	03
Defense Minister	04
Other Senior Member of Government	05
Member of the Legislature	06
High-ranking Political/Military Leader	07
Political Organization or Committee	08
Member of Legal Opposition Political Party or Group	09
Other Members of Illegal Opposition Groups	11
Member of Minority Group	12
Named Government Agency or Official Source at National/Provincial Level	13
Anonymous Government Agency or Official Source at National/Provincial Level	14
Worker, Soldier, Farmer, or other Citizen	15
Significant Public Personality	16
Distinguished Private Citizen	17
Artist or Writer	18
Distinguished Foreign Personality	19
Other	20
Insurgent Leader	21

SPECIFIC INDIRECT ACTOR (Cont.)  
COLS. 38 - 39

<u>SPECIFIC INDIRECT ACTOR</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Newspaper	22
Magazine/Journal/Publication	23
Pamphlet/Poster/Leaflet	24
Book	25
Letter	26
Radio (International) i.e., VOA, BBC, Radio Moscow, etc., or Radio (Domestic)	27
Commercial Record (Disk) or Tape Recording	28
Film	29
Television	30
News (Wire) Service	31



COLS. 40 - 43

CODE

Col. 40: Effect on Local Superpower Balance

1 Yes  
2 No  
0 .

Col. 41: Effect on Local Superpower Capabilities

1 Yes  
2 No  
0

Col. 42: Effect on Local Military Balance

1 Yes  
2 No  
0

Col. 43: Effect on Global Military Balance

1 Yes  
2 No  
0

TONE  
COL. 44

TONECODE

Critical

1

Neutral

2

Favorable

3

DEFINITIONS

Code as "Critical" if the item reflects discredit on the legally constituted authorities or ruling circles of the country, on the people, or the country in general.

Code as "Neutral" if the tone of the article is predominantly neutral or balanced.

Code as "Favorable" if the item reflects credit or favorable treatment of the legally constituted authorities or ruling circles of the country, of the people, or the country in general.

## INFORMATION SOURCE

ORIGINAL SOURCE: COLS. 48 - 49

IMMEDIATE SOURCE: COLS. 50 - 51

<u>INFORMATION SOURCE</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Newspaper	01
Magazine/Journal	02
Pamphlet	03
Poster	04
Leaflet	05
Book	06
Letter	07
Other Members of Illegal Opposition Groups	08
Member of Minority Group	09
Radio (International) i.e., VOA, BBC, Radio Moscow, etc.	10
Radio (Domestic)	11
Commercial Record (Disk) or Tape Recording	12
Named Government Agency or Official Source at National/Provincial Level	13
Anonymous Government Agency or Official Source at National/Provincial Level	14
Worker, Soldier, Farmer, or Other Citizen	15
Film	16
Television	17
News (Wire) Service	18
Significant Public Personality	19
Distinguished Private Citizen	20
Artist or Writer	21
Defector	22
Distinguished Foreign Personality	23

## INFORMATION SOURCE (Cont.)

ORIGINAL SOURCE: COLS. 48 - 40

IMMEDIATE SOURCE: COLS. 50 - 51

<u>INFORMATION SOURCE</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Staff Writer or Reporter or Contributor	24
Foreign Reporter, Correspondent, or Writer	25
Other	26
Head of State	27
Head of Government	28
Foreign Minister/Secretary of State	29
Defense Minister	30
Other Senior Member of Government	31
Member of the Legislature	32
High-ranking Political/Military Leader	33
Political Organization or Committee	34
Member of Legal Opposition Political Party or Group	35
Insurgent Leader	36

NEWS AGENCIES

UPI - United Press International	37
AP - Associated Press	38
Reuters Ltd.	39
AFP - Agence France Presse	40
Tass	41
MENA - Middle East News Agency	42
WAFA - Palestine News Agency	43
Saudi News Agency	44
Syrian News Agency	45
Novosti	46



## INFORMATION SOURCE

ORIGINAL SOURCE: COLS. 48 - 49

IMMEDIATE SOURCE: COLS. 50 - 51

INFORMATION SOURCECODENEWS AGENCIES (Cont.)

Multi News Agency Sources	47
Multi Communist News Agency Sources	48
Multi Non-Communist News Agency Sources	49
Other Arab News Agencies	50

NEWSPAPERS

New York Times	60
Washington Post	61
Christian Science Monitor	62
Los Angeles Times	63
International Herald Tribune	64
Washington Star	65
Al-Ahram	70
Akhbar al-Yom	71
An-Nahar	72
Al-Hayat	73
Le Monde	76
Nouvel Observateur	77
Pravda	80
Izvestia	81
Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star)	82
Times (London)	84
Guardian	85

## INFORMATION SOURCE (Cont.)

ORIGINAL SOURCE: COLS. 48 - 49

IMMEDIATE SOURCE: COLS. 50 - 51

INFORMATION SOURCECODEMAGAZINES

Newsweek	87
Time	88
US News and World Report	89
Die Welt	90
Der Spiegel	91

RADIO

Voice of America	94
Radio Cairo	95
Radio Moscow	98
BBC - British Broadcasting Company	99

PRESENTATION  
COL. 52

<u>PRESENTATION</u>	<u>CODE</u>
News Article	1
Analytical Article	2
Questions and Answers	3
Letters or items to the Editor	4
Editorial	5
Speech or Press Conference	6
Telegram or Congratulatory Message	7
Communique	8

ORIGIN OF STATEMENT  
COL. 53ORIGIN OF STATEMENTCODE

Interview	1
Press Conference	2
Congressional Testimony or Debate	3
Proposed Bill (or Amendment to Bill) before Congress	4
Speech, Lecture	5
Congressional Hearings	6
Communique	7



DISPLAY COL. 54	
<u>DISPLAY</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Banner Headline (a headline extending across the full width of the page)	1
Major Headline (a headline extending over at least two columns)	2
Minor Headline (a headline over a single column)	3
Box	4
Special Edition	5
Other - Major	6
Other - Minor	7

TYPE OF EQUIPMENT	
COLS. 59 - 60	
<u>TYPE OF EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Aircraft - Bomber	01
Aircraft - Fighter/F.B./Attack	02
Civic Action	03
Aircraft - Helicopter	04
Aircraft - Reconnaissance	05
Aircraft - General	06
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)	07
Missile - General	08
Other Naval	09
Armor	10
Artillery	11
Destroyer	12
Cruiser	13
Submarine	14
Other	15
Aircraft Carrier	16
Helicopter Carrier	17
Non Lethal (Trucks, Jeeps), Electronic Equip.	18
Small Arms/Ammunition/FOS	19
Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM)	20
Air-to-Surface Missile (ASM)	21
Air-to-Air Missile (AAM)	22
Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM)	23
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)	24
Precision-Guided Munition (PGM)	25

TYPE OF EQUIPMENT (Cont.)  
COLS. 59 - 60

<u>TYPE OF EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM)	26
Electronic Counter Measures (ECM)	27
Training (Unspecified)	28
Training - CONUS	29
Training - In Country	30
Satellite	31

QUESTIONS: COLS. 61 - 68

Theme	Question 1 Cols. 61 - 62	Question 2 Cols. 63 - 64	Question 3 Cols. 65 - 66	Question 4 Cols. 67 - 68
11-12-13	01 Naval Visit	01 Military Visit	01 Other Ceremonial Acts	01 Political Visit
21-22-23	01 Quality	.01 Quantity		
26-27-28	01 Civilian 02 Military 03 Civilian and Military 04 Unknown	01 To Train 02 To Sell 03 To Conduct Surveillance 04 To Perform Various Activities, Including Training 05 Combat		
31-32-33 And 37-38-39	01 Space 02 Air 03 Land 04 Water	01 Strat. Nuclear Forces 02 Other Strat. Forces 03 Tactical Nuclear Forces 04 Mil. Expenditures 05 Nuclear Submarine 06 ICBM 07 Nuclear Warhead 08 SLBM 09 Multiple Warhead 10 Other Missile 11 Armor 12 Artillery 13 Aircraft Carrier 14 Nuclear Aircraft Carrier 15 Bomber 16 Fighter 17 Other Aircraft 18 Naval Vessels - General	01 Firepower 02 Precision 03 Speed 04 Distance 05 Thrust 06 Logistics 07 Warhead	01 Lag Mentioned 02 No Lag Mentioned



QUESTIONS: COLS. 61 - 68 (Cont.)

Theme	Question 1 Cols. 61 - 62	Question 2 Cols. 63 - 64	Question 3 Cols. 65 - 66	Question 4 Cols. 67 - 68
41-42-43	01 Air Base 02 Naval Base 03 Army Base 04 Intelligence Base 05 Missile Base 06 Multiple Purpose Base	01 U.S. 02 Multinational 03 Soviet 04 British	01 Indirect Actor Supports 02 Indirect Actor Opposes/denies	01 Target Agrees/Approves/Accepts 02 Target Denies/(declares untrue) opposes
61-62-63	01 Maneuver 02 Game 03 Exercise 04 Force Movement (Deployment)	01 Air 02 Land 03 Sea 04 Air/Land 05 Air/Sea 06 Land/Sea 07 Air/Land/Sea	01 Crisis Time 02 Not a Crisis Time	01 North America 02 Central America/Carib. 03 South America 04 Atlantic 05 Pacific 06 Mediterranean 07 Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf 08 Europe 09 Middle East
67-68-69	01 U.S. Private 02 U.S. Government 03 U.S. Private and Government or Unspecified 04 Soviet	Use Theme Category Codes in Cols. 5-6		
71-72-73	01 Indirect Actor Supports 02 Indirect Actor Opposes/denies			
81-82-83	01 Executive Debate 02 Executive-Legis- lative Debate 03 Legislative Debate	Use Same Codes as for Cols. 59-60 for Additional Types of Equipment, if Needed.		

## QUESTIONS: COLS. 61 - 68 (Cont.)

THEME	Question 1 Cols. 61 - 62	Question 2 Cols. 63 - 64	Question 3 Cols. 65 - 66	Question 4 Cols. 67 - 68
94-95-96	01 Recommendation 02 Observation 03 Projection 04 Reflection 05 01 and 03 06 01 and 02 07 02 and 03 08 02 and 04	01 Strat. Nuclear Forces 02 Other Strat. Forces 03 Tactical Nuclear Forces 04 Mil. Expenditures/ Budget 05 Nuclear Submarine 06 ICBM 07 Nuclear Warhead 08 SLBM 09 Conventional Forces 10 Production (Quantity/ Rate 11 ABM (Anti Ballistic Missiles)	If Question 2 has more than one category, use Cols. 65 - 68.	

SOVEREIGN STATES AND TERRITORIES  
COLS. 17-19; 26-28; 29-31; 32-34;  
35-37; 45-47

<u>CODE</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>
631	Abu Dhabi
700	Afghanistan
615	Algeria
495	Angola
693	Arab Countries
160	Argentina
010	Atlantic Ocean Islands
900	Australia
305	Austria
045	Bahamas
672	Bahrain
771	Bangladesh
053	Barbados
211	Belgium
080	Belize
145	Bolivia
571	Botswana
141	Brazil
355	Bulgaria
775	Burma
516	Burundi
811	Cambodia
471	Cameroon
020	Canada
482	Central African Republic
483	Chad
155	Chile
710	China, People's Republic of
713	China, Republic of Taiwan

SOVEREIGN STATES AND TERRITORIES (Cont.)  
COLS. 17-19; 26-28; 29-31; 32-34;  
35-37; 45-47

<u>CODE</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>
100	Colombia
484	Congo, Brazzaville
094	Costa Rica
040	Cuba
352	Cyprus
315	Czechoslovakia
434	Dahomey
390	Denmark
042	Dominican Republic
130	Ecuador
651	Egyptian Arab Republic
092	El Salvador
440	Equatorial Guinea
530	Ethiopia
215	Europe (Western)
312	Europe (Eastern)
375	Finland
220	France
481	Gabon
420	The Gambia
265	German Democratic Republic
231	Germany (East-West)
255	Germany, Federal Republic of
452	Ghana
350	Greece
047	Grenada



SOVEREIGN STATES AND TERRITORIES (Cont.)  
COLS. 17-19; 26-28; 29-31; 32-34;  
35-37; 45-47

<u>CODE</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>
090	Guatemala
438	Guinea
110	Guyana
041	Haiti
091	Honduras
720	Hong Kong
310	Hungary
395	Iceland
750	India
795	Indian Ocean and Islands
850	Indonesia
630	Iran
645	Iraq
205	Ireland (North-South)
666	Israel
325	Italy
437	Ivory Coast
051	Jamaica
740	Japan
663	Jordan
501	Kenya
731	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of
732	Korea, Republic of
690	Kuwait

SOVEREIGN STATES AND TERRITORIES (Cont.)  
COLS. 17-19; 26-28; 29-31; 32-34;  
35-37; 45-47

<u>CODE</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>
812	Laos
660	Lebanon
570	Lesotho
450	Liberia
620	Libya
212	Luxembourg
580	Malagasy
553	Malawi
820	Malaysia
782	Maldives, Republic of
432	Mali
338	Malta
435	Mauritania
590	Mauritius
335	Mediterranean Basin
070	Mexico
695	Middle East
712	Mongolia
600	Morocco
921	Nauru, Republic of
790	Nepal
210	Netherlands
920	New Zealand
093	Nicaragua
436	Niger
475	Nigeria
385	Norway

SOVEREIGN STATES AND TERRITORIES (Cont.)  
COLS. 17-19; 26-28; 29-31; 32-34;  
35-37; 45-47

<u>CODE</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>
745 698	Okinawa (Ryukyu Islands) Oman, Sultanate of
950	Pacific Islands
770	Pakistan
662	Palestine (pre 1948)
095	Panama
150	Paraguay
691	Persian Gulf
675	Persian Gulf States
135	Peru
840	Philippines
290	Poland
235	Portugal
043	Puerto Rico
632	Qatar
552	Rhodesia
360	Romania
517	Rwanda
331	San Marino
670	Saudi Arabia
433	Senegal
451	Sierra Leone
830	Singapore
520	Somali Republic
560	South Africa
230	Spain
780	Sri Lanka
625	Sudan

SOVEREIGN STATES AND TERRITORIES (Cont.)  
COLS. 17-19; 26-28; 29-31; 32-34;  
35-37; 45-47

<u>CODE</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>
003	Superpowers
111	Surinam
572	Swaziland
380	Sweden
225	Switzerland
652	Syria
510	Tanzania, United Republic of
800	Thailand
461	Togo
052	Trinidad and Tobago
616	Tunisia
640	Turkey
500	Uganda
365	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
673	United Arab Emirates
200	United Kingdom
002	United States of America
439	Upper Volta
165	Uruguay
101	Venezuela
816	Vietnam, Democratic Republic of
817	Vietnam, Republic of
044	Virgin Islands (U.S.)
990	Western Samoa



SOVEREIGN STATES AND TERRITORIES (Cont.)  
COLS. 17-19; 26-28; 29-31; 32-34;  
35-37; 45-47

<u>CODE</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>
678	Yemen Arab Republic
671	Yemen People's Democratic Republic (Aden)
345	Yugoslavia
551	Zambia
490	Zaire Republic

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND  
POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

699	Arab League
400	CENTO
396	NATO
996	OAPEC (Organ. of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries)
993	OPEC (Organ. of Petroleum Exporting Countries)
697	PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization)
399	UN
394	Warsaw Pact
397	European Common Market